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January 10, 1996
To the President and the Congress:
The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation submits to you its third
report, Defining Federal and State Roles in Unemployment Insurance, in accordance with the provisions of Section 908 of the Social Security Act, as amended by
the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-164).
This report completes the Council's review of the nation's Unemployment
Insurance (UI) system. We have examined the program carefully and have, I
believe, produced a series of thoughtful and comprehensive reports and recommendations on the most crucial issues facing the system. We have held public
hearings in many parts of the country and have considered the views of workers
and employers, as well as those of state and federal government officials.
We believe that our analysis of the Unemployment Insurance system is particularly relevant to the cutTent national debate over federal-state roles in program design and execution. The Unemployment Insurance program is one of the
oldest federal-state programs, and it has been one of the most successful examples of partnership between the federal government and the states. Because of the
importance of this successful partnership, we have reviewed the system's governing structure to develop a coherent, rational basis for defining the future roles
of the federal and state governments in the UI program. We believe this conceptual framework can provide insights for the realignment of governing structures
for other programs as well.
In the course of examining federal and state roles, we documented several
fundamental problems in the Unemployment Insurance system, and have made
recommendations to cotTect them. We have found, for example, that competitive
pressures among the states have at times reduced the solvency of their
Unemployment Insurance trust funds, and we have made a series of recommendations to ensure the forward funding of state programs. Further, we have found
that these funding problems have frequently resulted in restrictions on worker
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eligibility for benefits and that these restrictions have often had a disproportionately adverse effect on low-wage and part-time workers.
The Council proposes several changes to address these problems. In addition,
in order to put the programs in all states on a more equal footing, we favor an
increase in the base wage for tax purposes to $9,000, with future alignment to the
change in average wages, and the elimination of the special temporary 0.2 percent federal administrative tax enacted some years ago.
The Council made a number of recommendations in its first two reports. We
believe that those, together with the recommendations in this report, will modernize the Unemployment Insurance program and improve the efficiency and
equity with which it operates.
My colleagues on the Council and I have appreciated the opportunity to share
our views on the Unemployment Insurance system with you. We hope that the
findings and recommendations produced by the Council will provide accurate,
insightful, and useful information to policymakers for years to come.
Sincerely,

Janet L. Norwood
Chair
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Preface

IN NOVEMBER 1991, THE CONGRESS of the United States passed the Emergency
Unemployment Compensation Act (P.L. 102-164). The act included a section
that created the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation, which
was charged with the task of evaluating "the unemployment compensation
program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding of State administrative
costs, administrative efficiency, and any other aspects of the program and to
make recommendations for improvement."
The Advisory Council is made up of eleven members, who represent the
interests of business, labor, state governments, and the public. Five of the
members are appointed by the President, three are appointed by the Senate,
and three by the House of Representatives.
In carrying out its mandate to evaluate and analyze the Unemployment
Insurance system, the Advisory Council has relied on diverse sources of
information. It received regular briefing materials from its staff, and held a
series of public hearings across the country so that interested individuals and
organizations might present their views. In addition, the Council convened a
number of academic conferences to facilitate the exchange of ideas and the
presentation of research work on the subject of unemployment insurance.
The latter forums included two economic research conferences (in August
1994 and August 1995), and a legal symposium (in March 1995) sponsored
jointly with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
This report, the Council's third and final, has two sections. Section I presents the Council's findings and recommendations on the subject of federal and
state roles in the Unemployment Insurance system. Section II contains a broad,
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background discussion of issues related to the roles of the federal and state governments and the administration of the Unemployment Insurance system.
The chapters in Section II include both original research and syntheses of
existing information. The primary authors of Section II are Laurie J. Bassi,
Amy B. Chasanov, Stacey G. Grundman, Eileen Cubanski, and Daniel P.
McMurrer. The section of Chapter 8 describing the results of the appeals case
studies was written by Anne L. Gallagher and Sarah P. Ralph.
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SECTION I

fiNDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1 / Introduction

THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION submits this final
report to the President and Congress in the midst of an ongoing debate about
the distribution of responsibilities and powers between the federal government and state governments. A similar debate has occurred throughout the
history of the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program, which was created
under Title III of the Social Security Act of 1935.
The Council has been mindful of developments during its final year of
deliberations. Its work over the past year has revealed both opportunities and
perils associated with the types of shifts in federal and state responsibilities
and powers that are under way. It is certainly possible to improve the efficiency of important government programs, and in many ways, the UI program can provide a useful model in this regard. At the same time, however,
the Council's research (summarized in Chapter 4 of this report) indicates a
basis for concern that competitive pressures among the states to attract and
retain business will lead to a continued deterioration in the percentage of the
unemployed who receive benefits.
Earlier research conducted by the Council showed that this phenomenon
disproportionately affects low-wage workers. When states experience a trust
fund solvency problem, they often tighten their eligibility requirements.
Furthermore, at times the federal government has created incentives that
have had the effect of causing states to restrict eligibility for the program.
Both of these developments have had a disproportionate effect on low-wage
workers. Recommendations in the Council's 1995 report suggested a number
of changes that would address these problems.

3
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The final year of the Council's deliberations on the Unemployment
Insurance system focused on methods that could be used to rationalize federal-state relations within that system, thereby contributing to improvements
in the administration of the program. In brief, the Council finds that in some
critical respects, the states face political and fiscal pressures to restrict their
UI programs in a fashion which undercuts important national interests. In
other respects, the states are subjected to detailed federal oversight which
does not fully reflect the administrative capabilities of state agencies. The
findings and recommendations resulting from the Council's deliberations are
summarized in Chapter 2, and should be considered together with the findings and recommendations that the Council presented in its first and second
annual reports. (See Appendices E and F in this volume for the 1994 and
1995 Findings and Recommendations, respectively.)
The Council is of the view that many important questions about how best
to administer the nation's UI system can be resolved by establishing a coherent, rational basis for defining the role of both the federal and state governments in the system. This report's findings and recommendations are
derived from a conceptual framework that builds upon the insights of both
political science and economics. This framework is based on the premise
that the federal government's role should be limited to those areas of policy
that meet two criteria: (1) an essential national interest exists; and (2) states'
interests may diverge from those national interests. Responsibilities for
those areas of policy that do not meet both of these criteria should reside
with the state governments, and federal oversight in these areas should be
reduced or eliminated.
The recommendations that follow from this framework suggest important
ways in which the U.S. Department of Labor could most effectively exercise
its responsibilities in administering the Unemployment Insurance program,
while simultaneously honoring the shared responsibilities and powers of the
federal and state partners. The implications of the report's conceptual framework can also be applied to programs other than the Unemployment
Insurance program.
ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

Section I of this report includes two chapters. Following this introduction,
Chapter 2 presents the current findings and recommendations of the
Advisory Council. Section II, comprising Chapters 3 through 9, then offers
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more detailed explorations of a number of Unemployment Insurance issues
related to the findings and recommendations.
Beginning the second section, Chapter 3 addresses the issue of federalstate relations in the Unemployment Insurance system. Chapter 4 discusses
the overall evolution of the system, focusing on some of the components of
the system that have changed over time and exploring a number of potential
explanations for those changes.
Issues in the financing of Unemployment Insurance are addressed in
Chapter 5. The use of performance standards is the topic of Chapter 6, and
experience rating is addressed in Chapter 7. Issues in nonmonetary determinations, denials, and appeals are discussed in the final two chapters, with
Chapter 8 focusing on trends in those areas, and Chapter 9 focusing on an
analysis of those trends.
The appendices of the report present the following information: a discussion of technical issues in the analyses contained in Chapters 4 and 9 of this
report, background tables and figures on financing and benefit issues, the
1994 and 1995 findings and recommendations of the Council, the charter of
the Council, and information regarding the calendar and public hearings of
the Council.
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2 / Findings and
Recommendations

THE NATION'S UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE system is based on the sharing of
responsibilities between the federal government and the state governments.
The Council finds that this framework, which has evolved over 60 years,
could be made more effective by implementing changes based on a refined
understanding of the appropriate division of responsibilities between the
federal and state partners. This finding leads the Council to a formulation
of the following statement of federal-state responsibilities in Unemployment Insurance.

1. Federal-State Responsibilities in Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment Insurance is a federal-state system of shared responsibilities and powers. These powers and responsibilities should be shared
in the most effective possible manner. Whenever appropriate, state
governments should assume broad responsibilities for determining the
elements of their Unemployment Insurance programs. The federal government should assume responsibility primarily in those areas in which
both an essential national interest exists and states' interests may
diverge from those national interests.
The fundamental objective of the system is the provision of insurance in the form of temporary, partial wage replacement to workers
experiencing involuntary unemployment. Federal involvement in this
area should limit that competition among states on the basis of
Unemployment Insurance costs that undermines the integrity of the
system and the capacity of the program to insure workers adequately.
A second objective of the system is the accumulation of adequate funds
7
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during periods of economic health, thereby promoting economic stability by maintaining consumer purchasing power during economic
downturns. The achievement of these fundamental purposes, which
serve the national interest and transcend the interests of any individual
state, require federal oversight and action.
FEDERAL-STATE INTERACTIONS
Federal Responsibility in Areas of Essential National Interest

As noted above, there are two primary areas of essential national interest that
may diverge from state interests: the provision of adequate insurance to
workers throughout the country and macroeconomic stabilization. The program's capacity to meet these two fundamental objectives first depends upon
the existence of state DI programs, and second, requires the proper functioning of a number of specific program components, each of which can be eroded through the dynamics of interstate competition. The components are enumerated in this section and are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this report.
The Council finds evidence that escalating competition among some
states to attract and retain business may result in DI tax rates that are lower
than they would be without this competition (see Chapter 4 of this report).
Reduced state DI taxes frequently result in tightened eligibility standards,
which adversely and disproportionately affect low-wage workers. In addition, tax competition could result in reductions in benefit levels or in diminished access to services.
Consequently, to ensure the achievement of the first national objectivethe provision of temporary, partial wage replacement to workers experiencing involuntary unemployment-the federal government should act to prevent any potentially destructive consequences mising from interstate competition. Thus, there are two primary areas in which federal involvement is necessary-minimum eligibility and benefit levels, and access to services.
To assure the achievement of the second national objective-the countercyclical stabilization of the national economy-a unified national strategy is
required. Thus, it is the responsibility of the federal government to take
action, as necessary, to preserve the four components that enable the program
to stabilize the economy during periods of economic downturn. The four
components follow. First, state programs should be forward-funded with
independent trust funds in order to ensure that the DI system as a whole has
the capacity to inject additional money into the economy during recessions
and in order to reduce the need to raise taxes during economic downturns.
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Second, state UI benefit levels should be high enough and should be paid to
a large enough percentage of the involuntarily unemployed to support efficient economic stabilization efforts. Third, the capacity must exist to monitor and analyze national and local labor market conditions consistently and
quickly. Fourth, any supplemental mechanism for stabilization (for example,
Extended Benefits or contingency administrative funding during times of
unusually high unemployment) should be maintained and coordinated at the
national level.
Thus, to protect essential national interests, the federal government must
take responsibility for protecting specific components of the DI program
when autonomous state action might adversely affect the national interest. To
preserve the components discussed above, federal involvement is necessary
in the seven areas listed in Recommendation 2. In each of these areas, federal requirements should be as clear and as simple as possible.

2. Recommendation
To preserve national interests in the UI system, the federal government
should take an active role in the following areas: (1) ensuring the existence of a UI system in each state; (2) promoting the forward funding
of the system; (3) monitoring and coordinating the collection of information on labor market conditions; (4) promoting economic stability
by maintaining supplemental benefit programs that trigger on automatically during recessions, thereby avoiding the need for costly federal emergency benefits; (5) coordinating the efficient pooling of risk
by making loans available to states experiencing prolonged recessions;
(6) assuring that all workers with a given level of attachment to the
work force are eligible for a minimum level of benefits; and (7) promoting quality and efficiency in program outcomes.

Federal Oversight in Other Areas
While taking a role in the areas listed in Recommendation 2, the federal government should avoid involvement in program areas in which essential
national interests are not at stake. Indeed, in these areas, the federal government should take steps to encourage state experimentation and to enhance
state flexibility. Program details in such areas are better left to the discretion
of the states, which function more efficiently as "laboratories of democracy"
and which may be able to provide better service to their citizens. Thus, federal involvement should exist primarily in those areas in which there are
essential national interests at stake.
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A number of current federal laws, federal regulations, and federal oversight functions affecting VI do not meet these criteria and should therefore
be repealed or discontinued. Included are the following: requirements that
the states must disqualify certain categories of workers (for example, professional athletes and school employees who are between terms) and reduce
unemployed workers' VI benefits if they receive certain other types of
retirement income; standards that the states must meet in order to qualify for
full Extended Benefits funding (for example, the imposition of a waiting
week for benefits and requirements that recipients meet stricter definitions
of continuing eligibility); and a variety of oversight functions which are discussed below.
3. Recommendation
Federal requirements that states disqualify certain categories of workers (for example, professional athletes and school employees who are
between terms) should be repealed.
4. Recommendation
Federal requirements that certain types of workers' retirement income
offset UI benefits should be repealed.
5. Recommendation
Federal requirements that states meet certain standards in order to
receive full funding for Extended Benefits should be repealed.

ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES
Measurement of Performance Outcomes

Performance measures within the UI system should focus on program outcomes rather than on program processes, since the latter are within the
purview of the states. In addition, performance requirements should be confined to areas in which there is both an essential national interest and a potential divergence of national and state interests. There is no need to monitor
program inputs or state performance in areas in which state and national
interests coincide. Moreover, these areas involve program processes rather
than program outcomes, which, as stated, should be the responsibility of the
states. Some of these areas, including aspects of benefit payment and revenue
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collection, are currently regulated by elaborate federal quality control programs (see Chapters 5 and 6).
By selecting only essential measures of performance outcomes, the federal government would underscore the importance of state performance on
those particular measures. Currently, the relative importance of various outcomes may be obscured by the large number of performance measurements
required of the states. Further, the elimination of unnecessary performance
measures should reduce state administrative burdens considerably and would
ensure that available resources were dedicated to achieving the outcomes
identified as most essential to the functioning of the system. Finally, the
selection of clear and easily measured outcomes would promote a better
understanding of the Unemployment Insurance system.
The federal government should, however, require the measurement of
performance outcomes in essential program areas in which national and state
interests may diverge. Some such areas are not currently subject to performance measurement, including forward funding and the ease of claimants'
access to the system, which is discussed below.
The Council is aware of the efforts of the Performance Enhancement
Work Group, which consists of representatives from the state employment
security agencies (SESAs) and the U.S. Department of Labor. This group has
been working since 1993 to improve the performance of the ill system by
improving the measurement of performance within the system. While this
collaborative effort is commendable, additional work needs to be done on the
fundamental issues of forward funding and access to the system.
The Council finds that there would be benefit in undertaking a more fundamental re-engineering of UI performance measurement. Such an effort
should be based on careful consideration of the basic objectives of the UI
program. Required performance measures, as well as the reports on UI that
the U.S. Department of Labor requires of the states, should be designed to
ensure that the basic objectives of the system are achieved.
The Council finds that four principles should be applied in shaping an
appropriate set of outcomes to be measured within the Unemployment
Insurance system. First, the measures should reflect the fundamental purposes of the Unemployment Insurance system. Second, perfonnance measures
should focus on the system's outcomes, rather than on the amount of input or
the processes by which outcomes are achieved. Third, those measures of performance outcomes that are identified as essential should be as clear and
simple as possible. Fourth, the application of these measures of performance
should ensure equity in the treatment of both claimants and employers.
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6. Recommendation
The federal priority in the area of performance measurement should be
to ensure that required performance measures emphasize the essential
national interests of the UI system. The national interests that could be
influenced by the system of performance measurement, but that are
not currently incorporated in it, include forward funding and access to
the system.
The current federal emphasis on benefit quality control measures is
excessive and should be reduced, because ensuring that benefits are not overpaid should be a state rather than a federal responsibility. Similarly, ensuring
that VI taxes are collected when they are due is a state responsibility that can
be accomplished with minimal federal oversight. Given that employers' tax
rates form a critical part of the nation's statistical system, some federal oversight in this regard is appropriate.

7. Recommendation
In cooperation with the u.s. Department of Labor, states should develop, monitor, and report their own measures of the quality of their procedures for UI benefit payment and revenue collection, using generally accepted accounting principles and auditing standards.

8. Recommendation
The u.s. Department of Labor should work in partnership with the states
to develop measures of access to the UI system. These measures should
include but should not necessarily be limited to the ease with which individuals can apply for benefits and the extent to which individuals with a
substantial attachment to the labor force are eligible for benefits.
Factors to be considered in developing measures of the ease with
which individuals can apply for benefits should include the following:
(1) whether information that clearly explains the application process is
readily available, (2) how much time is required to complete the application process, and (3) whether it is possible to apply for benefits in languages commonly spoken by those who are served by the program.
Factors that should be considered in developing measures of access
to the UI system include whether individuals with a substantial work
history are excluded for any of the following reasons: (1) they have
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worked in seasonal jobs, (2) their wages are low, (3) their most recently completed quarter of wages was not included in measuring their
monetary eligibility, (4) they quit their job for legitimate family-related
reasons, (5) they are unable to accommodate an employer's change in
job conditions, (6) they are seeking part-time work, or (7) they are
unable to accept shift work.
Inadequate or incomplete information about the UI claims or appeals
processes among some claimants may have the effect of restricting their
access to the DI system. Similarly, a lack of information or understanding
among some employers may result in their being charged for illegitimate
claims, resulting in higher UI taxes. In its 1995 report, the Council recommended that states distribute an information packet on eligibility requirements to unemployed individuals. Additional state efforts would also help
guarantee that all parties interact equitably-"on a level playing field"within the DI system. These efforts should be directed at ensuring that
claimants and employers enter the system with a common understanding of
the nature of relevant proceedings.
9. Recommendation

Each state should establish a mechanism, such as an ombudsman's
office, to provide claimants or employers with any requested information on procedures or requirements in the claims or appeals processes.
10. Recommendation

The federal guarantee of a fair hearing should be interpreted to include
the unrestricted right of appeals participants to representation of their
own choosing. Each state should provide clear notice of this right to all
claimants and employers.
11. Recommendation

Each state should provide information to claimants and employers on
available sources of advice or advocacy assistance.
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Data Needs and Reporting Requirements
Throughout its long history, the UI program has produced a vast amount of
information. These UI data are used for a variety of purposes, such as administering the UI program itself, facilitating its interaction with other federal
and state programs, and contributing information to the nation's statistical
system. For example, the ill tax records and data collected by the states to
determine labor force attachment and the earnings of workers cover most of
the nation's business establishments and almost all of the nation's workers.
These data constitute a large body of administrative information about the
labor market and are therefore extraordinarily important.
Individual states use UI information to operate the program, to evaluate
efficiencies, and to conduct research on UI issues. The federal ill Service
uses the data to monitor the work of the states, to carry out ill research, to
administer the system, and to ensure that federal UI program standards have
been met. In addition, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the statistical
arm of the U.S. Department of Labor, relies on the state employment and
earnings reports for survey benchmarks, and it uses the UI tax records to
form the universe of business establishments for sample surveys.
In spite of these varied uses, little systematic attention has been given to
the comparability, accuracy, and completeness of this rich data source.
Indeed, the Council frequently found it impossible to obtain comparable state
data for analyzing many of the questions it addressed. Further, only occasional attention has been given to the format, editing standards, uniformity of
data definition, completeness, and ease of computerized access to the base of
information that flows from the UI system.
These conditions are not surprising. Until recently, the informational
value of administrative data was not universally recognized. Few have understood the need for the precision and quality control that distinguish a statistical database for research purposes from a program database that ensures the
delivery of services. Today, data are increasingly used to monitor the economy and to evaluate public policy, and the value of administrative program
records as an efficient and cost-effective source of information with minimal
need for additional reporting burden cannot be overlooked. To allow fuller
utilization of this resource, the quality and comparability of these administrative data should be improved.
Congress has already taken some steps to meet this need. In 1992, it
required the BLS to determine procedures for creating a national longitudinal wage record database with information on earnings, establishment and
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industry classification, and geographic location of employment for all workers covered by the ill system. This improved database will be extremely
valuable for research, program evaluation, and statistical purposes.
Nor should other survey-based sources of data about the UI system be
overlooked. The BLS-sponsored Current Population Survey (CPS) provides
a rich body of infonnation about the U.S. labor force, employment, and
unemployment. The UI Service, which has occasionally sponsored special
supplements of the CPS, should develop a careful plan for regular periodic
supplements to collect detailed information on UI recipients.
Another important survey source of data used for ill research is the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) , conducted by the
Bureau of the Census. The SIPP provides an important longitudinal database
that includes workers who receive UI benefits, as well as those who participate in other federal and state-sponsored programs. While the SIPP provides
much important information about the behavior of UI recipients that is not
available elsewhere, many researchers find it unwieldy and extremely difficult to use. It is important that SIPP data be made more accessible.
In summary, the Council finds a need for a systematic and comprehensive
system of administrative and survey data about the UI program for use in the following areas: (1) analytical research on the program's outcomes, (2) development of improvements in the program's conceptual design, and (3) enhancement of the country's understanding of the labor market behavior of workers and
employers covered by the program. In addition, there is significant need to
improve the quality and timeliness of the ill tax reports, which fonn the universe
for sample selection and the benchmark for many of the nation's most important
statistical series. The Council finds that the federal government should be
responsible for the design and oversight of a comprehensive UI infonnation
system consisting of administrative and survey-based data that are comparable
among all states.

12. Recommendation
The u.s. Department of Labor's Unemployment Insurance Service, with
advice from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, should design the elements
of a comprehensive information system of UI data that are comparable
in definition and format for all states. Some of the elements that should
be included are data on (1) coverage and eligibility by earnings level and
by type of worker; (2) the elements of labor market attachment; (3) the
levels and duration of benefits paid; (4) the extent and causes of non-
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monetary disqualifications; (5) labor market information at the national, state, and local levels; (6) the extent of forward funding of state trust
funds; and (7) the quality, efficiency, and cost of program administration
at both the federal and state levels. Each state should maintain its database in accordance with U.S. Department of Labor requirements so that
statistical standards, definitional comparability, and easy computer
access for all users can be maintained.
13. Recommendation
The U.S. Department of Labor's Unemployment Insurance Service
should continue to plan and sponsor biennial supplements to the
Current Population Survey on UI issues.
14. Recommendation
Because of the importance of the quarterly report on employment and
wages (the ES-202 report) to the measurement of the national income
and product accounts, and because of the importance of UI tax records
to the nation's system of sample surveys, the accuracy and statistical
quality of these reports must be improved. Giving consideration to
costs, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, with advice from the
Unemployment Insurance Service, should establish standard procedures that states should follow regarding the development of these
data; establish magnetic-media format standards for computer compatibility and accessibility; and establish minimum requirements for
editing, data quality, and timeliness.
15. Recommendation
As required by law, the Bureau of Labor Statistics should continue its
work on the development of a National Wage Record Database. The
Bureau should develop rules to protect the confidentiality of those
workers and business establishments included in the database for purposes of research and evaluation. Congress should provide legal protection to ensure this confidentiality.
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Administrative Funding
The Council finds that the nation's Unemployment Insurance system is
subject to downward pressure because of the forces of interstate competition. It is imperative that the federal government exercise leadership to
ameliorate these pressures. An important arena for such leadership concerns the method by which the federal government allocates funds under
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) to the states for administering
the UI system. Indeed, the critical importance of efficient administration
was cited by the Committee on Economic Security in 1935 as the reason
for originally assigning the cost of state administration of the UI program
to the federal government.
The mechanism for allocating FUTA funds to the states for administrative
purposes should be as simple as possible, and should provide incentives to
promote efficiency and quality in state administration. As currently constructed, however, the system of allocating administrative funds contains no
such incentives. Funding levels are based roughly on the expected claims
workload, on measures of time (generally based on manual processing) for
administrative tasks, and on overhead costs. Under this formula, states with
higher costs receive higher levels of reimbursements.
More importantly, the formula provides no direct link between administrative funds and improvements in performance, and there are no overall
quality measures related to funding decisions. In the Council's view, states
that provide better services to claimants and employers by improving quality and efficiency should receive financial rewards for doing so. This might
be achieved through a number of mechanisms, including the tying of
administrative funding levels to state performance in certain essential areas
and increasing the federal government's use of challenge or innovation
grants to states.
The Council finds that the appropriation of administrative funding on the
basis of predicted workloads, reflecting economic conditions and increases in
operating costs, is the method that best serves the needs of claimants,
employers, and state agencies for reliable and predictable levels of administrative funding. These appropriations should be automatically adjusted to
cover the costs of increased workload for claims above the predicted level.
The Council affirms its concern that adequate amounts of dedicated FUTA
payroll tax revenues be made available to state agencies and to the U.S.
Department of Labor for their intended uses, and that appropriations of these
funds not be limited by budgetary factors external to the VI system.
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16. Recommendation
Congress should appropriate FUTA trust funds in amounts adequate to
fund state and federal UI activities on the basis of workload predictions
using economic factors, with a contingency reserve provision to cover
the costs of increased workloads arising during a fiscal year.

17. Recommendation
In order to support automation, development of one-stop services,
and improvements in customer services, added state administrative
funds beyond those needed for base funding should be provided
through innovation grants by the U.S. Department of Labor.

18. Recommendation
The U.S. Department of Labor should promptly review its current
reporting and oversight requirements, in consultation with the states,
and should reduce or eliminate requirements in areas in which state
and national interests are not in conflict or in which federal responsibilities are not directly related to a requirement.

19. Recommendation
States should be given greater flexibility to identify employers for tax
auditing. As an incentive for more effective auditing, the federal government should permit states to retain 50 percent of any FUTA revenues that are generated through state's redirected auditing activities.

EXPERIENCE RATING AND FUNDING
As the Council noted in its second annual report, the Unemployment Insurance system's capacity to achieve one of its fundamental purposes-promoting economic stability-rests on two key aspects of its funding mechanism. First, the funding of the system is "experience rated"-that is, employers who have been responsible for greater demands on the system pay higher taxes and consequently bear a greater share of the system's costs. Second,
during periods of prosperity, the system accumulates reserves that are then
spent during periods of economic decline.
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Empirical evidence indicates that experience rating helps discourage temporary layoffs, thereby lowering the overall level of unemployment. In addition, the evidence suggests that experience-rated taxes are more effective
than are flat taxes in influencing employer behavior in this regard. This may
be because experience-rated taxes are borne primarily by employers, whereas flat taxes are more easily passed on indirectly to employees or to consumers. By assigning a greater share of the costs of the system to employers
responsible for greater demands on it, a system of experience rating allocates
costs more equitably among employers. Finally, experience rating gives
employers an interest in ensuring that benefits are paid only to individuals
who meet the program's eligibility criteria.
Some members of the Council are concerned, however, with a number of
aspects of the experience-rating system. First, such a system often imposes
costs on firms precisely when they are in the weakest economic position.
Second, under a system of experience rating, some employers might make
excessive use of the appeals system. There is evidence that employers'
appeals rates have increased in recent years and that they are losing a higher
percentage of the appeals they file. Finally, the steady decline in the level of
the taxable wage base in real dollars may have the effect of reducing the
degree to which the system is experience-rated and forward-funded.
Given these differing perspectives, the Council makes no recommendation with regard to experience rating within the VI system.
With respect to the second key element of the VI system's funding-the
accumulation of reserves during periods of prosperity--empirical evidence
indicates that, holding all else constant, those states with higher taxable wage
bases have higher VI trust fund reserves. Thus, in order to promote the forward funding of the VI system-a federal responsibility-one of the most
effective mechanisms is to raise the minimum taxable wage base.

20. Recommendation
The federal taxable wage base should be raised to $9,000, with an
accompanying elimination of the two-tenths percentage point FUTA
surcharge. The federal taxable wage base should be adjusted annually
by the Employment Cost Index.*

*Three members of the Council object to the first sentence of Recommendation 20, and five members object to its second sentence.

SECTION II

ISSUES IN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
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3 / Federal and State Interests
and Responsibilities

INTRODUCTION
Federal government [i.e., federalism] stands for multiplicity in unity.
It can provide unity where unity is needed, but it can ensure also that
there is variety and independence in matters where unity and uniformity are not essential ... within this unity there is room under federalism for each region [state] to govern itself in its own way. This
exercise in self-government is sufficiently valuable to be worth the
cost it entails. [Wheare 1964, 244.]
The appropriate assignment of responsibilities to the federal and state governments in the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system has been debated
since the inception of the system six decades ago. This chapter begins by
examining some advantages and disadvantages of a federal-state program
structure and then applies this analysis to the specific case of the UI system.
Two objectives of the UI system that serve essential national interests are
identified, and the pursuit of these objectives is then considered in determining the appropriate division of federal and state program responsibilities. The
analysis ultimately leads to the identification of specific program components that must be in place in order to preserve national interests in the areas
of those two objectives, and the extent to which these interests are currently
protected is discussed.
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SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES IN A FEDERAL-STATE PROGRAM
STRUCTURE
Advantages of Assigning Significant Responsibilities to States
A number of advantages accrue to the nation, to states, and to individual citizens when federal and state governments share responsibilities in a program
such as Unemployment Insurance. In deciding how best to divide such
shared responsibilities among levels of government, it is important to consider "the comparative advantage of each level of government" (Peterson,
1995, 3). For example, among the advantages that derive from the assignment of significant responsibilities to state governments, two are particularly noteworthy. The first is that such assignment may lead to more rapid policy innovation than would otherwise occur. Thus, states can serve as socalled laboratories of democracy (Weaver, 1995,2). In large pmt, this opportunity for more rapid policy innovation and improvement at the state level is
a result of the likelihood that there are fewer barriers to adopting innovations
in at least some state governments than there are at the national level.
Another factor contributing to states' greater capacity for policy innovation
and experimentation is simply the variety and the number of units (namely,
states) within which policy experimentation can occur.
The second noteworthy advantage that occurs from the assignment of significant responsibilities to state governments relates to the ability of states to
respond to local conditions and preferences. In this area, states have the clear
advantage over a national government because they are more aware of local
conditions and can usually respond to them more quickly. In addition, stateby-state policy variations implicitly allow citizens to choose across states
from a variety of tax and service packages. All else being equal, this allows
more citizens to receive the particular policy package that they prefer (see
Weaver 1995).

Disadvantages of Significant State Policymaking Autonomy
It is possible that, under some circumstances, the general advantages of significant state autonomy in policymaking would be either partially or completely offset by other, destructive factors. Such disadvantages would most
likely involve one of the following phenomena, both of which are fundamentally linked to the sharing of policy responsibilities.
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First, there are policy matters in which national interests-that is, desired
policy outcomes that would benefit the country as a whole-may naturally
be hindered when states pursue their own interests through independent policymaking. These are matters in which there is no reason for state and national interests to coincide. If the particular national interest is determined to be
essential-that is, if it transcends state interests-then it may be considered
a matter in which "unity and uniformity" in state policies are indeed considered essential. Some form of national coordination would be necessary to
protect the national interest in such a matter.
Second, the general advantages of state independence in policymaking
may be offset by disadvantages that arise directly from the interstate dynamics inherent in autonomous state policymaking. Prominent among these
structural disadvantages is the tendency for states to be forced onto a policy
path of pernicious interstate competition, which, in its most extreme form,
has been called a "race to the bottom."1 Weaver (1995, 5) describes this
dynamic as "perhaps the most serious risk associated with federalism." In a
benefit program, this path would typically emerge as states responded to
interstate economic competition by taking actions that result in reduced tax
rates. In most cases, such actions ultimately cause reductions in benefit
expenditures. 2 Such actions by a state are directed at attracting or retaining
businesses, but they also create pressures on other, competing states to
reduce their tax rates and associated benefits or services.
As an example of this effect, the overall impact of external economic competition with regard to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program has been described as "a powerful convergence factor that shapes
policy outcomes. If a state's benefits are higher than those of its peers, pressures increase on policymakers to adjust their benefits downward" (Peterson
and Rom 1990, 81). Oates (1972, 225) suggests that this tendency may
increase over time: "Public officials are likely to become increasingly sensitive to tax competition among jurisdictions, which ... will result in less than
efficient levels of output oflocal [state] public services ... inefficiencies associated with decentralized taxation may become magnified over time." Thus,
these pressures are likely to result in gradually increasing erosion of the relevance, efficiency, or vitality of affected government programs. 3
Each state's wish to avoid a position of competitive disadvantage can also
be seen in the focus of state policy considerations for a given program.
Peterson and Rom (1990, 33-35) note that the debate about AFDC in one
state during the 1980s foqused almost exclusively on the "business climate"
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of the state: "In the debate over what the appropriate benefit levels should be,
almost never did one hear moral questions concerning, for example, whether
the poor 'deserve' welfare. Instead, the issues revolved around the consequences for ... economic position." Thus, competitive economic pressures
may channel state policy making efforts in different directions than they
would take if interstate competition were not a factor.

Balancing Responsibilities in a Federal-State Program
Given the considerations discussed above, the federal government needs to
pursue two courses of action simultaneously in order to maximize program
efficiency while also preserving national interests in a given policy area. The
two courses of action are these:
1. It should foster the inherent advantages that accrue from assigning
significant responsibility to the states.
2.

It should seek to minimize or prevent the emergence of phenomena
that may threaten essential national interests.

These joint endeavors would enable structural federal-state advantages and
disadvantages to be balanced as positively and as efficiently as possible. The
balance could be achieved perhaps most simply and directly by providing
for significant state policymaking autonomy in most elements of a given
policy area, but by explicitly limiting state policymaking autonomy in elements in which federal government coordination is necessary to secure basic
national interests.

FEDERAL-STATE ROLES IN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
Throughout its history, the VI program has functioned through the broad
sharing of powers between the federal government and state governments.
Discussing the history of the program, Rubin (1990, 207) states that "unemployment insurance thrived as a hybrid federal-state system. In no other federal program were responsibilities so thoroughly shared between two levels
of government." He goes on to say, however, that "few public programs were
as dependent on intergovernmental cooperation, and few generated as much
intergovernmental discord. Rarely has a public program's organizational
structure had such an important influence on its direction."
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The presumption that the federal government should not intervene except
in matters requiring uniformity has been cited as a foundation of the federalstate governance of the UI system since its beginning. In establishing the
program, Franldin D. Roosevelt's Committee on Economic Security said:
"The States shall have broad freedom to set up the type of unemployment
compensation they wish. We believe that all matters in which uniformity is
not absolutely essential should be left to the states" (quoted in Rubin 1990,
208). Implicit in this statement is a recognition that essential matters requiring uniformity should be regulated by the federal government. As discussed
above, the identification of such essential matters with respect to the
Unemployment Insurance system requires the identification of those program functions (1) in which basic national interests are unlikely to be
achieved through independent state policies, or (2) in which harmful interstate policy dynamics, such as pernicious competition, are likely to develop.

Essential National Interests
In a theoretical examination of federalism, Oates (1972) identifies three fundamental economic functions that he considers to be primary concerns of a
national government: economic stabilization, equitable income redistribution, and the provision of certain public goods (that is, goods or services that
benefit the entire nation but that are unlikely to be provided by state or local
governments). The three functions identified by Oates as national interests
within a structure of federalism relate most directly to two specific functions,
or objectives, of the Unemployment Insurance system: economic stabilization and wage replacement.
Economic Stabilization

The stabilization of the macro economy is an objective of the Unemployment
Insurance system that transcends the interests of each individual state. The
UI system functions as an automatic economic stabilizer in the American
economy by increasing consumption during economic downturns (see, e.g.,
Gruber 1994). The UI system represents one of the nation's largest automatic economic stabilizers.
The statement of purpose for the UI system prepared by the Advisory
Council on Unemployment Compensation enunciates this function: "the system should accumulate adequate funds during periods of economic health in
order to promote economic stability by maintaining consumer purchasing
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power during economic downturns" (ACVC 1995, 8). The national interest
in economic stabilization thus encompasses the economic stabilization function of the VI system-specifically, there is a national interest in maintaining
the capacity of the VI system to provide countercyclical stimulation at an
efficient leve1. 4

Insurance and Wage Replacement
The VI system provides workers with insurance against the risk of involuntary unemployment by replacing a percentage of the wages of eligible unemployed individuals. s The ACVC's statement of purpose for the UI system
cites this as the most fundamental function of the system: "The most important objective of the V.S. system of Unemployment Insurance is the provision of temporary, partial wage replacement as a matter of right to involuntarily unemployed individuals who have demonstrated a prior attachment to
the labor force" (ACUC 1995, 8).
Insurance principles hold that the provision of insurance requires a capacity to pool risks across individuals. 6 Economically efficient levels of insurance and risk pooling cannot be provided when external pressures erode the
mechanisms through which insurance is provided. Indeed, prior to federal
actions in the 1930s that changed existing incentives, pressures against the
provision of such insurance at the state level were so great that only one state,
Wisconsin, provided even limited insurance against unemployment, and voluntary private insurance was extremely limited (Blaustein 1993, 108).7
Overall, therefore, there is a national interest in the federal government's
acting to protect the UI system's function of providing insurance through the
replacement of wages. In the absence of federal action, the insurance nature
of the system is jeopardized, resulting in the inefficient prov,ision of insurance and/or in insurance benefits being unavailable to a large percentage of
the unemployed who are covered.
The Need for Federal Protection of Essential National Interests

As discussed in the previous section, the functioning of the UI system affects
two areas in which there is an essential national interest that requires protection by the federal government. Either the national interests in these areas are
not fully consistent with independent state interests, or they may be threatened
by the pernicious effects of interstate economic competition. Some fmID of
federal government action, such as establishing program standards or creating
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new incentives, represents the only means of assuring that these basic interests are not neglected as states pursue their own interests independently.

Consistency of National and State Interests
The question of the consistency of national and state interests is primarily relevant in regard to the national interest in economic stabilization, where there
is little or no theoretical correlation between national and state interests.
Although the states have no inceh1iVe :fOr-uIldermining the national macroeconomic stabilization function of the UI system, neither have they any
incentive to take action to promote that goal. Oates (1972) suggests that state
governments, left to their own devices, possess neither the capacity nor the
will to achieve any economic stabilization functions effectively.
By its very nature, state policymaking is a function of state and local interests. As such, it bears little, if any, relationship to national interests. Thus,
there is no reason to expect that the outcome of 53 independent sets of policymaking decisions would resemble the system that would most efficiently
stabilize the macroeconomy during periods of recession. "Since [residents of
different states] gain from macroeconomic stability and since their gain is
ignored by individual states when designing their UI systems, individual
states are likely to underprovide benefits" (Davidson and Martin 1995, 8).
Thus, if the UI system is to function efficiently as a national economic stabilizer, significant federal policy coordination is necessary.

Potential for Pernicious Interstate Policy Competition
The impact of interstate policy competition is most relevant with regard to
the national interest in providing insurance through the replacement of
wages. It is this goal that is most likely to be adversely affected by pressures
on states to reduce taxes, including UI taxes. Weaver (1995,9) states that pernicious competition is most likely to develop in circumstances similar to
those that exist in the UI system, where "deviation from the norm ... places
those states at a distinct competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other states with
regard to tax rates." One theoretical analysis suggests that, as a result of interstate economic competition, "inefficiently low levels of UI benefits will be
provided" (Hoyt 1995, 10).
As early as 1935, the Committee on Economic Security recognized the
impact that a UI system would have on a state's business climate. The committee noted that, in the absence of any federal action, competitive business
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advantages would accrue to states that did not have an unemployment insurance program in place: "So long as there is danger that businesses in some
states will gain a competitive advantage through failure of the state to enact
an unemployment insurance law, few such laws will be enacted" (quoted in
Rubin 1990, 209). As a result, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)
was explicitly structured to ensure that a competitive business disadvantage
would result for those states that did not enact a UI program.
Within the structure established by these FUTA provisions, then, competitive business advantages accrue to states in which a UI program exists, but
in which it also costs the least. Costs can be minimized and UI taxes kept low
by restricting eligibility or by paying a low level of benefits. Thus, states
seeking to improve their business climate do have strong incentives to reduce
UI costs relative to other states. Because these circumstances affect all states,
simply by pursuing their own interests, states can inadvertently be drawn into
pernicious competition.
It should also be noted that the external economic pressures for lower
state UI taxes have a direct effect even on states generally disposed toward
maintaining benefit or eligibility levels. All else being equal, if a state
reduced taxes, its neighboring states would have to lower theirs just to stay
at the same relative level of competition. Maintaining the status quo in such
a case would result in the deterioration of a state's competitive position.
TWO AREAS FOR DIRECT FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT
IN THE UI SYSTEM

As discussed, the two primary areas of concern regarding state policymaking
autonomy in the UI system are (1) that efficient economic stabilization cannot be achieved without a coordinated federal policy, and (2) that, given the
nature of the UI system, states could be forced into destructive interstate
competition in the absence of federal coordination, jeopardizing the provision of insurance and the replacement of wages. This section focuses on the
primary components of the Ul system that must be protected in order to preserve essential national interests through UI.
Elements Necessary to Preserve the System's Economic
Stabilization Capacity

To ensure the capacity of the ur system to stabilize the economy during periods of economic downturn, four components should be in place:
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1.

Each state must have an Unemployment Insurance program.

2.

The state programs should be forward-funded with independent trust
funds to ensure that the national ur system has the capacity to inject
additional money into the economy during recessionary periods.

3.

State benefit levels should be high enough to support efficient economic stabilization efforts.

4.

Systems should be in place for monitoring and analyzing labor market conditions, and any existing supplemental fiscal mechanism for
countering national or regional economic downturns (for example,
Extended Benefits or contingency administrative funding) should be
maintained at a national level.

These components are discussed in detail below.
Ensuring the Existence of State VI Programs

For any national goals to be achieved by a federal-state ur system, all of the
states must actually have programs in place. The incentive in FUTA for states
to enact and maintain unemployment insurance laws is the provision that
gives employers a substantial FUTA tax credit if they pay state ur taxes in a
state that meets certain minimum federal standards regarding the state's ur
program. As noted above, before FUTA was passed, all responsibility for providing unemployment insurance had been left to the states, but only
Wisconsin had implemented even a limited system. This same FUTA provision has continued to ensure the existence of ur programs in all states and
has also provided the federal government with powerful leverage for ensuring that the laws of a state continue to adhere to federal guidelines, including
those implemented after the creation of the state's ur program.
Maintaining Forward Funding

The capacity of the ur system for economic stabilization is dependent upon
the extent to which it is forward-funded. Under pay-as-you-go financing,
which prevails today in many state ur systems, few reserves are available to
stimulate the economy when needed because trust funds are not being built
up during periods of economic health. Thus, to secure and strengthen the eco-
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nomic stabilization capacity of the system, either standards or incentives for
states to increase the level of forward funding in the system are necessary.
The ACVC recommended the adoption of such incentives in its 1995 report. 8

Maintaining Benefit Levels
The economic stabilization capacity of the VI system is directly related to the
actual level of VI benefits. The higher the level of benefits paid out, the
greater the stimulus to the economy. Thus, any factors that reduce the levels
of benefits paid to unemployed individuals have a direct impact on the program's stabilization capacity. Many such factors are related to interstate economic competition, and are discussed in the next major section.

Monitoring Labor Market Conditions and Maintaining
Supplemental Stabilization Mechanisms
To ensure the efficiency of any economic stabilization efforts, there must be
systems in place for monitoring and analyzing labor market conditions.
Although states are well suited for monitoring conditions within their borders, national and regional unemployment conditions can be monitored most
efficiently at the national level.
Any supplemental countercyclical mechanisms (such as the Extended
Benefits program) created to address acute labor market conditions at the
national or regional level should also be maintained by the national government. This allows for more efficient stabilization through the pooling of
macroeconomic risk. When reserves are combined, lower levels of total
reserves are required to counter an economic downturn in any given state.
For example, if the economy in one state-say, Colorado-encounters difficulty, reserves collected from other states and deposited in the Extended
Benefits fund can be injected into the Colorado economy. In another year,
funds originating in Colorado may contribute to the stabilization of the economy of another state. For each state to provide this level of protection for
itself independently, state trust fund reserves would have to be much higher
than when risks are pooled across states. Similarly, by providing for federal
contingency funds for administrative expenses, risks can be more efficiently
pooled across states than if each state ran its program in isolation.
For a supplemental system to be effective, the federal government must
ensure that it is funded sufficiently to allow efficient economic stabilization
and stimulation during recessions. There is abundant evidence that the
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Extended Benefits system no longer achieves this function (see ACUC
1994). The ACUC made recommendations in 1994 for reforming this system
(see Appendix E in this volume).
Elements Necessary to Prevent Pernicious Interstate Competition

As discussed, the ultimate effect of interstate economic competition on the UI
program, as currently structured, is likely to be a reduction in UI tax rates. Such
tax rate reductions could come about through reductions in three primary areas:
eligibility standards, benefit levels, and administrative services (for example,
the benefit delivery and appeals systems). At the same time, tax reductions
themselves could necessitate reductions in these areas, as discussed below.

Maintaining Eligibility Standards and Benefit Levels
If a state's tax rates were reduced, in the absence of any other change the state
would ultimately find that its UI expenses also had to be reduced. Since the
vast majority of UI program expenses are benefit payments, the easiest way
to reduce costs would be to restrict eligibility in some way or to reduce benefit payments. Restrictive actions in either area would have the same cost
effect: costs would be reduced. Thus, these two program areas would be
expected to be affected most directly by interstate economic competition. 9
Reductions in either area would also threaten both of the essential national
interests in the UI program. To the extent that benefits or eligibility were
reduced, the economic stabilization capacity of the program would be weakened and the wage replacement function would be eroded.
The most direct means of protecting these two national interests from the
threat brought about by interstate competition would be the imposition of
some form of minimum benefit and eligibility standards, or the establishment
of incentives for states to protect benefit and eligibility levels. Currently, no
such federal standards or incentives exist.

Maintaining Quality Administrative Services
Interstate economic competition can also affect program components either
than benefits or eligibility. Benefit delivery, appeals, and other administrative
services, if left to the states, could be curtailed in an effort to cut UI-related
taxes. Davidson and Martin (1995,5) suggest that "there are a variety of reasons to expect that states would prefer to offer a system of lower quality than
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the Federal government would desire-the interests of the states and the
Federal government are likely to diverge." A recognition of the need to
"encourage efficient administration, without which unemployment insurance
will fail" was cited by the Committee on Economic Security as the primary
reason for assigning the cost of state administrative services to the federal
government (Rubin 1983,26).
Thus, administrative funding responsibility rests at the federal level.
Nonetheless, the quality of services is not necessarily ensured by this arrangement. Davidson and Martin (1995) suggest an alternative system in which
states are permitted to keep any funds that are allocated but unspent, and in
which the federal government measures and rewards quality administration.
CONCLUSIONS: SPECIFIC AREAS FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT

Currently, the federal government partially shapes policy in numerous ill
program areas. Some of these areas, as discussed in the chapter, are related
to the preservation of essential national interests. This discussion identified
specific program areas in which federal policy coordination is likely to be
necessary to protect the economic stabilization and wage replacement functions, even in a UI system where many program responsibilities reside at the
state level. Combining the components necessary for each of the two functions, five general areas can be identified in which state policy alone is
unlikely to protect the fundamental functions of the system: 10
1.

The federal government should ensure the existence of a UI system.
This function is currently carried out fully by the federal government.

2.

The federal government should ensure that the system is forwardfunded. This function is not currently being carried out. (The
Council's recommendations on forward funding from the 1995
ACUC report are reprinted in Appendix F in this volume.)

3.

Thefederal government should monitor labor market conditions and
maintain supplemental UI systems. Currently, the federal government does monitor labor market conditions. Further, a supplemental
benefits program, Extended Benefits, exists, but its effectiveness has
diminished considerably over time. (The Council's recommendations on Extended Benefits from the 1994 ACUC report are reprinted in Appendix E in this volume, and its recommendations on data
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needs in monitoring labor market conditions are presented in
Chapter 2 of this 1996 report.)
4.

The federal government should protect benefit and eligibility levels.
It does not currently carry out this function. (The Council's recom-

mendations on replacement rates-that is, on benefit levels-and on
monetary requirements for establishing eligibility from the 1995
ACUC report appear in Appendix F).
5.

The federal government should ensure quality and efficiency in program administration. It partially carries out this responsibility at the
present time. (The Council's recommendations on this issue are included in Chapter 2 of this 1996 report. The issue is also discussed in
Chapters 5 and 6.)

NOTES
1. Other harmful policy paths that Weaver (1994) suggests may result from federal-state
responsibility sharing are federal-state competition, policy preemption, and evasion of
responsibility. The likelihood that anyone of these paths would be followed is a function
of the characteristics of a specific policy area and relevant institutional an·angements.
Alternatively, circumstances may dictate that other, positive policy paths emerge from
federal-state responsibility sharing. In addition to a general trend toward policy experimentation, innovation, and emulation, positive competition may develop between the federal and state governments, resulting in effOlts to implement policies in a timely manner.
2. Over the long term, benefit payments and tax revenues must be approximately equal.
Thus, reductions in benefits would tend to result in reduced taxes, and reduced taxes
would tend to necessitate benefit reductions. Thus, changes in either benefits or taxes
would tend to affect the other as well.
3. With regard to the Unemployment Insurance program, there is evidence that some
components of the system have eroded over time. See Chapter 4 in this volume for additional information.
4. Application of Oates's conceptual framework to the UI system suggests that economic stabilization is also one component of the public good that the system provides.
5. While UI is essentially a social insurance program, it does maintain some elements of
income redistribution through its partial emphasis on "social adequacy principles" (that is,
its emphasis on providing the unemployed with benefits related to their presumed needs).
There are a number of examples of this pursuit of social adequacy in the UI program,
reflecting an assumption that individuals with lower incomes require a higher proportion
of income for necessities than do workers with higher incomes. For example, in some
states, benefit formulas are set in order to ensure that lower-wage workers receive a higher percentage of their previous wages in benefits than higher-wage workers do. In addition, all states set a maximum weekly benefit amount, meaning that for all workers at the
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benefit ceiling, replacement rates are progressively lower as previous wages increase.
Further, 13 states provide additional benefits ("dependent allowances") for UI recipients
who have dependents.
6. In the UI system, risks are also partially pooled across employers through the socializing of some UI costs.
7. By this time, England and Germany had already implemented compulsory unemployment insurance systems. England's system had been in place since 1911.
8. See the Council's 1995 Recommendations 2 through 7, reprinted in Appendix F of this
report.
9. Weaver (1995) notes that, in programs in which standards are set in nominal dollars
(which is the case in many states' ill programs), competition may have the more subtle
effect of states simply not adjusting benefit or eligibility standards for inflation.
10. Four of the federal responsibilities correspond generally to those identified by the
Committee on Economic Security in 1935: providing an incentive to create and maintain
a system of unemployment insurance, protecting UI reserves, ensuring efficient program
administration, and providing program standards in areas in which uniformity is considered essential (Rubin 1990,209).
One additional responsibility might be added: maintaining a supplemental component
of the Unemployment Insurance system that would act as an additional countercyclical
mechanism in times of economic recession. It is likely that this responsibility was not
explicitly addressed by the 1935 committee because the economic theories that suggest
this as an important federal responsibility had not yet been widely accepted.

4 / The Evolution of
Unemployment Insurance

THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE system's direct capacity to serve workers
can be measured through a number of varied dimensions. These workeroriented dimensions include the percentage of the workforce that is covered
under the system, the percentage of unemployed individuals who are eligible
to receive benefits, the percentage of the unemployed who actually receive
benefits, the percentage of UI recipients' lost earnings that are replaced by
unemployment benefits, and the potential duration of benefits.
The system's performance on some of these measures has changed dramatically since the inception of the UI system in the 1930s. For example, the
percentage of the workforce covered by the program has increased significantly over time, whereas the percentage of the unemployed who actually
receive benefits has exhibited a steady decrease over the long term. Still
other measures, such as the potential duration of benefits, have remained relatively constant decade after decade.
Taken altogether, these trends reflect the evolution of the UI system. They
indicate the direction in which it is moving and where it can be expected to go
in the future. They show the areas in which the system serves the unemployed
well and those in which its relevance and responsiveness have declined. These
trends also reveal changes in some areas that can help identify larger forces and
dynamics that could affect the functioning of the UI system.
This chapter has two objectives. First, it provides information about various measures of the generosity and relevance of the UI system and about
their change over time. Whenever possible, this information is based on
aggregate time series data. When this is not possible, cross-section information is provided from the 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation
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(SIPP), conducted by the Bureau of the Census. The SIPP data are then used
as the basis for estimating changes in VI generosity throughout the 1980s.
Second, the chapter explores two possible causes of the system's longterm decline in some dimensions-particularly the decline in VI recipiency
(the percentage of the unemployed who actually receive benefits). The first
of these possible causes is the existence of incentives for states to engage in
cost-shifting-that is, to shift low-wage individuals from ill (with benefits
fully financed by the states) to means-tested programs such as AFDC (with
benefits heavily subsidized by the federal government). The second possible
cause of the decline in ill recipiency (which could adversely affect other
measures as well) is the existence of incentives for states to compete with one
another by reducing VI payroll taxes in an attempt to attract and retain
employers and jobs. (See the discussion of this problem in Chapter 3.) Little
empirical research has yet been conducted regarding the existence and the
effects of these dynamics. 1
Chapter 4 is organized as follows. The next section discusses trends in
coverage and eligibility. The section on "Benefit Receipt" then reviews the
evidence on trends in VI recipiency, briefly summarizes the econometric literature that has examined these trends, and concludes by providing evidence
on the magnitude and effect of the cost-shifting phenomenon. The next section discusses trends in replacement rates and potential duration of benefits,
and is followed by a section on trends in VI tax rates that provides empirical
evidence of the existence of interstate competition in the setting of these
rates. The final section summarizes the findings of the chapter. Additional
detail and technical information on the analyses presented in Chapter 4 are
provided in Appendix A.
COVERAGE AND ELIGIBILITY
Coverage

The percentage of the labor force that is covered under the VI system is
defined as the percentage of jobs for which an employer pays ill taxes on a
portion of a worker's wages. An employer who is required to pay ill taxes
must pay taxes for all employees. Thus, whether or not a worker is covered
under the VI system is fully dependent on whether or not federal or state law
requires the worker's particular employer(s) to pay VI taxes, as discussed
below. If a worker who is covered becomes involuntarily unemployed, that
worker can receive VI benefits if he or she meets all monetary and nonmon-
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etary eligibility requirements. Coverage is thus a precondition for eligibility,
since workers who are not covered cannot receive benefits even if they meet
all eligibility requirements.
When the VI system was created in 1935 by the Social Security Act
(amended by the Federal Vnemployment Tax Act in 1939), federal law
required employers in only industry or commerce to be subject to VI taxes,
and then only if they employed eight or more workers during at least 20
weeks of the year.2 Among the effects of the initial federal coverage provisions was the exclusion from coverage of workers in small firms, workers in
agriculture and the public sector, and seasonal workers.3
Since the VI program's inception, federal law has been amended on a
number of occasions, always in the direction of extending coverage to groups
that had been excluded under the original law. Coverage was first expanded
in 1954, to include employees of all commercial or industrial employers with
four or more workers.
In 1970 the law was amended again, requiring employers to pay VI taxes
if they employ one or more workers during at least 20 weeks of the year, or
have a payroll of at least $1,500 in any calendar quarter. The 1970 UI amendments also extended coverage to employees of nonprofit organizations that
employ four or more workers. 4 Through a combination of 1970 and 1976 UI
amendments, coverage was extended to all employees of state and local governments. s In addition, the 1976 amendments extended coverage to some
agricultural workers. 6 A number of other, minor extensions in coverage have
occurred since the creation of the UI program. 7
Overall, as a result of extensions since the beginning of the program, VI
coverage today is nearly universal. As Figure 4-1 indicates, coverage has
been extended to more than 90 percent of all civilian employees in the Vnited
States. Almost 98 percent of wage and salaried employees are now covered. 8
By this measure, the VI system has clearly become relevant to the needs of a
larger percentage of workers than it was at the beginning of the program.

Eligibility
Eligibility among unemployed workers who are covered under the VI system
is based on a combination of factors. Monetary eligibility requirements are
designed to ensure that those who receive VI benefits had a substantial
attachment to the labor force prior to their unemployment. 9 These monetary
requirements, which vary from state to state, typically have three components. First, earnings during the "base period," which is defined in most

FIGURE 4-1. Percentage of Workers Covered by UI, 1947-1994
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states to be the first four of the most recently completed five calendar quarters, must exceed some minimum level. Second, most states also have some
form of a "high-earnings" requirement, which specifies a minimum level of
earnings that an individual must have within some specified amount of time
(often this requirement must be met during one calendar quarter in the base
period).10 Third, most states require that an individual have earnings in at
least two of the four base period calendar quarters.
Three nonmonetary requirements are designed generally to ensure that a
UI recipient is involuntarily unemployed (that is, was laid off from work) or
voluntarily left work for good cause, is available for work, and is actively
seeking work. The first of these conditions (along with the monetary eligibility requirements) determines whether an unemployed worker initially qualifies for benefits; the second and third of these conditions must be satisfied on
a continuing basis throughout an unemployment spell. If they are not satisfied
in any given week, the worker is ineligible to receive benefits for that week.
Blank and Card (1991) provide the only information available on what percentage of the unemployed meet their state's eligibility criteria. Using repeated cross-sections from the Current Population Survey (CPS), they calculate
that 43 percent of the unemployed meet eligibility requirements. Further, they
conclude that there was little change in eligibility between 1977 and 1987.
One of the disadvantages of using the CPS to estimate eligibility is that it
does not contain sufficient retrospective earnings data to allow UI eligibility
to be calculated with a high degree of accuracy. The Survey of Income and
Program Participation provides the best available data for this purpose, since
it includes monthly longitudinal earnings records as well as a number of
other variables that could affect eligibility. While neither the CPS nor the
SIPP contains enough detail to simulate nonmonetary eligibility, both databases identify whether or not an unemployed individual was laid off from his
or her job. It is possible to approximate nonmonetary eligibility with this
information, since the vast majority of those on layoff would meet their
state's nonmonetary eligibility requirements (while the majority of those who
quit their job would not).
Table 4-1 summarizes the results from eligibility simulations using the
1990 SIPP.lI Overall, in 1990, 61.4 percent of the unemployed satisfied their
state's monetary eligibility requirements; percentages ranged from 41.5 percent of unemployed black females to 69.7 percent of unemployed white
males. The second row of Table 4-1 reports the percentage of the unemployed who lost (rather than quit) their jobs and met their states' monetary
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TABLE 4-1. Results of SIPP Simulations: Percentage of
Unemployed Individuals Who Satisfied Their State's UI Monetary
Eligibility Requirements in 1990 and 1978
Women

Men

Total

White

Black

White

Black

1990 Monetary Eligibility
(assumes 1990 demographics)

61.4

58.3

41.5

69.7

56.3

1990 Monetary Eligibility,
Job Loscrs Only

50.9

44.4

33.0

60.5

51.1

1978 Monetary Eligibility
(assumes 1990 demographics)

63.6

60.9

43.1

71.8

58.0

1990 Monctary Eligibility
(assumes 1978 demographics)

55.0

54.0

36.6

62.4

48.1

-2.2

-2.6

-1.6

-2.1

-1.7

6.4

4.3

4.9

7.3

8.2

4.2

1.7

3.3

5.2

6.5

-----

-------------

Changes in UI Eligibility Between
1978 and 1990 Resulting from:
Changes in States' Monetary
Eligibility Rules
Demographic Shifts
Net Effects of Changes

NOTES: See the discussion of this table in the text of this chapter and in footnote 1l. Also see
Appendix A in this volume, thc section entitled "SIPP Analysis." The number of unweighted unemployment spells used in the analyses was 8,158 (32.6 million weighted). This table includes individuals who were simulated as being monetarily ineligible but who were reported as receiving UI benefits. The "total" column includes some individuals whose race was not identified as white or black.
SOURCE: Analysis of unemployment spells between 1989 and 1992, using the 1990 SIPP Full Panel
Research File and Wave 2 Personal History Topical Module (described in Appendix A).

eligibility standards for UI. These figures, which are the most directly comparable to Blank and Card's (1991) evidence, suggest that 50.9 percent of the
unemployed are eligible for VI (a somewhat higher percentage than was indicated by Blank and Card's analysis of CPS data).
The eligibility simulations were repeated, applying 1978 (rather than
1990) state monetary eligibility rules to the individuals in the 1990 SIPP. The
results, which are reported in the third row of Table 4-1, indicate that, holding the demographic composition of the labor force constant, the percentage
of the unemployed who met their state's monetary eligibility requirements
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declined by 2.2 percent between 1978 and 1990. Once again, theSIPP simulations produce higher rates of eligibility than those found by Blank and Card
(1991), suggesting that the CPS may underestimate UI eligibility.
A variety of changes in federal law in the 1980s contributed to the decline
in eligibility between 1978 and 1990. First, prompted by the intense borrowing of many states when their trust fund balances were negative, the federal
government began to charge interest on loans not repaid within one year.
Second, states could defer these interest payments if they adopted and maintained cost-cutting and tax-increasing measures. In addition, states were
given other direct incentives, linked to federal Extended Benefits funds, to
tighten eligibility requirements (ACVC 1994).
As a result of these changes in federal law, as well as voluntary state
responses to trust fund insolvency, many states raised their monetary eligibility requirements in the 1980s. Between 1981 and 1987,35 states increased
the minimum-earnings requirements (in inflation-adjusted terms) needed to
qualify for UI benefits (U.S. General Accounting Office 1993). The average
increase among these states was 63 percent, whereas the rate of inflation for
wages and salaries was less than half of that (31 percent). Evidence suggests
that these changes were linked to levels of state trust funds, because the
largest increases in earnings requirements were observed in states that had
the largest decreases in their trust fund balances. 12 As with most changes in
eligibility standards, these changes were most likely to affect low-wage
workers, part-time workers, and individuals with sporadic work histories.
Three changes occurred in the demographics of the unemployed population between 1978 and 1990: (1) men were a larger proportion of the unemployed population in 1990 (55 percent) than in 1978 (51 percent). (2) The
proportion of the unemployed who were white declined slightly (from 76 to
74 percent), and the proportion of minorities increased slightly (from 24 to
26 percent). (3) The unemployed population became older between 1978 and
1990. For example, 49 percent of the unemployed were between ages 16 and
24 in 1978, and only 35 percent of the unemployed were in that same age
group in 1990. The fourth row of Table 4-1 reports the percentage of the
unemployed population that would have been monetarily eligible for VI benefits in 1990 if the demographics of the unemployed population (including
the age distribution) had been the same in 1990 as in 1978. These calculations indicate that the demographic changes between 1978 and 1990 contributed to an increase in monetary eligibility.
The final three rows of Table 4-1 report the changes in UI eligibility that
result from changes in demographics and changes in states' monetary eligi-
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bility rules. Demographic shifts (the aging and gender/race mix of the unemployed population) contributed to an increase in the percentage of the unemployed who are eligible for UI. This increase, however, was partially offset
by changes in states' monetary eligibility requirements.

BENEFIT RECEIPT
Two statistics have been used most frequently to measure receipt of
Unemployment Insurance. The fIrst is the ratio of the Insured Unemployment
Rate (IUR) to the Total Unemployment Rate (TUR),13 and the second is the
ratio of UI claimants (IU) to total unemployment (TU). Both ratios are based
on a measure of the number of UI claimants, which is collected by each state
on a weekly basis. The two ratios, which are highly correlated (see Figure 4-2),
converge as the percentage of the workforce that is covered by UI increases. 14
A third measure of recipiency is used for the following reason. The total
number of claimants includes some individuals who do not receive UI benefits but who are counted among the insured unemployed for any given week.
These individuals are mostly in three groups: (1) those who are on a oneweek waiting period before the beginning of their benefit spell; (2) claimants
who are ultimately denied benefits for nonmonetary reasons; and (3)
claimants who are disqualified from collecting benefits in a given week
either because they are not able and available to work or because earnings
from a part-time or temporary job exceed a given level. The inclusion of
these groups has tended to inflate the measure of UI recipiency by 10 to 15
percent per year. Thus, the third measure of recipiency-actual weeks compensated as a percentage of total unemployment-excludes claimants who
do not receive benefits in any given week (see Figure 4-2).

Trends in Recipiency
UI recipiency is highly cyclical. The measure increases sharply during recessions, because a higher percentage of the unemployed have lost (rather than
quit) jobs, and are therefore more likely to meet nonmonetary eligibility
requirements. In addition to cyclical movements, there have been two noteworthy trends in the level of benefIt receipt. According to each of the three
measures of recipiency just discussed, two signifIcant trends emerge with
respect to the percentage of unemployed workers who receive UI benefits
under regular state programs. The fIrst is a long-term trend in which the national

FIGURE 4-2. Recipiency Rates for Regular State UI Programs, 1947-1994
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TABLE 4-2. Ratio of Unemployment Insurance Claimants to Total
Unemployment, by State, 1995
State

IU!TU

State

IU!TU

Rhode Island

65.0

Nebraska

31.5

Alaska

61.7

Maryland

31.1

Vermont

58.6

West Virginia

29.7

Oregon

54.2

Missouri

28.7

Washington

52.1

Kentucky

28.6

Hawaii

51.0

Ohio

28.6

Connecticut

49.0

Michigan

28.3

Idaho

47.4

South Carolina

28.1

Pennsylvania

46.1

Colorado

27.9

Wisconsin

43.6

Tennessee

27.6

Arkansas

42.1

North Carolina

26.1

Montana

41.6

Arizona

25.7

Massachusetts

41.5

Kansas

25.2

New York

41.3

Mississippi

25.2

Delaware

41.1

New Mexico

24.3

Maine

39.2

Florida

23.8

New Jersey

39.0

New Hampshire

22.5

California

37.5

Alabama

22.0

Illinois

37.2

South Dakota

21.4

Wyoming

35.5

Utah

21.4

District of Columbia

34.9

Texas

21.1

Minnesota

34.6

Oklahoma

21.0

North Dakota

34.5

Georgia

20.6

Nevada

34.4

Louisiana

20.0

Puerto Rico

33.7

Indiana

19.4

Iowa

33.3

Virginia

17.6

NOTES: Data for the Virgin Islands are not available. Data are for the second quarter of calendar
year 1995.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995c).
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TABLE 4-3. Percentage of Monetarily Eligible Job Losers Who
Receive UI Benefits, by State, 1989-1991
State

Percentage of
Eligible Recipients

State

Percentage of
Eligible Recipients

Arizona

32.3

Tennessee

59.1

Maryland

40.8

Minnesota

61.0

North Carolina

47.2

California

61.2

Texas

49.3

Wisconsin

63.9

Indiana

50.5

Washington

64.0

Georgia

51.3

Ohio

65.4

South Carolina

51.9

Virginia

65.8

Florida

52.0

Oregon

67.1

Oklahoma

54.5

Massachusetts

69.5

Michigan

55.1

New York

69.6

Missouri

55.5

Pennsylvania

73.8

Mississippi

56.0

West Virginia

78.6

Illinois

57.9

New Jersey

80.1

Louisiana

59.0

Connecticut

82.5

SOURCE: ACUC calculations using the SIPP for those states with a sample of at least 30 job losers
for whom monetary eligibility could be simulated.

recipiency percentage has declined slowly and consistently since the 1940sdespite the increase in coverage of workers during that time. The second is a
more recent trend in which the recipiency percentage dipped dramatically
between 1980 and 1984. By 1984, the number of ill claimants as a percentage
of total unemployment had dropped to 28.5 percent, the lowest recorded percentage since data were first collected in 1947. The ratio increased slightly
after 1984, but it has remained lower than its historical average.
Further, as indicated in Table 4-2, recipiency measures vary not just over
time, but also across states. The ratio of claimants to total unemployed ranged
from a low of 17.6 percent in Virginia to a high of65.0 percent in Rhode Island
during the second quarter of 1995. Additional estimates from the SIPP, reported in Table 4-3, indicate substantial variation across the states in the percentage of monetarily eligible job losers who actually receive ill benefits.
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Research on the Long-Term Decline in Recipiency
Burtless and Saks (1984) suggest that a primary cause of the long-term decline
in the ratio of VI claimants to the total number of unemployed (IUrrV) before
1980 was the changing demographic composition of the jobless. Throughout
the 1960s and 1970s, as many women and young workers from the baby boom
generation entered the labor force, they also became a higher percentage of the
unemployed. As a result, men of prime working age, who are statistically the
most likely to receive VI benefits, declined considerably as a percentage of the
unemployed. Burtless and Saks find that such demographic changes explain a
large percentage of the decline in the IUrrv ratio before 1980. The shift of
workers from manufacturing and other industries with high VI recipiency rates
was also identified by Burtless and Saks as a primary cause of the long-term
decline in recipiency, although they report that it is quite difficult to estimate
with precision the magnitude of this effect.

Research on the Recent Decline in Recipiency
While there is still considerable inconsistency in the findings from research
examining the decline in VI recipiency that occurred in the early 1980s, the
following factors have emerged as the most common explanations of this
short-term decline: (1) federal and state policy changes, (2) population shifts
to states with traditionally low VI claims rates, (3) the decline in the unionized percentage of the workforce, and (4) the decline in the manufacturing
sector of the economy. Table 4-4 summarizes the magnitude of each of these
effects, as found by those who have done empirical research in this area.

Eyidence on Cost-Shifting
An additional possible source of the decline in VI recipiency among the
unemployed is "cost-shifting" by the states. While the states pay for almost
100 percent of VI benefits, the federal government provides substantial subsidies for means-tested programs. Federal matching rates for the AFDC program currently range from 50 to about 80 percent, and the Food Stamps program is 100 percent federally financed. These federal subsidies could create
powerful incentives for states.to shift low-income unemployed individuals
from VI to AFDC and/or the Food Stamps program. The shifting could be
done through increases in monetary eligibility requirements (which would
reduce the number of low-wage workers who are eligible to receive VI) or
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TABLE 4-4. Summary of Studies Explaining Short-Term Decline in
Recipiency
Percentage of Decline Explained by:

Authors

Time Period
Analyzed

Policy
Changes

Baldwin & McHugh

1979-1990

54

1977-1987

0

50

1980-1982

21-54

16

Population

Change in

Change in

Shifts

Unionization

Manufaduring

29

16

(1992)
Blank & Card

25

(1991)
Corson & Nicholson

4-18

(1988)
Vroman

1967-1989

25

(1991)
NOTE: The specific measure of recipieucy used by researchers in examining this question has varied. While Corson and Nicholson (1988) examined both the IURITUR and the IUITU, they focused
primatily upon the IU/TU, which they call the UI claims ratio. Blank and Card (1991) also examined
this measure, which they call the fraction of insured unemployment. Vroman (1991) focused upon
the IUITU. Baldwin and McHugh (1992) examine lU/TU, but include Extended Benefits recipients
in addition to regular state UI recipients. The analysis by Baldwin (1993) found much smaller effects
from policy changes, but these results could not be readily decomposed into the categories of
explanatory variables included in this table.

through changes in nonmonetary eligibility requirements (which also might
have a disproportionate impact on low-wage workers).
There is considerable evidence that many states' UI systems do, in fact,
discriminate against low-wage workers either directly or indirectly (ACUC
1995; Bassi and Chasanov, forthcoming). In addition, Figure 4-3, which plots
recipiency rates against the percentage of means-tested expenditures that are
financed by the federal government, strongly suggests that cost-shifting may
have occurred.
For purposes of this report, regression analysis was used on a state panel
database to test the cost-shifting hypothesis. The panel included data on the 48
contiguous states from 1979 to 1990. The dependent variable was the IU/TU;
the independent variables were those other researchers have typically used
when estimating recipiency regressions. Three additional variables were
included-the federal AFDC matching rate, per capita federal AFDC expenditures, and per capita Food Stamps expenditures within each state. These

FIGURE 4-3. Federal Percentage of Means-Tested Public Assistance Expenditures and UI
Recipiency Rate (IU!TU), 1947-1990
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Assistance; Women, Infants, and Children Nutrition Program; and General Assistance.
SOURCES: Office of Management and Budget, unpublished data (various years); U.S. Department of Labor
(1995d).
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three variables were lagged one year. To avoid bias caused by unmeasured
heterogeneity, the model was estimated in first differences, meaning that
regression results were based on annual changes in the included variables,
rather than on the actual levels of the variables. Details on the construction of
the database and the regression results are reported in Appendix A.
Overall, the regression results provide evidence of cost-shifting. They suggest that an increase in either per capita Food Stamp receipts or in the AFDC
matching rate is followed by a decline in the rutru, although theAFDC effect
is only significant in a first differences modeV 5 The AFDC matching rate, however, has little capacity to explain changes in the rutru, since there has been
virtually no change in the matching rate over time. Per capita Food Stamp
expenditures, however, have changed significantly over time. 16
Figure 4-4 plots the actual IU/TU rate, as well as an ACVC estimate of
what the IU/TU rate would have been if states had not shifted individuals
from UI to Food Stamps. The estimates indicate that cost-shifting helps
explain the long-term decline in UI recipiency. For example, cost-shifting
behavior appears to account for 64 percent of the decline between 1971 and
1993. These findings suggest that much of the decline in the IUITU that other
researchers have attributed to "policy changes" (see Table 4-4) has taken the
form of states shifting costs to the federal government.
It should be noted that, during some of this period between 1971 and
1993, the federal government was inducing states to improve the solvency of
their VI programs, and the states responded in part by restricting eligibility.
The growing incentives for states to shift individuals from VI to federally
subsidized programs may have made states more willing to comply than they
would have been otherwise.
REPLACEMENT RATES AND POTENTIAL DURATION OF BENEFITS

With respect to the actual receipt of benefits under the UI program, there are two
important measures of the system's generosity-the replacement rate and the
potential duration of benefits. The replacement rate measures the percentage of
an unemployed individual's lost earnings that are replaced by UI benefits. The
potential duration of benefits provides a measure of how long UI recipients can
expect to be able to rely on the system for partial income replacement.
Many of the founders of the Unemployment Insurance system argued that
benefits should replace 50 percent of lost earnings. They believed that this
percentage was high enough to allow workers to purchase basic necessities,
but not so high as to discourage prompt return to work (see Blaustein 1993).

FIGURE 4-4. Actual IU/TU and Estimated IU/TU in the Absence of Cost Shifting to Food
~tamps, 1947-1993
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SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce (1994); U.S. Department of Labor (1995d); and ACUC calculations
as described in Appendix A.
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TABLE 4-5. Comparison of Replacement Rates Reported by U.S.
Department of Labor and Actual Replacement Rates, Various
States and Years
DOL-Reported
Replacemenl Rale
(percenl)

Aclual
Percenlage of Recipienls for
Replacement Rate Whom Replacemenl Rate
(percenl)
Is Grealer Than 50%

State

Year

Illinois

1984-1985

35

62

70

Michigan

1994

39

52

76

Pennsylvania

1988-1989

42

72

77

Texas

1994

38

68

80

Washington

1988-1989

38

63

90

Wisconsin

1994

39

71

83

NOTE: These were the only states for which the ACUC could obtain data on the actual replacement
rate.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor (1995d); unpublished data from Illinois, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.

A number of presidents including and following Dwight D. Eisenhower have
endorsed a goal of 50 percent replacement of lost earnings within the UI system. President Richard M. Nixon advocated that the UI system should replace
50 percent of lost earnings for four-fifths of all recipients (see O'Leary 1994).
Both the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (1980) and
the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995) endorsed "one
half for four-fifths" as an appropriate goal.
Unfortunately, almost no cross-section data are available on replacement
rates, and no data whatsoever are available on changes in replacement rates
over time. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) does report what it refers to
as a "replacement rate," but it defines this measure as the ratio of average
benefits paid to UI recipients to average wages paid in all of covered employment. Because this ratio compares data for two different populations, it does
not measure the extent to which UI benefits replace the wages of those individuals who are actually unemployed and actually receive benefits.
Table 4-5 summarizes unpublished data on the actual replacement rate in
the only six states for which the ACUC could obtain data. When compared
with the DOL-reported replacement rates for comparable time periods, these
data indicate that the reported rates significantly understate the actual
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u.s.

TABLE 4-6. Comparison of Replacement Rates Reported by
Department of Labor and Actual Replacement Rates, Based on
SIPP Simulations, All States, 1978 and 1990
Year

DOL-Reported
Replacement Rate
(percent)

Average Replacement
Rate of UI Recipients in
SIPP (percent)

1978

36

64

1990

36

63

NOTE: SIPP replacement rates are defined as the average weekly benefit amount divided by (base
period earnings/52).
SOURCES: Analysis of unemployment spells between 1989 and 1992 using the 1990 SIPP Full
Panel Research File and Wave 2 Personal History Topical Module (described in Appendix A); U.S.
Department of Labor (1995d).

replacement rate in all six states. In five of the six states, the actual rate is
understated by between 25 and 30 percentage points. Furthermore, all six
states either exceed or almost meet the goal of replacing 50 percent of lost
earnings for four-fifths of VI recipients.
Alternatively, the SIPP can be used to calculate actual replacement rates.
The average replacement rate of VI recipients in the SIPP (see Table 4-6) is
comparable to the average of the six states, as discussed above. 17 Thus, the
replacement rate found in the SIPP is also substantially greater than the officially reported replacement rate. By calculating what the replacement rate
would have been in 1990 if the equivalent of 1978 benefit formulas were
used, it is also possible to assess how replacement rates have changed over
time. These calculations indicate that replacement rates were decreased by
only one percentage point in the 1980s. Thus, the replacement rate appears to
have remained relatively constant over time. It should be noted, however,
that replacement rate calculations refer to pre-tax income. The subjecting of
VI benefits to federal income tax in the 1980s reduced the effective replacement rate for VI recipients.
As noted above, another component of VI benefits besides the replacement rate is their potential duration. The V.S. Department of Labor collects
information on the number of weeks for which VI claimants are qualified to
receive benefits. Figure 4-5 indicates that the average potential duration of
VI benefits increased by a modest amount during the 1950s and has been
nearly constant since then. 18

FIGURE 4-5. Average Potential Duration of UI Benefits (in weeks) for All UI Claimants,
1948-1994
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NOTES: Line denotes the average potential duration of benefits calculated for all UI claimants. The 1979
figure for duration of benefits was interpolated due to erroneous data.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995d).

56/ ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

Overall, therefore, evidence on both replacement rates and benefit duration suggests that the system's relevance has remained relatively steady over
time with respect to the needs of those unemployed workers who actually
receive benefits. The evidence also suggests that the program's capacity for
providing income support is substantially higher than is indicated in some
official statistics.

UI TAX RATES
Each of the worker-oriented measures of program generosity described
above is affected by the other side of the UI system, the collection of taxes.
When average UI tax rates are relatively high, trust funds can support higher benefit levels and/or a larger number of recipients. (Similarly, higher benefits or increased numbers of recipients require higher taxes.) Conversely,
relatively low tax rates tend to result in pressures to reduce benefit levels or
to increase eligibility standards. Thus, the framework within which UI tax
rates are established can be expected to have a direct impact on the workeroriented measures discussed in this chapter.
The current system of financing the federal-state UI system imposes some
minimal federal standards, but generally provides states with significant discretion in determining levels of UI taxes, as well as eligibility standards and
benefit levels. It has been suggested that such a system may be susceptible to
pressures related to interstate economic competition. If this were the case,
then tax rates would be expected to be lower than they would without such
competition, and eligibility and/or benefits would also tend to be tightened as
a result. This section presents the results of an empirical examination of
whether such competition has manifested itself in the VI system.
The tax provisions for financing the UI system are contained in the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act. Under this law, a federal unemployment
insurance tax is imposed on employers, with a partial credit provided to
employers in states that have a UI system that meets minimum federal standards. Currently, the FUTA tax credit to employers is $378 per worker who
earns at least $7,000. Since the passage of FUTA, this large financial incentive has ensured that all states have had UI systems that have almost always
met federal standards.
As noted above, the federal requirements that states must meet are quite general, providing states with a great deal of discretion in making VI policies. In
order to qualify employers in the state for the FUTA tax credit, a state must
(1) levy a separate tax that is used only to finance VI benefits; (2) have a taxable
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wage base that is at least as high as the federal taxable wage base; and (3) have
a maximum tax rate of at least 5.4 percent, which is adjusted for the individual
employer only on the basis of that employer's experience with unemployment.
Prior to the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, only the state of
Wisconsin had a UI program, which operated on an extremely limited basis.
Although other states were interested in creating such programs, they could
not do so, in large part because of concerns that an employer-financed UI
system would put the employers in their states at a competitive disadvantage:
"The perceived threat of competitive disadvantage [proved to be] an effective barrier to individual state action on unemployment insurance" (Blaustein
1993, 128). The genius of the FUTA tax structure was that it reversed this situation, creating a competitive disadvantage for employers in states that do
not have a UI program.
Nevertheless, relative to other states, states can still gain a competitive
advantage for employers by only minimally satisfying the federal standards,
thereby qualifying employers for the FUTA tax credit while minimizing their
tax burdens. Although concerns about the welfare of involuntarily unemployed workers may deter a state from reducing its UI program to the minimum
allowed by federal law, competition among the states to attract and retain
employers and jobs may put states under considerable pressure to have smaller UI programs than they would otherwise. Interstate competition could even
set off a "race to the bottom," with some states cutting UI payroll taxes to
gain a competitive edge and other states responding, and another round of tax
cuts ensuing.
Hoyt (1995) and Weaver (1995) have outlined economic and political science models, respectively, that can be used to explore the possibility of pernicious interstate competition within the UI system. Principles suggested by
these models were examined for this report in an empirical exploration of
state interactions in setting tax rates. This analysis was conducted using a
state panel database that contains information from 1977 to 1990. Details of
the construction of the database and the results from the regressions are presented in Appendix A.
The basic model for testing the hypothesis used an observed state's UI tax
rate (measured as a percentage of covered wages) as the dependent vmiable.
Independent variables included various measures of the UI tax rates in other
states, lagged by one year, as well as a set of other potentially important
explanatory variables (for example, the state's unemployment rate, measures
of state government, and the percentage of workers who belong to unions).
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The following expected outcomes of a "race to the bottom" were examined empirically:
1.

The VI tax rates of nearby states should have a larger effect than the
VI tax rates of states that are farther away.

2.

There should be an asymmetric response to the VI tax rates of other
states. In particular, an observed state's VI tax rate should respond
more to those states with lower VI tax rates than to states with higher VI tax rates.

3.

The effect of VI tax rates in more populous contiguous states should
be greater than the effect of VI tax rates in less populous contiguous
states.

4.

Holding all else constant, more populous states should be able to
resist the pressures of interstate competition more successfully than
less populous states can.

The regression results reported in Appendix A provide compelling evidence in support of these hypotheses. Briefly, the results are as follows:
1.

There is strong evidence that states respond in some way to the ill
tax rates of all other states. In general, a given state's VI tax rate as
a percentage of total wages tends to move in the direction of other
states' tax rates (lagged one year). On average, a contiguous state
has a much greater effect on the level of a given state's VI tax rate
than a noncontiguous state does.

2.

An observed state's VI tax rate responds more to lower than to higher rates in other states. That is, a state responded more when, in the
previous year, other states in a given category had, on average, lower
VI tax rates than its own. It responded less when the other states'
average VI tax rates were higher.

3.

Additional regressions supply evidence that, on average, the tax rate
of the most populous contiguous state has a greater impact than
other contiguous states' tax rates in determining the tax rate of any
given state.
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4.

Holding all else constant, a state's tax rate is moderately higher
when its population is relatively large in comparison with that of
contiguous states. 19

The coefficient estimates (their signs, significance, and rank ordering) are
entirely consistent with a priori expectations of theoretical models of interstate competition.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The nation's Unemployment Insurance system, which consists of 53 separate
state programs (in the 50 states and in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands), is both highly complex and dynamic. The complexity can be seen in the diverging paths of some of the measures of the system's
relevance to the needs of workers. Measures of coverage clearly suggest that
the relevance of the system has increased, because numerous workers who
were once excluded from coverage are now covered under the system.
Available evidence on the measures of replacement rates and potential duration of benefits suggest that the system has generally maintained historic levels of generosity in those areas.
The time trend in the percentage of the unemployed who receive UI, however, reveals a long history of steady decline-punctuated by occasional
sharp decline-in the generosity of the program. Available evidence on the
percentage of the unemployed who are eligible for benefits is also indicative
of a slight decline in eligibiljty since the late 1970s.
Of all of these dimensions of generosity, coverage-which has increased-is the only aspect of the UI program that is directly controlled by
the federal government. All of the rest-replacement rates, potential duration
of benefits, recipiency rates, and eligibility-are either directly or indirectly
under the control of the states. This suggests that, while the federal government has acted to expand generosity in the one dimension of the program that
it controls, states' actions have resulted in a decline in generosity in terms of
eligibility for and receipt of benefits.
As noted above, however, there does not appear to be a significant deterioration of the benefits (in terms of replacement rates or potential duration
of benefits) for the shrinking percentage of the unemployed who are eligible
for and who receive benefits. This suggests that states have cut back instead
on their UI programs mostly by limiting access to the program rather than by
reducing the generosity of the benefits that claimants receive.
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The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that two significant forces
have shaped the evolution of the Unemployment Insurance system. One of
these is embedded in the federal-state structure of the program. Although federallaw effectively forces the states to have a UI program, it does not prevent them from administering only a minimal system, and it provides no support against competitive pressures that may act upon the states and adversely affect their ur programs. Other researchers have attributed the decline in
some elements of the ur system to the effects of changes in state policy as
well as to demographic and industrial shifts, but the evidence presented here
indicates that state policies are endogenous to the system.
In essence, the findings of this chapter suggest that the failure of the system to respond to changes in the nation's demographic and industrial composition is an outcome, rather than a cause, of the decline in some aspects of
the system's relevance. Similarly, increasingly restrictive state policy is the
means by which states respond to the competitive pressures within the system. Finally, the decline in ur recipiency that some researchers have attributed to "population shifts" may well be the result of a broader movement of
jobs from states with higher employer taxes (of which UI taxes are but one
component) to states with lower taxes.
The second force that has driven the evolution of the system is inherent
in the methods by which alternative social insurance programs are financed.
Because the federal government provides substantial subsidization for
means-tested programs, states face an enormous price differential in the provision of assistance to unemployed, low-income individuals. It is much less
expensive for them to provide a certain level of assistance through a meanstested program than through their own ur system.
The two forces discussed here no doubt interact. As states respond to
competitive pressures by ratcheting down their VI programs, the easiest way
for them to do so is by shifting low-income individuals onto means-tested
programs. If the major means-tested programs (AFDC and Food Stamps)
were converted to block grants to the states, as is currently being proposed,
then the financial incentives for states to shift low-wage individuals from UI
to these programs would be reduced. Nonetheless, the underlying pressures
from interstate competition would remain. Thus, the evidence presented here
suggests that fundamental changes in the method by which means-tested programs are financed might provide, at most, a temporary reprieve to the ur
system from its inherent tendency to allow its relevance to erode in the face
of continuous change.
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NOTES
1. One exception is the recent analysis by Craig and Palumbo (1994), which documents
a trade-off between UI and AFDC benefits. The authors do not, however, analyze the
implications of this trade-off for changes in UI recipiency over time.
2. Blaustein (1985) suggests that the decision to limit coverage was primarily a practical
decision, in that it would allow the administrative burden to be lessened during the first
years of the program while still ensuring that a significant percentage of workers would
be covered. Blaustein suggests that there was always an expectation that coverage would
be extended-ultimately to all workers who could be subject to involuntary unemployment. Others, however, have suggested darker reasons for some of the coverage exclusions; in particular, they argue that the decision to exclude agricultural labor from coverage was rooted in discrimination and racism (see Norton and Linder, forthcoming).
3. Many states, however, chose to adopt more liberal coverage standards from the beginning, particularly in requirements on the size of firm. The existence of more liberal coverage standards in various states has continued throughout the history of the program.
4. This provision did not apply to employees of churches or other religious organizations. Nonprofit employers were offered the choice of reimbursing the state for only those
benefits chargeable to them or paying the state UI tax in the same manner as other covered employers. Nonprofit employers were also offered the option of forming a group to
pool their benefit liabilities through a common reserve fund. All nonprofit organizations
remained exempt from the federal unemployment tax.
5. The reimbursement option was made available to all state and local government
employers, and such employers remained exempt from the federal unemployment tax.
6. Employers with 10 or more agricultural workers in at least 20 weeks of the year or
with a payroll of at least $20,000 in any calendar quarter were required to pay UI taxes.
Estimates suggested that at least 50 percent of agricultural workers would be included as
a result of this change (Martin 1994).
7. Federal civilian employees were included in the system in 1954, when a separate program was created to cover them. Former members of the military were included under
various pieces of legislation in the 1950s, with a separate program, also created for them.
Puerto Rico was included in the system as a "state" in 1960, and the Virgin Islands was
included under the 1976 amendments.
8. Only two significant coverage exceptions remain. First, agricultural workers who are
employed on farms that are defined as "small" are not covered in many states. Second,
workers who are classified as "self-employed" are also excluded from coverage.
(Ambiguities in the definition of "self-employed," however, have caused some workers
who should be covered under some other coverage requirement to be excluded because
they are classified as self-employed independent contractors.) In addition to these two primary exclusions, groups that include household workers of employers who pay wages of
less than $1,000 per quarter and employees of religious organizations are also excluded
from coverage.
9. Only covered wages are considered in making a determination of monetary eligibility. Thus, if an individual works in two jobs but only one of them is covered under ur, then
only the wages from the covered job are considered in determining eligibility (and benefit levels).
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10. The high-earnings requirement can result in the disqualification of part-time workers, especially those who work at the minimum wage.
11. Appendix A contains additional details about the SIPP simulations. The estimates
reported in Table 4-1 understate rrionetary eligibility to the extent that individuals have
underreported their income in the SIPP. According to the simulations, approximately 3
percent of the unemployed who are calculated to be ineligible for UI report that they do,
in fact, receive UI. Thus, either the simulations are incorrect because of underreported
income, or these individuals are receiving UI in error. Undoubtedly, some additional individuals who are simulated to be ineligible do, in fact, meet the monetary eligibility rules
in their states but do not receive benefits.
An additional source of etTOr results from using the state in which an individual
resides as the basis for the simulations. To be completely accurate, the simulations should
be based on the state in which an individual works (although this information is not available in the SIPP). Unlike underreporting of income, however, this latter source of mismeasurement is unlikely to cause any systematic bias in these estimates of eligibility.
12. Those states with the largest drop in their high cost multiple (a measure of trust fund
reserves) increased their base period earnings requirement during the early 1980s by an
average of $811 (in 1990 dollars), while states with an increase in the high cost multiple
during the same time period slightly decreased the requirement (U.S. General Accounting
Office 1993).
13. The IUR is defined as the number of regular UI benefit claimants divided by the
average number of people in UI-covered employment over four of the last six completed
calendar quarters. The TUR is defined as the number of all active unemployed job seekers divided by the total civilian labor force.
14. The numerator of the IUR is the number of regular UI claimants (A), and the denominator is the number of workers in covered employment. The numerator of the TUR is the
number of unemployed workers actively seeking work (B), and the denominator is the
number of workers in the labor force. The IU is A, and the TU is B. Therefore, the
[(IU/TU)]/[(IURlTUR)] equals the number of workers in covered employment divided by
the number of workers in the labor force, which converges to 1 as coverage expands.
15. The AFDC matching rate was shown to be significant at the 0.05 level under afirst
differences regression model. It was not, however, significant in a model using the actual
levels of the included variables. The AFDC per capita expenditures variable was also
insignificant-a result that is not entirely unexpected. These results are discussed further
in Appendix A.
16. The annual mean values for these variables and the additional variables used in the
regression are contained in Table A-I of Appendix A.
17. Income is known to be underreported in the SIPP, which would tend to cause the
replacement rate to be overestimated.
18. The small variations in potential duration are cyclical. During recessions, people
who are laid off tend to have higher earnings and higher labor force attachment than those
laid off during nonrecessionary periods. Although the average length of benefits receipt
has remained fairly constant over time, the length of unemployment spells has increased.
Consequently, the percentage of VI recipients who exhaust their benefits (which is highly cyclical) appears to have increased slightly over time. Thus, it would not be unreason-
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able to conclude that the potential duration of benefits has become somewhat less generous in the sense that it has not responded to increases in the duration of unemployment.
19. For technical reasons discussed in Appendix A, it is difficult to identify the magnitude of this effect with precision.

5 / Financing Unemployment
Insurance

THE TAXABLE WAGE BASES and UI tax rates for employers established by the
federal and state governments directly affect a broad range of policies, program goals, and administrative goals in the UI system. The taxable wage
bases and employer tax rates are directly related to the amount of revenue
that is available to states to pay benefits and indirectly related to the amount
available for the administration of the system.
In addition, the taxable wage bases and employer tax rates affect the level
of trust fund reserves. Adequate reserves are needed to maintain trust fund solvency and to achieve the advantages of a forward-funded system. During
good economic times, a forward-funded system accumulates reserves that can
be drawn on when demand for UI benefits increases during periods of recession. This capacity helps maintain consumer purchasing power and contributes to economic stability. I Thus, the taxable wage base and employer tax
rates directly affect the ability of the UI system to meet its two primary objectives, as identified by the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation
(1995): (1) the provision of temporary, partial replacement of wages as a matter of right to involuntarily unemployed individuals who have demonstrated a
prior attachment to the labor force; and (2) the accumulation adequate funds
during periods of economic health in order to promote economic stability by
maintaining consumer purchasing power during economic downturns.
While both the taxable wage bases and the employer tax rates may affect
UI program outcomes, no mechanism currently exists for influencing the
average employer tax rate in the states on a broad scale. With regard to the
taxable wage base, however, the FUTA tax credit virtually ensures that
changes in the federal taxable wage base will have a direct effect on states'
taxable wage bases. The effects of such changes in the federal taxable wage
65
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base on VI program outcomes and the effects of the financing structure of the
VI system are the focus of this chapter.
After a brief overview of the financing structure of the VI system, the
chapter discusses some of the advantages and disadvantages of increasing the
taxable wage base. First, it presents empirical research that examines the
effects of changes in the state taxable wage base and tax rate on various measures of VI program outcomes. It then looks at changes in the taxable wage
base and the proportion of covered wages in a historical context and discusses some of the effects of a low taxable wage base on low-wage workers.
The chapter next explores the opposition to increases in the taxable wage
base that stem from the inclusion of the VI trust fund in the federal unified
budget and the constraints of the budget process. Finally, the issue of evaluating administrative funding levels is addressed, and a framework for linking
state funding levels to performance is discussed.

BACKGROUND
The Vnemployment Insurance system is financed through a combination of
federal and state payroll taxes. The federal payroll tax, established by the
Federal Vnemployment Tax Act, is currently set at 6.2 percent of the first
$7,000 of an employee's salary. Employers in states with Unemployment
Insurance (UI) programs that meet specified federal guidelines receive a 5.4
percent credit toward their FUTA tax payment. The resulting net tax rate of
0.8 percent yields an employer cost of $56.00 per employee earning a minimum of $7,000. FUTA revenues are used to finance the state and federal
administrative costs of the VI system, the federal portion of the Extended
Benefits program, loans that are provided to states with insolvent trust funds,
and other related federal costS.2
A state sets its own taxable wage base and tax rates, but must meet the following federal guidelines in order for employers in the state to receive the federal tax credit: (1) a separate tax must be levied that is used only to finance VI
benefits, (2) the state taxable wage base must be at least as high as the federal taxable wage base, (3) the maximum state tax rate must be at least 5.4 percent and must only be adjusted through experience rating. 3 State revenues
finance the payment of regular VI benefits and the state portion of Extended
Benefits. In 1995,42 states had taxable wage bases that were above the federal minimum of $7,000, and 18 had indexed their taxable wage base to the
average annual state wage. Table 5-1 lists 1995 state taxable wage bases.

TABLE 5-1. State Taxable Wage Bases, by State, 1995
--~

Slate Taxable
Wage Base

State

State

(dollars)

~

..

~---

State Taxable
Wage Base
(dollars)

Hawaii *

25,500

Ohio

9,000

Alaska*

23,900

Texas

9,000

Idaho *

21,000

Delaware

8,500

Washington*

19,900

Georgia

8,500

Oregon*

19,000

Louisiana

8,500
8,500

New Jersey*

17,600

Maryland

Rhode Island*

16,800

Missouri

8,500

Utah*

16,500

Alabama

8,000

Nevada*

16,400

Kansas

8,000

Montana*

15,500

Kentucky

8,000

Minnesota*

15,300

New Hampshire

8,000

Iowa*

14,200

Pennsylvania

8,000

Virgin Islands*

13,900

Vennont

8,000

New Mexico*

13,500

Virginia

8,000

North Dakota*

13,400

West Virginia

8,000

Wyoming*

11,900

Arizona

7,000

North Carolina*

11,300

California

7,000

Massachusetts

10,800

Florida

7,000

Oklahoma*

10,700

Maine

7,000

Wisconsin

10,500

Mississippi

7,000

Colorado

10,000

Nebraska

7,000

Connecticut

10,000

New York

7,000

District of Columbia

10,000

Puerto Rico

7,000
7,000

Michigan

9,500

South Carolina

Arkansas

9,000

South Dakota

7,000

Illinois

9,000

Tennessee

7,000

Indiana

9,000

NOTE: An asterisk (*) denotes that a state has indexed its taxable wage base to average wages.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (l995a).
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Most states also use a series of tax rate schedules that allow them to shift
from one schedule to another, based on factors such as trust fund solvency
and economic conditions. For example, during periods of low unemployment
when trust fund reserves are generally high, a favorable tax schedule (with
lower tax rates for all experience-rating levels) would be used. Some states
assess solvency surtaxes when trust fund reserves decline. As a result of the
range of state taxable wage bases across states and the range of tax rates
across and within states, the amount of state VI taxes paid by individual
employers varies greatly.

EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN TAXABLE WAGE BASE AND TAX RATES
Program Outcomes

Empirical research was conducted by the ACVC staff to examine systematically the effects of changes in a state's taxable wage base and tax rate on various program outcomes, including trust fund solvency, receipt of benefits,
and benefit levels. The results indicate that increases in a state's taxable wage
base can produce increases in the state's reserve ratio;4 also, increases in the
taxable wage base are associated with slight increases in VI benefit levels.
Following is further discussion of the model and the results.
Five regression equations were used to examine each of these VI outcomes: (1) the reserve ratio as a measure of trust fund solvency; (2) the percentage of the unemployed who received VI benefits (that is, the actual benefit recipiency rate);5 (3) the percentage of the unemployed who were VI
claimants (IU/TU);6 (4) the maximum weekly benefit amount; and (5) the
average weekly benefit amount. In the analysis, the state taxable wage base
is measured as the difference between the state taxable wage base and the
required federal wage base. The employer tax rate is measured as the ratio of
total employer taxes paid to taxable wages. The means for each of these measures, for the states and years included in the model, are presented in Table
5-2.7 The analysis used a fixed effects regression model and a database that
included annual, state-level data for the 50 states and the District of
Columbia from 1978 to 1990. 8

Taxable Wage Base
The analysis revealed that the primary effect of increasing the state taxable wage
base is a significant increase in a state's reserve ratio. Results also suggest a
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TABLE 5-2. Means of Key Varia~les from Regression~_ _ _ __
Variable

Mean

Explanatory Variable
State Taxable Wage Base over Federal Level
Effective Employer Tax Rate

$ 1,644.95
0.025%

Dependent Variable
Reserve Ratio
Recipiency
IU/TU
Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount
Average Weekly Benefit Amount

1.38
0.30
0.35
$ 156.09
$ 121.33

NOTE: Data are for 1978 to 1990 and include the 50 states and the District of Columbia. All dollarvalue variables are in 1993 dollars.
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations using a database compiled from the following: Council of State
Governments (1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, b, c); U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics (1995c); and U.S. General Accounting Office (1993).

small but positive relationship between the taxable wage base and both measures of benefit generosity (see Table 5-3). Overall, the results indicate that,
holding all else constant, a $1,000 increase in the taxable wage base increases a
state's reserve ratio by an average of 0.14 (see column 1 of Table 5-3.) This finding supports the view that increases in the taxable wage base would help states
increase trust fund reserves, thereby improving the UI system's capacity to
achieve one of its fundamental goals-economic stabilization.
Results of the analysis also indicate that increases in the state taxable wage
base would be expected to result in slight increases in benefit levels.
According to the model, a $1,000 increase in the state taxable wage base
would, on average, increase the maximum weekly benefit level by $3.70 and
the average weekly benefit level by $1.80 (see columns 4 and 5 of Table 5-3).
Equations examining the effect of state taxable wage base changes on the
receipt of benefits produced some unexpected results. The results suggest that
increases in the state taxable wage base produce slight decreases in both actual recipiency and the Iu/TU ratio. A $1,000 increase in the state taxable wage
base would be expected to decrease the percentage of the unemployed who
file for and receive benefits by 0.38 and 0.39 percentage points, respectively
(see columns 2 and 3 of Table 5-3). The negative relationship is counterintu-

TABLE 5-3. Generalized Least Squares Regression Results, 1978-1990
Dependent Variables
Explanatory Variables
State Taxable Wage Base over Federal Level

"

0.00014 (.00)

IU/TU

Recipiency

(2)

(3)

-0.00038 (.02)

Maximum Weekly
Benefit Amount

Average Weeldy
Benefit Amount

(4)

-0.00039 (.01)

0.0037

(5)

(.00)

0.0020

(.00)

Employer Tax Rate

-0.19

(.00)

-1.96

(.00)

-0.018

(.00)

-0.43

(.74)

-2.15

(.Ol)

Percentage of Labor Force Unionized

-2.95

(.00)

54.19

(.00)

33.40

(.00)

31.71

(.24)

13.94

(.44)

0.47

(.01)

-1.41

(.30)

-1.94

(.13)

22.19

(.00)

18.10

(.00)

Disqualification for Refusing Suitable Work

-0.18

(.14)

-1.16

(.23)

-0.98

(.29)

-5.98

(.10)

-2.88

(.23)

Disqualification for Misconduct

-0.11

(.41)

-2.28

(.04)

-1.18

(.26)

5.41

(.19)

-1.64

(.56)

(.55)

0.38

(.30)

-0.011

(.98)

1.44

(.29)

-0.54

(.55)

-0.0027

(.00)

-0.0022

(.00)

-0.000075 (.96)

-0.0029

(.01)

Disqualification for Voluntary Quit

0

Reserve Ratio
(1)

State Government

0.027

Required Base Period Wages for Benefits

-0.000071 (.22)

Total Unemployment Rate

-0.26

(.00)

-0.44

(.00)

-0.18

(.17)

-1.04

(.04)

0.64

(.06)

Denial Rate per Initial Claim

-0.22

(.63)

-18.30

(.00)

-20.62

(.00)

7.70

(.58)

-0.83

(.93)

Percentage of Employment Covered by UI

0.74

(.30)

-3.09

(.59)

4.47

(.41)

....fJ6.27

(.00)

-31.14

(.03)

Average Weekly Wage

0.00038 (.73)

(.00)

0.030

(.00)

0.33

(.00)

0.32

(.00)

R" Statistic

.35

0.028
.20

.18

.14

.25

NOTE: Significance levels are reported in fixed effects regression analysis that was used on data for the 50 states and the District of Columbia for the years
1978-1990. Missing data for the required base period wages for Michigan in the years 1982 and 1983 were estimated on the basis of data from 1981 and
1984. The state government variable for Nebraska was based on the political party of the governor, because the state has a unicameral legislature.
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations using database compiled from the following: Council of State Governments (1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor
(1995a, b, c); U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1995c); and U.S. General Accounting Office (1993).
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itive; if taken at face value, however, its small coefficient would suggest that
the impact of state taxable wage base changes on recipiency are minimal.
Employer Tax Rates

The empirical analysis also revealed statistically significant relationships
between employers' tax rates and four of the five outcomes examined. 9 The
relationships, however, are negative-contradicting the expectation that
increased revenues would increase reserves, recipiency, and benefits. The
most likely explanation for these unexpected results is that the average tax
rate may be an endogenous variable. That is, because the tax rate is partially
determined by the dependent variables, it is difficult to isolate its effects on
those variables. In addition, the tax rate is highly cyclical, which further complicates the task of isolating its effects.
National Effects

The regression results were then used to simulate the effects of increases in
the federal taxable wage base on the national average of the reserve ratio.
State reserve ratios were weighted by total state wages to produce the national averages presented in Table 5-4. The calculations assume that an increase
in the federal taxable wage base would produce increases in states with taxable wage bases below the new federal level. For example, a $1,000 increase
in the federal taxable wage would result in increases in the taxable wage
bases of the 11 states currently at the federal level. The calculations suggest
that increases in the states' taxable wage bases resulting from a new federal
taxable wage base set at $8,000 would increase the reserve ratio by 0.05 and
that a federal taxable wage base of $10,000 would increase the reserve ratio
by 0.22. The effects of incremental increases in the federal taxable wage base
are greater at higher wage base levels because more states would be required
to raise their taxable wage bases in order to match the federal level. (For
example, the effects of a $1,000 increase in the taxable wage base from
$8,000 to $9,000 would be greater than the effects of a $1,000 increase from
$7,000 to $8,000 because the former would affect more states.)

Trends in Taxable Wages as a Percentage of Total Wages
For reasons discussed later in this chapter, it is difficult to evaluate whether
the FUTA tax generates enough revenue to fund the administration of the UI
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TABLE 5-4. Estimated Effects of Different Federal Taxable Wage
Bases on National Average of the Reserve Ratio

SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations using database compiled from the following: Council of State
Governments (1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, b, c); U.S Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics (1995c); and U.S. General Accounting Office (1993).

system sufficiently. The proportion of covered wages subject to UI taxes and
the per worker cost of the FUTA tax over time, however, are known. The
trends with respect to these two matters indicate that, contrary to some perceptions, an increase in the taxable wage base would not produce a histOlically high tax burden.
There have been only four changes in the federal taxable base in the more
than 60-year history of the UI system. These increases have not kept pace
with the increases in total covered wages and, as a result, the proportion of
wages on which taxes are paid has declined, as illustrated in Figure 5-l.
The original unemployment provisions contained in the Social Security
Act of 1935 called for a federal tax on employers equal to 1 percent of total
payroll beginning in 1936. That percentage was to be increased to 2 percent
in 1937 and to 3 percent in 1938. Employers could receive a credit of up to
90 percent of their federal tax obligation for their contributions to approved
state unemployment compensation funds.
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act of 1939 amended those provisions
of the Social Security Act, reducing the taxable wage base from total payrolls
to the first $3,000 paid to each employee. 10 At the time, this change reduced
the total amount of covered wages by only 8 percent. Over time, however, the
impact of the $3,000 taxable wage base limit on FUTA tax revenues
increased. As total wages increased, the proportion of taxable wages to total
wages decreased. In 1948, about 82 percent of all covered payrolls were sub-

FIGURE 5-1. FUTA Wage Base as a Percentage of Total Covered Wages, 1940-1994
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ject to the FVTA tax; by 1969, however, only half of all payrolls were covered. Federal legislation increased the taxable wage base to $4,200 in 1972;
to $6,000 in 1978; and to $7,000 in 1983. In 1994, the ratio of taxable wages
to covered wages had eroded to 36 percent, its lowest level in history.
In addition to increases in the federal taxable wage base, increases in the
net federal tax rate have been adopted periodically to cover administrative
costs that grow because of inflation, to support the Extended Benefits program, and to maintain funds for loans to state trust funds. II Table 5-5 depicts
the changes in the FUTA tax rate and wage base, as well as the inflationadjusted, per worker cost over time.
The inflation-adjusted per worker cost of VI captures the fluctuation of
employers' federal VI tax burden as the federal tax rate and federal taxable
wage base have changed over time. This employer cost measure has declined
substantially from $93 per worker in 1978 (when the taxable wage base was
increased from $4,200 to $6,000) to $56 per worker in 1993.
Effects on Low-Wage Workers

The federal and state taxable wage bases also affect the relative tax costs to
employers of low- versus high-wage workers. When a taxable wage base is
low in comparison to the average annual wage, employers with a high percentage of low-wage workers are required to pay taxes on a higher proportion of their total payroll than are employers with higher-paid workers.
Further, research suggests that the incidence of a flat rate payroll tax (such as
the FUTA tax) is often passed from the employer to the worker in the form
of lower wages (Anderson and Meyer 1994). Thus, the FVTA tax is likely to
represent a greater burden for low-wage workers than for higher-paid workers, because the FUTA tax burden that may ultimately be paid by workers
represents a larger percentage of the total earnings of low-wage workers.
UI TRUST FUNDS IN UNIFIED FEDERAL BUDGET

The preceding discussion suggests that increases in the federal taxable wage
base would generate a wide variety of improvements in program outcomes
and would reduce the inequitable tax costs borne by low-wage workers without creating a historically high tax burden for employers. This approach,
however, is complicated by the inclusion of the VI trust fund in the federal
unified budget-which severely limits the use ofFUTAfunds despite the fact
that they are specifically earmarked for the financing of the VI system. Thus,
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TABLE 5-5. Changes in FUTA Tax Rate and Wage Base,
Fede~~I~~,:,employment Tax Act Provisions, 193~~ 1994

by Year

of

Gross FUTA
Tax Rate
(percent)

Offsetting
Credit
(percent)

Potential Net
Tax Rate
(percent)

FUTA
Wage Base
(dollars)

Inflation-Adjusted

1939

3.00

2.7

0.30

3,000

96

1960

3.10

2.7

0.40

3,000

61

1970

3.20

2.7

0.50

3,000

57

1972

3.20

2.7

0.50

4,200

74

1973

3.28 a

2.7

0.58

4,200

81

1974

3.20

2.7

0.50

4,200

64

1977

3.40b

2.7

0.70

4,200

72

1978

3.40

2.7

0.70

6,000

95

1983

3.50

2.7

0.80

7,000

83

1985

6.20

5.4

0.80

7,000

77

1994

6.20

5.4

0.80

7,000

56

Year
Effective

per Worker Cost

(1994 dollars)

SOURCE: Blaustein (1993); ACUC calculations using data from Council of Economic Advisors
(1995).
U Reflects a 0.08 percent increase in federal unemployment tax rate in 1973 to pay for additional benefit costs.

b A temporary surtax was enacted in 1977 for the Extended Benefits program; it was extended in
1987, 1990, and again in 1993. It is due to expire at the end of 1998.

an increase in the federal taxable wage base (without some corresponding
decrease in the FVTA tax rate) would increase the flow of funds into the federal accounts in the VI trust fund without any guarantee that these funds
could be used in a timely manner for VI purposes. Predictably, this has
sparked opposition to any increases in the federal taxable wage base. The
genesis of this situation is discussed below.
The Federal Budgeting Process

Funding levels for the federally financed portion of the UI system are determined by the federal budget and appropriations process. The current budget-
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ing system is workload-driven, based on the number of UI claimants and the
number of covered employees. There are two categories of federal UI funding. Base funding includes all costs associated with the collection of taxes
and an estimate of the minimum costs associated with the distribution of UI
benefits. Contingency funding is provided when the actual claims workload
exceeds the base estimates.
The minutes per unit (MPU) that it takes for states to perform specific
tasks, average state salaries, and national economic assumptions are used to
estimate state costs for administering state UI programs. 12 Contingency workloads are funded at lower salary levels than are those used for base funding,
under the assumption that an additional workload is performed by temporary
help with lower pay rates and benefit costs. The sum of the estimates for each
of the states, theoretically, provides the basis for the annual federal budget
request for funds for administering state UI programs.
The funding that is available for administration of the UI system is limited to the level that is appropriated through legislation. It is largely unrelated
to the balance of the federal UI accounts. 13 This violates the principle that
holds that trust fund balances are accumulated and held in trust solely for a
specified purpose. The inclusion of the UI trust funds in the federal unified
budget creates an additional incentive to limit federal funding levels for UI,
because federal budget offsets must be identified before additional FUTA
funds can be appropriated for program administration in order to maintain
budget neutrality. 14
For the system of UI administrative funding, there are two primary implications of this inclusion of the UI trust funds in the federal unified budget.
First, the system cannot respond to a justifiable demand from the states for
increases in their administrative funding grants even if there are sufficient
funds available in the trust fund account. Second, the system loses its capacity to increase spending automatically during recessions. As a result, one of the
principal functions of the UI system-economic stabilization-is threatened.
Revenues and State Administrative Funding Levels

The relationship between states' FUTA contributions and the funding they
get back in administrative grants has varied over time. 15 As shown in Figure
5-2, 85 percent of states' FUTA contributions were returned in the form of
administrative grants in 1975; in 1988, this figure was only 43 percent; in
1992, it rose to 63 percent. Typically, a higher percentage of states' FUTA

FIGURE 5-2. State Administrative Grants as a Percentage of FUTA Contributions, 1970-1994
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contributions are returned during periods of high unemployment. The years
1982 and 1983, however, represented an exception; a relatively low percentage of FUTA revenues was returned to the states despite very high unemployment levels.
The portion of FUTA contributions that states receive back from the federal government as state UI grants (the subset of administrative grants that
only include UI funding) also varies greatly across states (see Table 5-6). For
example, in Fiscal Year 1993, the percentage ranged from 22 percent in
Hawaii to 121 percent in Alaska. When total state administrative grants
(including those for the Employment Service and other programs financed by

TABLE 5-6. Administrative Grants and UI Grants as Percentage of
Each State's FUTA Contributions, 1993

State

Hawaii
Indiana
Florida
Tennessee
Georgia
North Carolina
Virginia
Ohio
Texas
Kentucky
Arizona
Massachusetts
South Carolina
Colorado
Louisiana
New Mexico
Alabama
Iowa
Minnesota
Missouri

Administrative Grant!
FUTA Contributions
(percent)

28.6
41.7
41.9
42.2
42.5
43.1
43.7
47.3
47.4
49.0
51.8
51.8
52.2
53.0
53.3
54.7
55.3
56.5
56.7
58.4

Rank

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

UI Grant!
FUTA Contributions
(percent)

22.0
25.3
25.2
26.6
27.4
27.5
26.8
29.9
30.0
31.0
35.7
38.2
34.5
36.5
32.8
30.6
36.8
34.9
38.3
40.7

Rank

3
2
4
6
7
5
8
9
11

19
22
16
20
14
10
21
18
23
25
(continued)

TABLE 5-6. (continued)
State
Oklahoma
Nebraska
Wisconsin
Mississippi
Arkansas
Maryland
Illinois
New Hampshire
Delaware
Nevada
West Virginia
Kansas
Michigan
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Oregon
Puerto Rico
Washington
District of Columbia
California
South Dakota
Utah
Vermont
Maine
Connecticut
Wyoming
Montana
Idaho
Rhode Island
North Dakota
Virgin Islands
Alaska

Administrative Grant!
FVTA Contributions
(percent)

59.2
59.4
61.2
61.4
61.4
62.0
63.9
65.2
66.2
66.5
70.2
71.0
75.5
75.7
77.2
79.2
81.0
83.8
85.3
85.9
86.2
86.3
87.8
98.2
99.1
101.8
105.7
107.5
112.3
122.3
125.7
155.0
186.7

Rank
21
22

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

VI Grant/
FVTA Contributions
(percent)

32.5
31.9
43.6
39.9
41.1
45.0
46.0
43.3
47.4
48.2
43.1
34.7
55.5
58.2
58.6
59.8
61.7
52.5
65.6
56.6
68.6
34.5
46.9
65.7
73.4
82.9
55.2
52.0
69.4
98.7
60.2
66.8
120.6

Rank
13
12
29
24
26
30
31
28
33
34
27
17
38
40
41
42
44
36
45
39
48
15
32
46
50
51
37
35
49
52
43
47
53

NOTE: State FUTA revenues are estimates.
SOURCE: Unpublished data from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service,
Office of Actuarial Services.
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FUTA) are considered, the percentages increase to 29 percent in Hawaii and 187
percent in Alaska. The variation in this ratio can be attributed both to the size of
the grants and to the amount of revenue generated by FUTA in each state.
The level of administrative funding relative to a state's claims workload
has also varied over time. Historically, there appears to be an inverse relationship between funding per claim and the overall unemployment rate (see
Figure 5-3). That is, funding per claim is lower during periods of high unemployment. This is due, at least in part, to the decrease in fixed overhead costs
per claim when the number of claims increases. The level of VI administrative funding per claim also varies significantly across states (see Table 5-7).
In 1993, funding ranged from a low of $101 per claim in Puerto Rico to a
high of $490 in Alaska.
These factors represent some of the basis of opposition to increases in the
federal taxable wage base. Most states contribute significantly more in FUTA
revenues than they receive back in administrative grants. In 1993, for example
(as shown in Table 5-6), half of the states had less than 65 percent of their
FUTA contributions returned in the form of administrative grants. In addition,
skepticism may affect even the states that receive more money than they contribute. They, too, would recognize that the total amount of funding available
for administration in any given year is influenced heavily by national economic constraints and by the politics of the federal budget. As a result, there is
little they can know about how any additional contributions would be used.

An Alternative Option
The inclusion of the VI trust fund in the unified federal budget creates a number of constraints on the funding of the VI system. In particular, it limits the
use of FUTA revenues that are collected and held in trust for the administration of the VI system. As a result, it may be difficult to justify policies that
increase FVTA revenue collections from the states by placing an additional
tax burden on employers. Included among such policies would be a proposal to increase the federal taxable wage base in order to increase state taxable
wages bases, thereby improving state VI program outcomes.
It is possible, however, to create a revenue-neutral increase in the federal
taxable wage base by implementing a corresponding decrease in the net
FUTA tax rate. A revenue-neutral adjustment would bring about higher taxable wage bases in some states, but would not create additional revenue for
the federal trust funds-money that would then also be included in the federal unified budget. One example of a revenue-neutral adjustment would be

FIGURE 5-3. UI Administrative Funding per Claim, 1973-1993
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TABLE 5-7. UI Administrative Funding per Claimant, by State,
1993
State
Puelto Rico
Tennessee
Georgia
Alabama
Kentucky
South Carolina
Arkansas
North Carolina
Iowa
Missouri
Ohio
Florida
Virginia
Indiana
West Virginia
Louisiana
Mississippi
Texas
Michigan
Illinois
Oklahoma
Wisconsin
Montana
Kansas
California
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Washington
Oregon
Arizona
Massachusetts
New Mexico
Nebraska
New York

Claims
(no., in thousands)

State UI Grant
State UI Grant/Claim
(dollars, in thousands)
(dollars)

167.0
24l.6
287.7
204.6
151.3
170.2
116.4
26l.3
104.2
245.1
368.9
373.8
185.5
160.7
64.4
123.8
91.9
544.7
529.7
531.8
83.5
211.9
30.8
74.2
1831.3
39l.6
538.4
265.6
151.0
106.4
261.9
38.6
36.7
696.8

16,867.9
28,837.6
40,932.2
29,22l.5
21,884.5
24,83l.8
18,723.3
42,728.7
18,836.3
44,427.6
68,723.3
70,330.5
35,545.2
30,878.9
12,442.5
24,075.4
18,094.9
107,38l.7
104,773.2
113,866.7
17,997.4
46,380.5
6,914.0
16,991.3
430,950.7
92,870.2
133,749.6
66,711.3
38,228.5
27,470.2
69,359.6
10,404.2
10,214.0
202,054.9

101
119
142
143
145
146
161
164
181
181
186
188
192
192
193
194
197
197
198
214
215
219
225
229
235
237
248
251
253
258
265
269
278
290
(continued)
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TABLE 5-7. (continued)
State

Hawaii
Colorado
Maine
Maryland
Vermont
Connecticut
Delaware
Minnesota
Rhode Island
New Hampshire
Nevada
Idaho
Virgin Islands
South Dakota
Wyoming
North Dakota
Utah
District of Columbia
Alaska
UNITED STATES

Claims
(no., in thousands)

State Ul Grant
State Ul Grant/Claim
(dollars)
(dollars, in thousands)

41.8
101.1
56.2
154.5
23.8
192.3
24.1
116.5
58.2
31.8
60.4
44.4
4.0
11.8
15.3
16.9
39.4
26.9
38.9

12,201.7
29,609.1
16,664.4
46,485.1
7,228.2
58,757.8
7,441.8
36,183.1
18,158.8
9,948.8
18,979.0
14,167.2
1,336.2
4,278.3
5,801.1
6,563.4
16,124.9
11,208.7
19,049.6

292
293
296
301
304
305
308
311
312
313
314
319
338
362
378
388
409
417
490

10,521.9

2,384,000.0

227

NOTE: Administrative funding is based on state UI grants. The number of claims represents new
initial claims.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (l995b).

a $2,000 increase in the federal taxable wage base (to $9,000) and a decrease
in the net FUTA tax rate to 0.6 percent. This would produce FUTA revenues
that would be approximately 5 percent lower than they currently are, based
on ACUC calculations from unpublished Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE AND EFFICIENCY

Another issue related to federal ur taxes is how the level of state administrative funding should be determined. If the constraints of the budget process
were removed, should additional federal funds be provided to the states for
the administration of their ur programs, or are current levels of funding suf-
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ficient to achieve desired performance outcomes?
The current absence of incentives for efficient behavior in VI program
administration makes it impossible to determine whether current outcomes
are a function of funding levels or of other factors that may shape administrative performance. This section discusses the current process for allocating
administrative funds to the states, suggests the need for efficiency incentives
in the allocation process, and presents some general principles for developing a set of administrative-outcome measurements that could be linked to
state administrative funding levels. Such measurement systems are needed to
prevent efficiency incentives from threatening program quality.

Allocating Administrative Funds
The budget for administrative funds is determined, as discussed above, by a
formula based on estimated workload and is subject to the federal budget
appropriations process. A lack of efficiency incentives for states is characteristic of the current administrative funding process. State performance outcomes are not considered when the overall funding levels for the VI system
are determined, nor are they considered in the allocation of funds to the
states. Furthermore, the formula used to distribute administrative funds to the
states lacks incentives for efficiency, because more funds are provided to
states that were determined to require more time to perform administrative
tasks. The lack of efficiency incentives in the current administrative funding
process makes it difficult to determine whether funding levels are sufficient
for states to perform at desired outcome levels.
Some believe that higher-quality programs must be more expensive to run
because, they assume, improving accuracy, timeliness, or other aspects of
performance requires costlier staff, computer equipment, and other
resources. Thus, decreases in funding would produce declines in some
aspects of program performance. However, in a study of the relationship
between program costs and quality, Vroman (1993) concluded that there is no
statistical evidence to support the view that administrative costs are positively related to performance. 16 Other studies have examined the implications of
a funding system based on average costs per unit of workload in highquality or high-performance states. 17 The results suggest that many states that
administer high-quality programs have relatively low costs.
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linking Performance, Efficiency, and Administrative Funding
Besides reducing wasteful spending and program costs, efficient program
administration is necessary to determine whether administrative funding levels are adequate. The relationship between funding and performance is
unclear. No research to date has addressed the key question of whether additional funding can improve poor performance. (This same question arises
with respect to many publicly-provided services-for example, whether
investing more money in school districts with poor performance records will
improve education for children in those schools.) It is apparent, however, that
if funds are being spent wastefully and programs are not run efficiently, there
can be no basis for evaluating this question.
Davidson and Martin (1994) and Parsons (1994) have proposed similar
conceptual frameworks for an allocation system that would promote efficiency. Both studies recommend that states be allowed to keep the savings
generated by cost-cutting innovations in the administration of their UI programs. The stll<;lies refer to this provision as a residual contract. Allowing
states to keep unused funds rather than requiring that they be returned to the
federal government would encourage efficient behavior.
For a residual contract to be effective, the allocation of funds cannot be
based on costs (which would undermine states' incentives to devise and
implement cost-cutting techniques). Consequently, both Davidson and
Martin (1994) and Parsons (1994) suggest the use of a "pay-for-performance" system in conjunction with the residual contract. Under such a system, funds would be allocated on the basis of state performance, and states
would be allowed to keep any residual savings. "If a state chooses not to
adopt some cbst reducing innovation it forgoes revenue. By the same token,
any state that chooses to overlook some quality enhancing opportunity will
receive a lower allocation of administrative funds than it would have
received had it pursued the opportunity" (Davidson and Martin 1994,24-25).
It is likely that a pay-for-performance method would also encourage states to
align their goals and efforts with federal performance priorities, which, in
turn, reflect national interests in the UI program.

Outcome Measures
Any administrative funding system that promotes efficiency requires a viable
outcome-measurement system that the federal government can use to ensure
that efficiency incentives do not encourage states to sacrifice program quali-
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ty. An appropriate outcome-measurement system could help prevent the erosion of program quality that can occur when states are faced with incentives
to cut costs. The current "system" for outcome measurement is actually an
extensive collection of federal programs that monitor, evaluate, or impose
requirements on the states. As discussed in the next chapter, the primary purpose of this "system" is to direct and inform program improvement efforts.
In most cases, there is little threat of sanctions or other consequences if states
fail to meet standards or if performance inadequacies are uncovered.
According to the discussion in Chapter 3, federal efforts to measure state
VI programs should be limited to those areas that affect the fundamental goals
of the VI system and in which there is a potential divergence of national and
state interests. There is no need for federal monitoring of state performance in
areas where national and state interests coincide. Further, the capacity of states
to focus their administrative efforts on areas identified as being the most crucial to the national interest would increase if the federal performance-review
system limited itself to only the most important program outcomes.
Thus, the federal government should measure essential program outcomes in areas in which national and state interests may diverge. This framework would support federal monitoring of eligibility guidelines and other
program areas where states may respond to interstate economic pressures to
enhance their business climates by adjusting policy in ways that may undermine national objectives. For example, performance measures could be used
to guard against the following means of state cost reduction: unreasonably
high eligibility standards; inappropriately low benefit levels; the provision of
limited administrative services, which may make it difficult for individuals
to collect benefits; and other reductions in services. Outcome measures could
also be used to monitor state levels of forward funding, and ensure that individuals have adequate access to the VI system, including the ability to enter
and fully participate in the system.

CONCLUSIONS
The empirical research presented in this chapter suggests that a strategy of
increasing the taxable wage base could be quite effective in increasing state
trust fund solvency. Further, increasing the taxable wage base could have the
added effect of reducing the inequities that result from the current low taxable wage base.
Because of the inclusion of the VI trust fund in the unified federal budget, however, any increases in the federal taxable wage base would have the
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effect of generating additional FUTA revenues without guaranteeing that
additional funds would be made available to the states for administration.
Removing the trust fund from the unified budget is one solution to this problem, although it is unlikely to be a viable option in the current political and
economic environment. Alternatively, the problem could be remedied more
easily by simultaneously enacting a decrease in the FUTA tax rate and an
increase in the wage base, offsetting the federal tax revenue effects of the
wage base increase.

NOTES
1. For additional information, see Chapter 3 in this report and Chapters 3 and 4 in
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995).

2. FUTA revenues are also used for the following purposes: the Employment Service
(ES), the collection of labor market information by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
and the collection of FUTA taJi.es by the U.S. Treasury.
3. Experience-rated taxes are based on an employer's use of the benefits in the UI system. In principle, an employer that has many former workers collecting UI benefits will
be assessed at a higher tax rate than the rate for an employer with few former employees
collecting benefits. In practice, however, experience rating is far from perfect. For additional information, see Chapter 7 in this report and Chapter 6 in ACUC (1995).
4. The reserve ratio represents net trust fund reserves as a percentage of total covered
wages.
5. This measure ofrecipiency is calculated as follows: (number of first payments of benefits times average actual duration) divided by total annual unemployment.
6. The IUITU is the ratio of the number of UI claimants (the insured unemployed) to the
number of unemployed job seekers (total unemployment). The distinction between the
IUITU ratio and recipiency is that the IUITU ratio measures the percentage of the unemployed who have filed for UI benefits-it does not consider whether or not benefits were
received. Recipiency only includes claimants who actually receive benefits. For additional information, see Chapter 4 of this report, and Chapter 4 of Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation (1994).
7. The other variables included in the model were these: disqualification penalties for
voluntary quits, refusal of suitable work, and misconduct; base period wage requirements
to receive minimum benefits; the percentage of initial claims that were denied; the total
unemployment rate; the average weekly wage; the ratio of covered employment to total
employment in the state; the percentage of state workers who were union members; and
the relative power ofthe Democratic and Republican political parties in the state government. The means of these variables are also included in Table 5-2. All dollar value variables are expressed in 1993 dollars.
8. A fixed effects model was used in order to accommodate the panel data (for example,
multiple observations for each state over a given number of years). Unlike ordinary least
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squares (OLS) regression, the fixed effects model does not assume that all observations
are independent of one another, and therefore, it provides more reliable estimates of
regression coefficients, standard errors, and the model's explanatory power.
Due the nonavailability of data for a number of variables in various years, the analysis was confined to the years 1978 to 1990.
9. Results did not indicate the existence of a significant relationship between the taxable
wage base and the maximum weekly benefit amount.
10. Originally, this was done to match the tax base used for old-age insurance contributions, in order to simplify federal employer tax collections and payment procedures for
both programs (Blaustein 1993).
11. Tax rate adjustments included a 0.2 percent tax increase enacted in 1977 to generate
revenues to repay a loan from the Federal Treasury to the Extended Benefits account,
which had been depleted. The increase was intended to be temporary-once the loan was
repaid, the increase was to terminate. In May 1987, the advances had been repaid and the
0.2 percent surcharge was due to expire at the end of the year. The Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987, however, extended this tax component through 1990 to offset some of the
federal budget deficit. The surtax was extended again in 1990 to help finance the
Emergency Unemployment Compensation program that was passed that year. A 1993 act
extended the surtax through 1998 for budget reconciliation purposes.

12. Until 1985, periodic studies were conducted to estimate the MPU for each of 17 specific tasks within each state. Since then, no studies have been performed.
13. While there is no direct link between trust fund balances and administrative funding
levels, administrative funding may be threatened by competing budget priorities when
account balances are low.
14. Inadequate levels of administrative funding may cause states to dive11 funds designated for the payment of benefits from their state bust funds to pay for administrative
expenses, further eroding the financial integrity of the system.
15. State administrative grants include funding for UI, the'Employment Service, some
activities of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and some services for veterans. State UI grants
are a subset that only include UI funding.
16. Vroman's model tested the ability of cross-state variation in administrative costs to
explain the changes in several measures of quality in processing UI claims. The measures
of quality were promptness of first payments, promptness of higher- and 10wer-authOlity
appeals, and benefit quality control payment error rates. Cost measures were based on
state salaries and workload mix.
17. Fu Associates (1994) calculated a national unit cost using data from 15 high-quality
states for benefits and 20 high-quality states for taxes, Cook and Kirchner (1995) developed a measure of relative administrative efficiency and examined the relationship
between efficiency level and a state's ability to meet specitled standards for the timely
delivery of UI services. Using these results, they calculated alternative allocations of
funds that would enable all states to meet the performance standards if they adopted the
behavior patterns of states which demonstrated high-quality administrative performance.
The results suggest that total allocations could be reduced if all states were funded as adequately as the states that actually did meet the standards.

6 / Performance Measurement

QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCEDURES have been in place since the inception of the
Unemployment Insurance program. The current system of state UI performance measurement is an extensive collection of federal programs that monitor, evaluate, and/or impose requirements on the states. The federal Quality
Appraisal (QA), and Quality Control (QCY programs collect data and review
work samples from the state ill programs to assess state performance against
dozens of measures for various components of program quality. States are also
evaluated to ensure that their laws conform to federal law and that their policies and practices comply with federal law. Conformity and compliance are
necessary for them to receive certification to receive the administrative grants
and the FUTA tax credit from the federal government, as discussed in Chapter 5. In addition to the QA and QC programs, other federal programs verify
reported workload data, investigate incorrect benefit payments and fraud, and
measure cash management. This chapter describes these various programs.

QUALITY APPRAISAL
The Quality Appraisal (QA) program/ begun in 1978, assesses the quality of
state ill program activities. Assessments are based on either promptness or
performance. There are two categories of measures: (1) Secretary's
Standards (SS), established by regulation before the inception of the QA program, measure the compliance of state programs with federal law in their
timeliness in processing lower-authority appeals and in delivering intrastate
and interstate first benefit payments. (2) Additional Desired Levels of
Achievement (DLA) , established in 1978 and revised periodically, supple-
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ment the SS with performance measures in other program areas,4 although in
practice there is little difference between the SS and DLAs.
Overall, the activities evaluated under the Quality Appraisal program are
initial claims, nonmonetary determinations, combined wage claims, appeals,
status determinations, field audits, collections, and employer accounts (see
Table 6-1). Samples of documents and/or transactions from each of these
areas are measured against the established standards. QA results for each
state are published annually by the Unemployment Insurance Service. State
staff review the results and make the quality determinations for two consecutive years, with federal review of the results. During the third year, federal
regional office staff make the quality determinations. If, in any year, deficiencies are detected, states must develop a "Corrective Action Plan" to
address them. This plan must be filed with the federal regional UI office,
which has the authority to approve or reject it. 5
The QA program uses data compiled from in-depth reviews of work performed in specified program areas and from various UI Required Reports
(UIRRs). The UIRRs represent a substantial body of reports that states submit to the federal government for use in calculating economic indicators,
budgeting purposes, charting the status of programs, and measuring performance. A 1993 internal review by the Unemployment Insurance Service catalogued 38 such reports, one of which has since been eliminated. 6

QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAMS
The Benefit Quality Control (BQC) program,7 which was begun in 1988, is
used to measure some aspects of the accuracy of benefit payments and to
assist states in developing program improvement plans to correct problems.
It reviews and analyzes a randomly selected sample of Unemployment
Insurance payments to estimate eligibility and benefit payment error rates,
and it collects data on the cause of errors and the party responsible for error. S
The results for each state are published annually by the Unemployment
Insurance Service. In 1993, an estimated $1.9 billion (8.8 percent) of the total
$21.1 billion in UI payments were overpayments, and an estimated $182 million (0.9 percent) were underpayments (U.S. Department of Labor 1994b).
Payments for interstate claims and for Emergency Unemployment
Compensation are not evaluated under the BQC program. In addition, neither
denied claims nor appeals decisions are included in the BQC sample. As a
result, the BQC program underestimates the rate of underpayment, because
erroneously denied claims are never examined.
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States have the primary responsibility for implementing and administering BQC, based on methodology established by the federal Unemployment
Insurance Service. No sanctions or funding incentives are available for the
federal government to use for encouraging any specific level of achievement
in state programs. The 1993 National Performance Review conducted by the
Office of the Vice President recommended that the UI Service reduce BQC's
emphasis on error measurement and focus instead on constructive use of the
results in order to improve quality (Gore 1993).
The Revenue Quality Control (RQc) project is intended to provide objective information on the quality of state revenue operations.9 This information
could be used both by state UI agencies in improving operations and by the
U.S. Department of Labor in line with its oversight responsibilities. RQC program development began in the late 1980s, with input from state UI representatives. Pre-testing and pilot programs took place in 1990 and 1991,
respectively. It was expected that the computed-measures component of the
RQC program could be used in 1995 and that the complete program would be
implemented in 1996. The program will review the timeliness, accuracy, and
completeness of the following tax functions: status determinations, cashiering, report delinquency, collections, field audit, and account maintenance.
When it is in operation, RQC will use three methodologies to measure
quality. First, computed measures based on data reported by the states,
including the tax measures used in DLA, will provide information on the
timeliness and completeness with which UI tax transactions occur. Second,
program reviews will examine tax systems for internal controls and will
check a small sample of transactions to verify the effectiveness of the internal controls in producing accurate results. Third, surveys will gather information on best state practices, and these will be compiled in a report and distributed by the U.S. Department of Labor.
Overall, the federal QC programs maintain their own data collection and
state reviewing operations, independent of the QA and UIRR processes. They
are also budgeted separately from the regular state administrative funding
system. 10 Funding for QC was approximately $35.2 million for FY 1993. This
represents approximately 1.4 percent of the $2.4 billion in state UI grants that
year.lI The BQC program was allocated 533 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff
positions for FY 1994, representing just over 1 percent of the total number of
PTEs in the Unemployment Insurance program. The RQC program currently receives 1 PTE staff position per state. 12

TABLE 6-1. State UI Activities Measured by Secretary's Standards (SS) and Desired levels of
Achievement (DlA)
State Activity Being Measured

Category
(55, DLA)

Performance Measure

-----------------------------------------

Initial Claims Promptness-Intrastate

SS

In Waiting-Week States: A minimum of 87 percent of fITst payments made within 14 days of
first compensable-week ending date. In Nonwaiting-Week States: A minimum of 87 percent
of fITst payments made within 21 days of fITSt compensable-week ending date. A minimum
of 93 percent of fITSt payments made within 35 days of fITst compensable-week ending date.

Initial Claims Promptness-Interstate

SS

In Waiting-Week States: A minimum of 70 percent of fITst payments made within 14 days of
first compensable-week ending date. In Nonwaiting-Week States: A minimum of 70 percent
of fITSt payments made within 21 days of first compensable-week ending date. A minimum
of 78 percent of first payments made within 35 days of fITst compensable-week ending date.

Initial Claims Promptness-UCFE

DLA

In Waiting-Week States: A minimum of 70 percent of first payments made within 14 days of
fITst compensable-week ending date. In Nonwaiting-Week States: A minimum of 70 percent
of fITst payments made within 21 days of fITst compensable-week ending date. A minimum
of 78 percent of fITSt payments made within 35 days of fITst compensable-week ending date.

Initial Claims Promptness-UCX

DLA

In Waiting-Week States: A minimum of 87 percent of fITst payments made within 14 days of
first compensable-week ending date. In Nonwaiting-Week States: A minimum of 87 percent
of first payments made within 21 days of fITSt compensable-week ending date. A minimum
of 93 percent of fITst payments made within 35 days of first compensable week ending date.

Nonmonetary Determinations
Performance-Intrastate

DLA

For Separation Cases: A minimum of 75 percent of cases having acceptable scores. For Nonseparation Cases: A minimum of 80 percent of cases having acceptable scores.

Nonmonetary Determinations
Promptness-Intrastate

DLA

A minimum of 80 percent of determinations made in a timely manner.

""

Combined Wage Claims

DLA

A minimum of 75 percent of wage transfers made in a timely manner.

Appeals Perfonnance

DLA

A minimum of 80 percent of cases scoring 80 percent of points or more.

Appeals Promptness-Lower Authority

SS

A minimum of 60 percent of appeals decisions made within 30 days. A minimum of 80 percent of appeals decisions make within 45 days.

Appeals Promptness-Higher Authority

DLA

A minimum of 40 percent of appeals decisions made within 45 days. A minimum of 80 percent of appeals decisions made within 75 days.

Status Determination Promptness

DLA

A minimum of 80 percent of determinations of employer liability made within 180 days of
liability date.

Field Audits

DLA

A minimum penetration rate for contributory employer audits of 4 percent. A minimum penetration rate for large employer audits of 1 percent of the number of audits required for total
audit penetration rate.

Report Delinquency

DLA

A minimum of 95 percent of employers fIling reports by end of quarter.

Collections

DLA

A minimum of 75 percent of delinquent accounts with some monies obtained within 150
days from end of quarter.

Cash Management

DLA

A minimum of 90 percent of collected taxes deposited in Clearing Account within 3 workdays
of receipt. A maximum of 2 business days for transferring funds on deposit in Clearing Account
to Trust Fund. Withdrawal from state account in Unemployment Trust Fund an amount sufficient to maintain in benefit payment account a balance equivalent to not more than 1 day's benefit payment requirement from the account.

Benefit Payment Control

DLA

A minimum recovery of 55 percent of regular state UI fraudulent overpayments. A minimum
recovery of 55 percent of regular state UI nonfraudulent overpayments.

w

SOURCE: Cook, Brinsko, and Tan (1993).

94/ ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

WORKLOAD VALIDATION PROGRAM
The Workload Validation Program was initiated in the late 1970s to standardize the workload definitions used by states for budget items. This standardization was needed primarily for use in the budget allocation process.
Workload items are validated for quantity and quality. Quantity validation,
which measures accuracy, applies to workload items in the following categories: initial intrastate claims (new and additional claims), continued weeks
claimed, agent and liable (interstate) initial claims, nonmonetary determinations, lower- and higher-authority appeals, active employers, and wage items.
Quality validation is required for all of these categories except for that of
agent and liable (interstate) initial claims and that of wage items.
States are responsible for planning, implementing, and reporting the validation program according to federal guidelines. The federal regional UI
office audits and oversees the validation process and supplies technical assistance when requested by the states.
CONFORMITY AND COMPLIANCE REVIEWS
Conformity and compliance reviews are intended to ensure that state laws
and procedures conform to and comply with all federal UI requirements in
the Social Security Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (U.S.
Department of Labor 1993a). (Conformity refers to agreement of state law
with federal law and with the Secretary of Labor's interpretations of the law.
Compliance refers to the consistency of state policy and practice with federallaw.) For disbursements from the federal UI trust fund and for administrative grants to be released to a state, the Secretary of Labor must certify to the
Secretary of the Treasury that the state is in conformity and compliance. 13
Most conformity or compliance issues are resolved informally. To resolve a
conformity issue, a state must indicate that it will change its law or its interpretation of the law. To resolve a compliance issue, it must correct its practices.
If informal attempts to resolve such issues fail, the state is notified in writing by the U.S. Department of Labor of a final opportunity to take corrective
action before a hearing process is initiated. If the proceedings determine that
the state is out of conformity or compliance, it can lose certification and, as
a result, the FUTA tax credit and part or all of its administrative grant.
Substantial nonconformity or noncompliance is required before certification
is withheld. (In fact, certification for the FUTA tax credit has never been
withheld.) Certification decisions may be appealed through the U.S. Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court. 14
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PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT REVIEW
The Performance Measurement Review (PMR) project was initiated in 1988
to "examine, evaluate and improve the mechanisms for performance measurement in the VI Service oversight of state VI programs" (Macro
International, Westat, and The Urban Institute 1991). The project aims to
coordinate and improve the various VI oversight systems.
In its first phase, PMR proposed new timeliness and quality measures that
would be field-tested, including timeliness measures for aspects of the program that were not previously measured. 15 Timeliness is an important component of state compliance with the provision in the Social Security Act that
requires the use of "such methods of administration as are found by the
Secretary of Labor to be reasonably calculated to insure full payment of
unemployment compensation when due."16
The PMR project also proposes to improve other quality measurements
by including all forms of adjudication (including benefit payment denials),
rather than only examining selected categories. 17 When fully implemented,
the PMR measurements will replace the benefit standards currently in the QA
program, and the revenue components of QA will be absorbed by the new
Revenue Quality Control program.

CONCLUSION
Currently, the primary purpose of the various performance measurement programs in the Ul system is to direct and inform state program improvement
efforts. In most cases, there is little threat of sanctions or other consequences
if states fail to meet standards or if other inadequacies are uncovered by performance measurement programs. Indeed, even the sanctions for conformity
and compliance requirements, which are statutorily determined, are rarely
imposed. These sanctions, which include the loss of administrative funds or
loss of the FVTA tax credit, are so severe that every effort is made to correct
deficiencies or to negotiate compromises before they are enforced. In theory,
however, various forms of performance measures and standards could be
used to help ensure that national objectives in the VI system are preserved.

NOTES
1. The Performance Measurement Review, a project initiated by the u.s. Department of
Labor in 1988, is revising the QA performance measures and benchmarks. Also see Fu
Associates (1994) and Cook and Kirchner (1995) for additional information.
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2. Quality Control includes two separate programs-Benefit Quality Control and
Revenue Quality Control.
3. See U.S. Department of Labor (1994a) for additional information and results.
4. Cook, Brinsko, and Tan (1993).
5. After approval from the federal regional UI office, state agencies generally submit
Corrective Action Plans as part of their Program and Budget Plan (which represents their
application for administrative funds). The Program and Budget Plan is then submitted to
the national Unemployment Insurance Service office, which reviews the package and
notifies the regional office of any concerns.
6. The UIRRs include two weekly reports, nine monthly reports, eight quarterly reports,
and three annual reports, as well as additional reports that are submitted when specific
programs (such as Extended Benefits) are activated in a state.
7. See U.S. Department of Labor (1994b) for additional information and reports on state
performances. The BQC program grew out of a test study conducted by the National
Commission on Unemployment Compensation that revealed that the actual error rate for
UI payments was higher than reported.
8. Each state received resources to investigate an average of 785 cases in 1993.
Individual state sample sizes varied, with the smallest states receiving resources to investigate 475 cases, and the largest, 1,754 cases. Some actual state sample sizes varied slightly from resource allocation targets, but it is required that the sample size fall within minimum and maximum limits specified by the federal government.
9. See U.S. Department of Labor (1993b) for additional information.
10. Funds for VIRR and QA are included in the regular VI base and contingency administrative budget, whereas QC has a separate budget line item.
11. Federal VI Service staff indicate that FY 1993 funding for QC included $34.4 million from the state administrative budget, and $0.8 million from the national activities
budget. In FY 1994, the totals were $36.5 million and $1.1 million, respectively.
12. Federal UI Service staff indicate that there are currently 19.5 FTEs in Quality
Control who are assigned to the national office (4 of them are assigned to RQC). The
workers in these FTEs do not, however, work exclusively on QC; conversely, there may
be other staff members who work on QC but are not assigned to that program.
13. Certification requirements exist in three areas: Section 3304 of FUTA (for the 5.4
percent FUTA tax credit), Section 3303 of FUTA (which requires experience rating), and
Section 303 of Social Security Act (which provides state administrative grants).
14. Procedures for withholding payment and certifications are codified at 20 CFR 601.
15. The timeliness measures selected for field testing included the timeliness of the following: first payments (initial claims), continued-weeks payments, adjudications, adjudication implementation, adjudication redetermination, lower-authority appeals, lowerauthority decision implementation, higher-authority appeals, combined wage claims and
wage transfers, combined wage claims and billing, and combined wage claims and reimbursements.
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16. The "when due" provision is contained in Section 303(a)(l) of the Social Security
Act of 1935.
17. The quality measures selected for field testing included the quality of the following:
adjudication, lower-authority appeals, combined wage claims and wage transfers, combined wage claims and billing, and combined wage claims and reimbursement.

7 / Experience Rating

IN MOST STATES, benefits under the Unemployment Insurance system are
financed through employer payroll taxes that are assessed by the states.'
States are currently required by FUTA to finance program benefits through
an "experience-rated" tax structure-that is, the rate of taxation under a
given tax schedule2 varies with an individual employer's experience with
unemployment. In other words, employers who create the most cost for the
system are assessed the highest tax rates. 3
CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE THE BEHAVIOR OF FIRMS
It is often argued that experience-rated UI taxes allow state governments and

the federal government to influence employers' behavior in socially beneficial ways. For example, experience-rated taxes can influence firms to reduce
layoffs and to participate actively in the process by which the eligibility of
claimants is determined.
Economists, however, often assert that the entity (in this instance, employers) on which a tax is legislatively imposed may be different from the entity
that actually pays the tax. Thus, it is possible that some or all of the ultimate
burden of UI taxes could be shifted from employers to workers in the form of
lower wages or benefits, or to consumers in the form of higher prices.
Recent research by Anderson and Meyer (1994) focuses specifically on
this question with regard to experience-rated UI taxes. Their estimates indicate that a firm is able to shift a flat tax (for example, the minimum tax rate
within that firm's industry) to its employees, but that it is much less able to
shift the portion of its taxes that are experience-rated. Thus, according to this
study, a significant percentage of experience-rated taxes actually are paid by
99
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the individual finn. Overall, the research by Anderson and Meyer (1994) supports the belief that experience-rated taxes do, in fact, influence firms' decisions and behavior.
Thus, an experience-rated UI tax (rather than a flat tax) is likely to support several VI program goals. First, experience rating provides a financial
incentive (in the fonn of reduced tax burden) for individual employers to stabilize their employment and avoid layoffs. Second, it charges the costs of VI
to those employers who are responsible for unemployment. Third, it provides
an incentive for employers to police the VI program by protesting ineligible
claims for benefits.
Assigning costs through experience rating, however, may also have negative consequences. First, finns may choose to limit future exposure to VI
costs by increasing the hours of current workers rather than by hiring new
workers when the firm's workload increases. Such decisions would have the
effect of increasing the level of unemployment in the country. Second, if too
large a percentage of VI costs is charged back to firms, employers would bear
costs for which they should not be held exclusively responsible (for example,
in the case of unemployment not caused by the employer, but in which workers are still found to be eligible for VI). Third, experience rating may result
in inappropriate employer involvement in the eligibility determinations and
appeals processes if some employers contest legitimate VI claims in an effort
to minimize their VI tax burden. Additionally, the timing of the experience
rating financing structure can result in an increase in employers' tax rates at
a time when employers are already facing financial hardship.
Each of these positive and negative implications is discussed below, following a general discussion of the level of experience rating-that is, of how
much employers actually pay toward VI benefits for fonner employees. The
potential outcomes of experience rating would be expected to vary depending largely on the actual level of experience rating.

LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE RATING
Vnder a "perfectly" experience-rated system, employers would pay doIIarfor-dollar the actual UI benefits generated by all previous employees (regardless of the employee's particular reason for separation). In practice, experience rating is far from perfect, with some employers incurring little or no
additional cost for an additional layoff.
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Impedect experience rating occurs for numerous reasons, including the
following: low maximum tax rates, minimum tax rates set at zero, partial forgiveness of charges for employers with negative-balance reserve accounts,
disqualifications for separation issues, dependents' benefits, net overpayments, financing of Extended Benefits, assignment of tax rates to new
employers, firms going out of business, special industry rates, caps on
changes in annual employer tax rates, solvency surtaxes, and low state taxable
wage bases (U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Inspector General 1985).
Perfect experience rating is not considered the optimal level, because
noncharges are generally deemed to be reasonable in circumstances that are
beyond an employer's control or when unemployed workers are engaged in
activities that are considered socially desirable-such as training. Additionally, some charges are ineffective because an employer is inactive and
has a negative account balance, or because states have made decisions to cap
or write off large negative balances. Although it is generally recognized that
"pedect" experience rating is not the appropriate goal, there is no agreement
about the specific level of experience rating that would be appropriate.
Indeed, it is difficult even to measure the degree of experience rating that
currently exists. Although it has a number of limitations, the Experience
Rating Index (ERI) calculated by the U.S. Department of Labor's
Unemployment Insurance Service is the only overall measure of experience
rating.4 The ERI is defined as the benefits paid in a one-year period (less the
amount of noncharges, ineffective charges, and inactive employer charges)
divided by total benefits. This ratio measures the percentage of benefits
charged to individual employers. The ERI provides a limited picture for a
number of reasons. For example, it does not account for changes in trust fund
balances, and it incorporates only tlle current year's data.
Table 7-1 provides the state and U.S. average ERIs from 1988 through
1994 (the only years for which the ERI is available). The ERI can be used to
make within-state and national comparisons over time, but it is considered
misleading to make strict comparisons across states because of differences in
state laws and in the timing of charges made to employers. Between 1990 and
1994 the ERI declined in 35 states and increased in 18 states, and between
1990 and 1992 the U.S. average dropped from 66 to 56. This change, however, was probably most atuibutable to the recession of the early 1990s, during which more employers were at the state maximum tax rate; this would
have caused an increase in ineffective charges.

TABLE 7-1. Experience Rating Ind~x-,--by State, 1988-1994
State
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

71
80
48
65
45
62

78
80
47
67
53
51
56
66
65
56
64
86
91

56
78
60
64
65
47
70

49
69
58
52

NA

74
83
56
68
60
58
71

47
68
61
47
55
83
81
78
64

79
42
62

64

77

73
79
87
60

NA

72

55
80
67
40
61
54
61
66

54
67
66
54
58
58
57
67

NA
NA

NA

72

72

50
62
66
58
85
94
67
69
75
85
60
62
50

56
65
63
53
80
84
70
69

72

72

88
52
62
40
70
62
42
61
61
60
63

61
80

78
59
73

69
53
59
62
63
68
81
75
63
61

NA

N.A.

NA

70
63
55
50

62
70
50

65
74

57
74
60

70
48

64

72

64

64

42
N.A.

62
53
52
32
44
79
78

74
57
58
83
41
65
43
63
58
51
55
55
57
41
55
63
62
51
44
60
65
31

1993

1994

64

52
81

76
53
53
62
49
82
N.A.

67
58
36
54
76
75
67
58
66

NA

53
68
59
83
64
75
75
33
50
71
75
66
59
72

50

75
60

NA

N.A.

47
73
64
53
63
73
56
59
68
51
62
60
42
56
65
37

58

77

77

69
50
70
63
55
72
77

38
67
84
31
64
73
66
(continued)
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TABLE 7-1. (continued)
State

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

59
66
75
58
59

56
65
68
65
48
66
55
70
63

60
62
58
61
45
68
52
69
58

51
56
55
54
49
71
51
66
54

50
57
64
52
44
73
49
61
48

48

53
61
70

63
69
69
62
38
69
58
70
66

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

65
60
83
90
38
63

68
63
51
82
62
66

70
63
56
78

61
61
58
66
55
62

51
57
56
65
63
56

66
48
62
70
60

77

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virgin Islands
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
U.S. Average

N.A.

N.A.

66

64

75
58
47
73
N.A.

66
51

39
59
70

NOTE: "N.A." indicates data are not available. The ERI is not applicable for Alaska and Puerto Rico.
Alaska uses the payroll decline method; Puerto Rico had a flat tax until 1993.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service.

PRIMARY EFFECTS

This section discusses the four primary effects of experience rating-stabilization of employment, allocation of costs, employer participation, and timing of tax adjustments. The following subsections discuss the theory that
underlies each effect, the extent to which desired goals have been achieved,
and the extent to which related negative effects may also occur.
Stabilization of Employment

In theory, financing VI through an experience-rated system of employer
taxes should discourage layoffs and, as a result, stabilize employment by
reducing the number of individuals who lose their jobs. There are, however,
limits on the extent to which experience rating can affect employers' layoff
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decisions. First, any increased Dr cost associated with a layoff is often more
than offset by the labor cost savings (in wages and benefits) from the layoff.
Second, layoff decisions are frequently based on major external economic
conditions beyond the control of employers (for example, business cycles,
demand changes, technology changes). Third, Dr taxes represent only a small
percentage of total employee costS.5 Finally, to the extent that experience rating is imperfect, the full effects of stabilization will not occur.
Major research findings indicate that the current system of imperfect
experience rating does stabilize employment and that perfect experience rating would reduce labor turnover even more (see Table 7-2). Most research
has used analytic techniques to estimate the amount of unemployment that
could be avoided through higher levels of experience rating. The research
indicates that approximately 30 to 50 percent of the unemployment that is
attributable to temporary layoffs (rather than to permanent job loss or to leaving jobs) could be avoided with perfect experience rating. This would result
in a decrease in the overall unemployment rate of between 0.8 and 1.5 percentage points during the time of the studies. 6 Some researchers suggest that
these estimates are likely to be overstated because of a number of limitations
in the available data. 7
These gains may be offset, however, if fear of future costs due to experience rating discourages employers from hiring new workers, and they rely
instead on existing employees to work longer hours. Further, some employers-especially small ones-that need to layoff workers may find that their
tax rates increase so dramatically as a result of those layoffs that additional
layoffs then become necessary. No research has been done on these possible
negative effects of experience rating.

Allocation of Costs
Financing Dr through an employer experience-rated tax system allows the
costs of unemployment to be attributed to the employer who created those
costs. The extent to which this objective is achieved depends on the state's
taxing structure. For example, when states have low maximum Dr tax rates,
many individual employers may be at the maximum tax rate and would face
no additional costs associated with a layoff. rn addition, states often shift to
higher tax schedules when their Dr trust fund balances decline. For employers that already have relatively high maximum tax rates, these shifts frequently result in little additional burden if a firm is a negative-balance
employer (that is, an employer whose workers consistently receive more in
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benefits than the employer pays in taxes): Instead, a disproportionate share of
the burden resulting from the shift in tax schedules is passed on to positivebalance employers (those employers who pay more in taxes than their workers receive in benefits).
As discussed above, there are valid reasons for a state to decide that some
VI benefits should be socialized (that is, subsidized by all employers in the
VI system rather than being paid for by a specific employer). For example,
most insurance mechanisms offer protection against large losses. Similarly,
under ill, most states offer protection to firms when they incur large VI costs;
this takes the form of writing off portions of balances for firms with large
negative reserves and placing a cap on the annual increase in the tax rate that
a firm pays. In addition, in those instances in which the unemployment
occurred through no fault of the employer (for example, when individuals
quit their jobs and receive benefits after a temporary disqualification),
employers should not be financially responsible for the associated ill
expense. States do socialize costs in many of these cases.
While the level of the ERI in a state indicates the general extent to which
costs are attributed directly to the employer creating the cost, it masks any
inequitable relationships across firms or markets. Research indicates that some
firms are receiving a subsidy from imperfect experience rating, while others
are paying the cost. Table 7-3 presents four research efforts that addressed this
issue. The extent to which such subsidization occurs across firms and industries reflects the extent to which costs are misallocated to firms.
The research indicates that there is significant interindustry subsidization
of VI benefit costs, as more stable industries, such as finance, insurance, and
retail, provide large subsidies to less stable industries, such as construction.
A study conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of the Inspector
General (1985) found that, in 1983, negative-balance employers contributed
only $1.00 for every $3.10 in benefits that were paid. The study also found
that when a higher tax schedule was in effect (usually in periods of a state's
experiencing lower ill solvency), a disproportionate burden of the increased
cost was passed on to positive-balance employers. Some researchers (Becker
1972b, and Anderson and Meyer 1993) have found that, in addition to these
industry differences, some researchers have found that small employers are
somewhat more likely to have a negative balance than are large employers.
This may be because any change in employment represents a much larger
percentage change in a small employers' labor force.
While appropriate allocation of costs is a goal of experience rating,
imperfect experience rating may result in less-than-optimal cost allocation,

TABLE 7-2. Research Results on Experience Rating: Its Effect on Employme!1t Stabilization
Researcher(s)

Data

Research Results Using Quantitative Data Analysis

Feldstein (1978)

Current Population Survey data of
almost 25,000 observations, 1971. Data
included demographic and employment
characteristics, but not variables on UI
tax system, UI benefits, or industry
information.

Layoff unemployment rate of 1.6 percent would have been reduced by
roughly half if employers were fully experience rated.* This result is not
based on any information regarding UI taxation, but instead on the
author's hypothesis.

Halpin (1980)

Survey of Income and Education data of
more than 40,000 individuals in 30
reserve ratio states, 1976. Data included
UI tax rate variables, earnings, and
demographic characteristics.

An increase in experience rating brought about by a 1 percentage point
increase in the effectiveness of the maximum tax rate (i.e., the tax rate that
a negative-balance firm would receive if benefits and taxes were equal) is
estimated to result in a decrease of 0.14 percentage point in layoff unemployment (a 10 percent drop in the rate for the 1976 sample).

Marks (1980)

Employer-level data of over 20,000
New Jersey manufacturing employers,
1975-1977. Data included UI tax information, number of employees, industry,
and turnover.

Over half of employers were assigned to the minimum or maximum tax
rate which did not change with marginal changes in benefit levels.
Employers at the maximum tax rate have layoff rates that are 2 to 3 times
higher than the layoff rates of those in the middle of the tax schedule.

UI-related data for all 52 states, 19671975. Data included UI benefit variables, experience-rating variables, and
covered employment.

An increase in the maximum tax rate or a decrease in the minimum tax rate
was found to increase the degree of experience rating and to reduce unemployment.

Saffer (1980)

Brechling and Jebn
(1978)

UI-related data for reserve ratio states,
1962-1969. Data included information on
UI taxes and coverage (but not UI benefits)
for the manufacturing industry.

An increase in experience rating by doubling the relevant tax rate applied
to firms with a negative reserve ratio would result in a 50 percent lower layoff unemployment rate. An increase in experience rating by increasing the
maximum tax rate by 10 percent (e.g., from 3.40 to 3.74 percent) would
reduce layoff unemployment as much as 7 percent from its existing leveL

Topel (1986, 1990)

Current Population Survey data of more
than 76,000 males, 1977-1981. Data included demographic and em-ployment information, and state-specific UI information.

Imperfect experience rating fails to prevent about 30 percent of all unemployment spells, the majority of which are from temporary layoffs. The
unemployment rate would have been 1.5 percentage points lower than its
level of 5.2 percent if experience rating were perfect.

Card and Levine
(1992)

Current Population Survey data of more than
185,000 individuals in 35 states, 1979-1987.
Data included demographic information, and
focused on 5 major industry categories.

A perfectly experience-rated system would reduce the temporary layoff
unemployment rate by 1 percentage point (50%) during the trough of a
recession. *

NOTE: An asterisk (*) indicates the model had low explanatory power.

TABLE 7-3. Research Results on Experience Rating: Its Effect on Allocation of Costs to Employers
.~~~~-

Researcher(s)
Becker (1972)

Data

Results

Benefit-cost rates for 11 states by indus- Industry: Due to imperfect experience rating, a number of industries have benefit
try,1957-1967.
payments larger than tax collections. For example, agriculture, mining, and construction have large ratios in most states, and transportation, trade, finance, insurance,
real estate, and services have small ratios in most states. In addition, there is a much
larger percentage of negative-balance firms in industries such as construction, mining, and agriculture than in industries such as manufacturing, transportation, trade,
finance and insurance and real estate, and services.
Firm Size: Looking at only 4 ofthe 11 states, small firms are more likely to have negative balances than large firms are; however, there is not a large difference between
the tax rates of small firms and large finns.

a
co

Munts and Asher
(1980)

Data submitted for 21 states by industry Due to imperfect experience rating, there are subsidies across industries: construction, manufacturing, and agriculture receive large positive subsidies; service and minon contributions, benefits, taxable and
total wages, and em-ployees, 1968-1978. ing receive smaller subsidies; and trade and finance, insurance, and real estate receive
negative subsidies (i.e., contribute more than paid out in benefits).

u.s. DOL, Office

Data from 12 audited states, 1983.

Employers with low unemployment subsidized employers with high unemployment
by $1.6 billion in the 12 states in 1983. Stable industries (e.g., financing, retailing,
services) subsidize more unstable industries (construction, manufacturing). Negativebalance employers were charged $3.10 in benefits for each $1 contributed.

Data for 6 reserve ratio states from the
Continuous Wage and Benefit History
(CWER) project, 1978-1984. Data
included a sample of records for covered workers (100,000-200,000 per
state) and their VI benefit status, as
well as firm's industry, employment
level, U1 tax rate, and payrolL

Industry: Due to imperfect experience rating, there are large subsidies to construction
in all 6 states and subsidies to manufacturing and mining in most states. Finance,
insurance, and real estate; retail and wholesale trade; services; and transportation
receive negative subsidies. The results for agriculture are mixed.

of Inspector
General (1985)
Anderson and
Meyer (1993)

Firm Size: There is some weak evidence which suggests that large firms have larger
subsidies.
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because of cross-industry subsidization and socialization. Many researchers
believe that experience rating should be increased, primarily through the use
of higher maximum tax rates and broader ranges in tax schedules, to ameliorate these problems (see, for example, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of
the Inspector General 1985; Vroman 1989; and Topel 1990). This would
increase the degree of experience rating and would reduce reliance on higher tax schedules and surcharges. s
Employer Involvement

An experience-rated tax provides employers with a clear financial incentive
to increase the level of their involvement in the UI system. Such involvement
could include a firm's scrutinizing former employees' UI claims, protesting
claims that are ineligible, reviewing charges to the firm's account, participating in the appeals process, and participating in the legislative process.
Because the system is financed by employers although the benefits generated go directly to workers, most resistance to the program is likely to arise
from employers.
Employers have an incentive to contest UI claims, since their ill taxes are
directly related to the extent to which their former employees receive UI benefits. In 1994, employers were responsible for 26 percent of lower-authority
appeals (approximately 256,000 employer appeals) and 32 percent of higherauthority appeals (approximately 57,000 employer appeals), according to
Unemployment Insurance Required Reports submitted by the states to the
U.S. Department of Labor. Both levels of employer appeals have grown more
rapidly than claimant appeals. Increasingly, employers are turning directly to
the large number of service companies that manage UI costs in order to monitor UI costs generated by former employees more closely.
It is difficult to determine the extent to which employers appeal even
those UI claims that are legitimate. The U.S. Department of Labor, Office of
the Inspector General (1985) offers some evidence that employers who pay
the maximum possible tax rate in each state (and therefore incur additional
costs from benefit claims by former employers) file appeals less frequently
than do other employers, whose tax rates increase when their benefit costs
increase (see Table 7-4). This reflects the reduced incentive for employers at
the maximum tax rate to contest UI claims, since they face no additional cost
associated with each additional layoff. 9 ACUC staff calculations using
appeals data in two states also indicate that employers at the maximum tax
rate are less likely to file appeals than are employers at other tax rates.1O
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TABLE 7-4. Research Results on Experience Rating: Its Effect on
Employers' Intervention in UI_S-'--y_st_e_m____________
Researcher(s)

U.S. DOL,
Office of
Inspector
General (1985)

Data
Data from 12
audited states,
1983

Results
In 12 audited states, up to $1.1 billion (or 17 percent of total benefits) of "savings" were generated
because claimants were disqnalified as a result of
employers or states identifying separation issues
that made them ineligible for benefits.
Employers at the maximum tax rate were roughly
two times less likely to file benefit appeals than
were variable-rated employers.

This finding does not necessarily indicate that employers are making
excessive use of the appeals system. Such a conclusion might be valid if there
were evidence that employers' (or claimants') win rates vary systematically
with an employers'}evel of experience rating. Data from Wisconsin and Texas
(see note 10) do not, however, provide any evidence of such variation.
Alternatively, one might conclude that employers were making excessive
use of the appeals system if they won a substantially lower percentage of the
appeals that they filed compared to the percentage of appeals won by
claimants who file. Once again, there is no evidence that this is the case. 11
Timing of Tax Changes

The temporal relationship between prevailing economic conditions and the
assessment of experience-rated DI taxes andlor tax schedules can take three
forms. First, there can be a cyclical relationship: DI taxes and schedules can
be highest when revenues are most needed. Second, DI taxes can be levied at
a steady rate each year. Third, there can be a countercyclical relationship: UI
taxes and schedules can be highest when benefit drain is the lowest.
State tax schedules are determined, in general, by state economic conditions and by the solvency of the state UI trust fund. Individual tax rates are
usually calculated once a year. They take the average costs of only the previous three years into account. Consequently, experience rating typically
results in a tax structure that cycles one to three years later than does the
economy. Both the cyclical assessment of individual employers' DI taxes and
the cyclical assignment of a state tax schedule may have the effect of requiring employers to pay higher DI taxes when they can least afford them (that
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is, when the firm's financial position has required layoffs or when state economic conditions are poor). The cyclicality of experience rating may be even
greater in states with low taxable wage bases, since a low level of taxable
payroll can significantly constrain the amount of taxes collected during periods of prosperity. (This assumes that tax rates in these states have not been
increased enough to offset the low taxable wage base.)
Most researchers believe that a countercyclical system of experience rating individual employers (that is, the system in which tax schedules are kept
constant or reduced during times of recession and increased during periods
of economic growth) would be preferable to a cyclical assessment of costs.
However, the current level of solvency in most states' trust funds and states'
frequent use of solvency surtaxes and shifting tax schedules indicate that
many states are not currently in a position to move toward countercyclical
funding. A state's trust fund must be healthy in order to adopt countercyclical funding strategies, because low reserve levels often necessitate triggering
higher tax schedules or solvency surtaxes during economic downturus simply to remain solvent. For example, in the most recent recession, 15 states
had reserve ratios below 1 percent; between 1990 and 1992, these states
experienced an average change in tax rates of 51 percent, compared to a
change of 21 percent in all other states. While it is the low level of forward
funding (not the experience-rating system) that is primarily responsible for
the poor timing of employer tax increases, experience rating may compound
the timing problem.

CONCLUSIONS
A number of possible costs and benefits are associated with experience rating. Research indicates that the benefits in terms of reduced unemployment
are substantial. The research also indicates that increases in experience rating, brought about through higher maximum tax rates and broader ranges in
the tax rate schedules, would decrease the unemployment rate and improve
the allocation of costs to the employers and industries that generate those
costs. This would also decrease the current level of subsidization across
industries. There is no evidence that experience rating causes increased costs
to the VI system as a result of employers appealing a significant number of
legitimate VI claims. However, it is likely that experience rating, in conjunction with a low taxable wage base and low levels of solvency, contributes
to the cyclical funding of VI, thereby directly detracting from the system's
capacity for forward funding.
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NOTES
1. In addition to employers, employees also help pay payroll taxes in four states. See
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995,51) for more information.

2. The tax schedule in effect in a given state will vary depending on (1) state trust fund
solvency and (2) economic conditions.
3. See Chapter 6 of Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995) for additional background information on experience rating, as well as a detailed discussion on
the types of experience rating.
4. While there were earlier estimates of the degree of experience rating in the 1970s and
1980s, the studies were based on a small number of states and calculated very different
trends in the ERI (Wandner and Crosslin 1980; U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the
Inspector General 1985).
5. In 1993, employer UI taxes were 0.9 percent of total wages (U.S. Department of Labor
1995d).
6. Three studies provide estimates of this decline-Feldstein (1978), Topel (1986), and
Card and Levine (1992).
7. For example, the research usually (1) does not include individual employer tax rates
and instead usually focuses on industrywide averages, (2) does not have information on
which individuals actually receive UI and often assumes that all individuals on layoff
receive UI, and (3) may assume the economy is in equilibrium even if the study period
includes significant changes in the economy (Vroman 1989).
8. As noted in the report of the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Inspector
General (1985), higher tax schedules and solvency surtaxes often decrease the level of
experience rating.
9. As noted in technical comments to U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Inspector
General (1985, 131), these employers may have failed to participate in the appeals
process, which led to higher benefit charges and higher tax rates than those for other firms.
10. In Wisconsin, employers were the appellants in 19 percent of all appeals that
involved employers at the maximum tax rate and in 31 percent of all appeals that involved
employers not at the maximum. In Texas, employers were the appellants in 45 percent of
all appeals that involved employers at the maximum rate and in 55 percent of all appeals
that involved employers not at the maximum.
11. According to ACUC staff calculations, nationwide, employers win 34 percent of the
appeals that they file and claimants win 31 percent of the appeals that they file. See
Chapter 9 in this report for additional information.

8 / Trends in Determinations,

Denials, and Appeals

THE DETERMINATION OF monetary eligibility is a straightforward process that is
based solely on the employment and earnings history of the VI applicant.) In
contrast, the determination of nonmonetary eligibility is frequently a more
complex process, involving three general steps. First, the state agency must
define and impose a set of nonmonetary eligibility requirements. Second, in
each individual case, the state identifies whether or not there are nonmonetary
eligibility issues that need to be investigated. Third, in cases where nonmonetary issues are investigated, the state makes what is called a "determination" of
eligibility, based on information assembled from the employer and claimant.2
A number of nonmonetary eligibility requirements are applied when the
state is deciding whether an individual claimant will be awarded VI benefits.
In general, it is required that the individual demonstrate an ability and willingness to seek and accept suitable employment (be "able and available"),
and there must be no disqualifications related to the individual's most recent
job separation.
States disqualify individuals from receiving benefits for a number of reasons, including the following: voluntary separation from work without "good
cause" (a "voluntary quit"), discharge from employment due to misconduct
related to the job, refusal of suitable employment without "good cause," unemployment as a result of a labor dispute, or fraudulent misrepresentation to
obtain or increase VI benefits. These restrictions are designed to limit payment
to those workers who are unemployed primarily as a result of economic causes (U.S. Department of Labor 1995a).3 Because almost all eligibility requirements for receiving Unemployment Insurance are determined by the states, the
definitions of nonmonetary eligibility vary significantly across states.
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This chapter presents overviews of the determination, denial, and appeal
processes, followed by a discussion of trends in the numbers of determinations, denials, and appeals. Chapter 9 then presents quantitative analysis of
the causes of the trends in denials and appeals, and it concludes with additional discussion of the appeal system.
OVERVIEW OF THE DETERMINATION PROCESS

The extent to which nonmonetary eligibility requirements actually have an
effect on claimants depends largely on the extent to which nonmonetary eligibility violations are discovered. Just as there is significant variation across
states in the definitions of nonmonetary eligibility, there is also variation in
the processes used to detect determination issues (that is, primarily, the initial decision to pursue additional information on a separation issue or on a
claimant's continuing availability for work). Consequently, the process of
identifying and evaluating individual cases is an important step that ultimately determines the extent to which benefits are denied on the basis of
nonmonetary eligibility provisions.
Although a complete description of the methods used in each state to
detect and decide separation and nonseparation issues is not available, some
general information is known. The process varies depending on whether the
issue involves the initial separation from employment or a claimant's ongoing eligibility for VI benefits (that is, a nonseparation issue). Each of these
processes is described below.

Determination Process for Separation Issues
Determinations with respect to separation issues (that is, issues related to an
individual's separation from employment, such as voluntary separation from
work without "good cause," and misconduct) are made primarily on the basis
of the claimant intake process and of information obtained from employers.
The nature of intake procedures may have a direct effect on the number of
determinations. Areas of possible variation in intake procedures that could
have such an effect include the following: (1) when information on nonmonetary eligibility requirements is provided to claimants (either before or after
the intake process), (2) whether the filing of additional forms is required at
intake if a separation issue arises, and (3) how questions are posed to
claimants (for example, whether a request is made for a claimant's submis-
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sion of fact or whether a claimant's judgment call is acceptable on the matter of whether the separation action was with "good cause").4
With regard to the information obtained from employers, the procedures
used to solicit this information may significantly affect both the level and the
type of employer participation. Areas of possible variation in the processes
for obtaining employer information include the following: (1) when and how
information is gathered from employers (for example, whether a form is sent
out automatically with every application for ill benefits or whether all
responsibility for contesting a claim originates with the employer); (2) how
the questions are posed to employers; and (3) what types of follow-up measures are taken to ensure a response. In addition, the decision of individual
employers to protest the eligibility of VI claims dictates the extent to which
they participate in the VI system's eligibility determination process.

Determination Process for Nonseparation Issues
The number of determinations with respect to nonseparation issues (that is,
the issues related to an individual's ongoing eligibility, such as that person's
ability to work, his or her availability for work, and the earning of disqualifying income) depends largely on four types of information: (1) the intake
form; (2) ongoing claims forms, which include information on the claimant's
job search; (3) Eligibility Review Process (ERP) interviews, which focus on
detecting potential eligibility issues surrounding the claimant's job-search
efforts and availability for work; and (4) the claimant's responses to referrals
and job offers generated by the Employment Service.
States vary in how frequently they require ongoing claims forms to be
submitted, as well as in how they interpret and review the information submitted on the forms. For example, states are more likely to detect an issue if
they randomly audit some portion of employer contacts required to prove job
search activity or if they review the ongoing claims forms in detail. States
that lack review procedures or enforce them poorly would be less likely to
detect such issues. Similarly, states vary in the frequency with which they
schedule ERP interviews and office appointments and in their responses to
these interviews and appointments. In some states, missing one appointment
with VI staff is considered to be evidence of unavailability for work, whereas other states are concerned only with repeated broken appointments, and
still other states never consider this to be a reason to initiate a determination.
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OVERVIEW OF THE DENIAL PROCESS

After a determination issue has been identified, a fact-finding process is
undertaken to gather information from both the claimant and the employer.
The state's laws and regulations are then applied to those facts, and a decision is made as to whether ill benefits will be awarded to a claimant.
Research indicates that the percentage of claims that are denied for nonmonetary reasons in any given state is influenced more heavily by the percentage
of claims in which the state makes a determination than by the percentage of
determinations that ultimately lead to denials in that state (Corson, Hershey,
and Kerachsky 1986).5 As a result, the likelihood that any claim will ultimately be denied is a function of both the percentage of claims in which a
determination is made and the percentage of determinations that lead to
denial, but the former factor is more the more important of the two.
Corson, Hershey, and Kerachsky (1986) identified the following three
factors which also influence the denial rate: (1) the extent to which all factfinding is part of a recognized determination process; (2) the extent to which
states use in-person interviews; and (3) the extent to which a single staff person conducts both fact-finding and adjudication.
OVERVIEW OF THE APPEAL PROCESS

The Social Security Act, under which the UI system was established, requires
that when the determination process results in a denial of UI benefits, each
state must provide an "opportunity for a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal" (Section 303(a)(3». Every state also allows employers to appeal UI
benefit awards to claimants, and the state agency may also be involved in an
appeal. As a result of the 1971 U.S. Supreme Court decision in California
Department of Human Resources v. Java (402 U.S. 121, 91 S.Ct. 1347, 28
L.Ed.2d 666), claimants who have been found eligible for benefits are
allowed to continue receiving benefits unless and until a decision is made
that reverses that determination. Thus, an employer's filing an appeal does
not stop payment of benefits.
All states allow a claimant or employer at least one administrative appeal,
usually called a lower-authority or lower-level appeal. The amount of time
the claimant or employer has to file this appeal varies by state, ranging from
7 to 30 calendar days after a benefit determination has been made. 6 In more
than one-half of the states, a single hearing officer, generally referred to as a
referee or examiner, decides the appeal at this stage. In the remaining states,
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a panel comprised of a referee and two associates may also be used to decide
the lower-authority appeal. In such cases, the referee is typically an administrative law judge, and the associates are representatives of the interests of
employers and claimants. During the appeal, the officer(s) hears evidence
from both the claimant and employer, conducts a cross-examination, and
issues a written ruling, called a decision. This decision is final, pending further appeal, in all states except four, in which referees are permitted to reconsider their decisions within a certain time limit. 7
Although this is not required by the Social Security Act, all but three
states also provide claimants and employers the opportunity to file a second
administrative appeal, usually called a higher-authority or higher-level
appea1. 8 Again, filing time requirements vary across states, ranging from 8 to
30 calendar days after a lower-authority appeal decision has been made. In
about half of the states, a board of review or board of appeals is specifically
formed to decide UI higher-authority appeals. These boards are appointed by
the governor and consist of between three and seven members, who represent
labor, employers, and the public. 9 In the other states, an existing commission
or agency head serves as the higher-appeal authority. All states allow these
decisions to be appealed to the state courts for judicial review.

TRENDS IN DETERMINATIONS AND DENIALS
Determination Rates
According to data submitted by the states, 37 percent of all new claimant
unemployment spells in the United States in 1994 resulted in some form of a
nonmonetary determination. 'o The total number of nonseparation determinations (3.4 million) was slightly higher than the number of separation determinations (3.2 million). Nonseparation determinations, however, have generally been decreasing, and separation determinations have been increasing
as a share of total determinations since 1978.

Determination Rates for Separation Issues
In 1994, approximately 18 percent of new claimant unemployment spells
resulted in a separation determination. The ratio of separation determinations
to new claimant spells has fluctuated over time, but has been increasing since
its low of 11 percent in 1982 (see column 1 in Table 8-1). Approximately half

TABLE 8-1. U.S. Determination and Denial Rates for Separation
and Nonseparation Issues, 1971-1994
separation Issues

Year

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

Rale per
Initial Claim
(percenl)
(1)

15
17
18
15
15
18
19
20
18
14
14
11
13

14
14
15
16
17
17
16
15
16
18
18

Nonseparation

Iss-'::l~s

(percent)

Denial
Rale per
Initial Claim
(percenl)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

51
53
54
55
54
54
53
53
55
57
56
55
53
53
52
53
53
54
54
55
56
56
56
56

8
9

34
39
43
35
29
41
43
49
42
31
31
23
24
27
25
25
26
27
25
23
20
20
21
21

39
38
37
38
38
37
37
36
37
41
43
46
45
46
51
56
57
57
60
62
61
61
61
60

13

Determination

Denials per

Determination

10

8
8
10
10

11
10

8
8
6
7
7
7
8
9
9
9
9
8
9
10
10

~".-.-----~.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995b).
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Determination
Denial
Rate per 10
Denials per
Rate per 10
Claimant Contacls Determination Claimant Contacts
(percenl)
(percent)
(percenl)

15
16
13
11

15
16
18
15
13
13
11
11

13
13

14
15
15
15
14
13

12
13

13
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of the separation determinations in 1994 were for issues related to voluntary
leaving, and the other half related to misconduct.
Given the wide range of state procedures for detecting nonmonetary eligibility issues, it is to be expected that determination rates vary significantly
by state, as shown for separation issues in Table 8-2. (The table shows the
number of separation determinations per new UI spell as well as the state
rank; Nebraska has the highest determination rate, with a rank of 1.) The
1994 ratio of separation determinations to new claimant spells ranged from a
low of 8 percent in the Virgin Islands and Kentucky to a high of 89 percent
in Nebraska." As mentioned previously, significant differences in determination rates across states are likely to arise from different detection procedures
as well as from varying definitions of what constitutes a determination.

Determination Rates (or Nonseparation·/ssues
Because claimants may become ineligible at any time while receiving VI, nonseparation issues are usually expressed as a percentage of weekly claimant contacts (that is, of all weeks that UI benefits are claimed by active VI claimants).
In this chapter, nonseparation determinations are expressed per 10 weekly
claimant contacts. In 1994, of every 10 claimant contacts, 2.1 (or 21 percent)
resulted in a nonseparation determination (see column 4 of Table 8-1).
In 1994, 38 percent of nonseparation determinations related to "able and
available" issues, 25 percent to claimants earning potentially disqualifying
income, 21 percent to reporting requirements, and 5 percent to refusal of suitable work; the remaining 11 percent related to "other" issues. Over time, the
determination rate for able-and-available issues has decreased, becoming a
much smaller proportion of total nonseparation determinations.
By state, the 1994 rate of nonseparation determinations per 10 claimant
contacts ranged from a low of 2 percent in Tennessee to a high of 84 percent
in Utah (see Table 8-3).

Denial Rates
Two related measures 12 can be used to describe the frequency with which
denials occur: (1) the ratio of denials to determinations and (2) the ratio of
denials to either new claimant unemployment spells (for separation issues) or
weekly claimant contacts (for nonseparation issues). Table 8-1 displays both
measures and shows that in 1994, 56 percent of all separation determinations
resulted in denials and 60 percent of all nonseparation determinations resulted in denials.

TABLE 8-2. Determination and Denial Rates for Separation
Issues, by State, 1994

State

Determination
Rate per
Initial Claim
Rate Rank

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

12% 48
16
30
30
7
18
26
15
34
43
2
21
16
19
25
14
41
25
13
21
18
17
28
15
33
20
20
35
4
19
22
25
12
8
52
35
3
15
37
27
9
14
39
21
17
16
29
23
14
27
10
16
32
89
33
5
26
11
12
49

Denials per
Determination
Rat. Rank

78%
73
57
75
47
70
26
74
64
64

63
50
60
57
57
57
43
65
55
40
70
56
60
45
75
60
62
83
56
48
68

2
8
30
5
41
9
53
6
16
15
18
37
24
29
27
28
47
14
33
49
10

31
23
46
4
22
20
32
40
13

Denial
Rate per
Initial Claim
Rate Rank

9%
12
17
13

7
30
5
14
9
16
13

8
9
11

20
11
11

5
20
6
19
8
13

7
17
16
10

74
18
12
8

28
18
8
13
42
2
49
12
31
11

15
34
29
21
3
23
25
50
4
48
5
36
16
41
7
9
27
1
6
17
37
(continued)
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TABLE 8-2. (continued)
Denial

Determination

State

Rate per

Denials per

Rate per

Initial Claim

Determination

Initial Claim

Rate

Rank

Rate

Rank

Rate

Rank

12%
8
9
7
8
13
8
5
4
6
11
12
7
16

20
40
32
46
38
14
35
51
52
47
26
19
43

11

22
24
53
33
30
39
45
44

---~.~

North Dakota

20%
15
12
14

Ohio

13

Oklahoma

23
19

New Mexico
New York
North Carolina

Oregon
Pennsylvania

11

Puerto Rico

South Dakota

12
12
14
19

Tennessee

10

Texas

32
28
15
8
16
17

Rhode Island
South Carolina

Utah
Vermont
Virgin Islands
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia

13

Wisconsin

15
19

Wyoming

19
36
45
40
43
15
21
50
47
46
42
23
51
6
8
35
53
31
27
44
38
24

59%
51
69
47
62
59
42
47
35
49

25
36
12
43
19
26
48
42
52

77

3
17

63
69
50
40
73
46
53
53
61
46
36

39

11

38
50
7
45
35
34
21
44
51

11
4
8
9
8
7
7

10

NOTE: Rank = state rank, by rate. The higher a state's rate, the lower its rank.
According to knowledgeable sources in the Unemployment Insurance Service, there are problems
with some data reported by Nebraska.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (l995b).
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TABLE 8-3. Determination and Denial Rates for Nonseparation
Issues, by State, 1994

State

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

Determination
Rate per 10
Claimant Contacts
----"-Rate
Rank

53%
30
44
20
21
38
22
10

7
8
13
17
35
18
18
17
26
8
30
50
24
15
19
19
23
38
12
76
18
52
13

Denials per
Determination

"-----,---

Rate

3

84%
70
70
85
63
90
48
88
75
78
94
75
99
51
85
58
65
68
86
59
58
55
54
82
53
84
56
79
84
55
55

13

7
24
23
10

22
46
52
48
43
35
11

30
31
34
18
49
14
5
20
39
27
26
21
9

44
2
29
4
41

Rank

10

25
26
7
32
4
49
5
20
16
2
19
48
8
37
30
27

6
36
38
41

Denial
Rate per 10
Claimant Contacts
~"Rank-

45%
21
30
17
13

34
10

8
5
6
12
13
35
9
15
10

17
5
26
30
14
9

44

10

13
45
12
39
15

16
12
32
6
60
15
28
7

11

43
42

2
13

8
16
26
6
34
40
50
45
31
27
5
38
19
36
17
49
11

9
24
39
35
18
30
7
44
20
10

42
(continued)
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TABLE 8-3. (continued)
Determination

State

New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

Rate per 10
Claimant Contacts
Rate
Rank

16%
25
17
20
13

Oklahoma

11

Oregon

18
27
16
17
9
49
2
27
84
14
7
27
19
7
30
41

Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virgin Islands
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Denials per
Determination
Rate
Rank

38
19
36
25
42
45
32
17
37
33
47
6
53
15
1
40
50
16
28
51
12
8

39%
47
74
75
61
60
79
18
72

70
63
75
67
53
53
68
84
92
71
56
61
45

52
50
21
17
33
35
14
53
22
24
31
18
29
46
47
28
9
3
23
40
34
51

Denial
Rate per 10
Claimant Contacts
Rank
Rate

6%
12
12
15
8
7
14
5

12
12
6
37
14
44
10

6
25
13

4
18
18

46
32
28
21
41
43
23
51
33
29
48
4
53
22
3
37
47
12
25
52
15
14

NOTE: Rank = state rank, by rate. The higher a state's rate, the lower its rank.
According to knowledgeable sources in the Unemployment Insurance Service, there are problems
with some data reported by Nebraska.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995b).
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Denial Rates for Separation Issues
In 1994, approximately 10 percent of all new claimant unemployment spells
resulted in a separation denial (see column 3 in Table 8-1). The ratio of separation denials to new claims has fluctuated over time, but has been increasing since a low of 6 percent in 1982.
In 1994, the percentage of determinations that resulted in denial was 72
percent for issues related to voluntary leaving, and 41 percent for issues related to misconduct. Thus, determinations related to voluntary leaving are more
likely to result in a denial of benefits than are misconduct determinations. In
the majority of states, these denials resulted in disqualification for benefits
for the duration of the individual's unemployment spell.
By state, the 1994 percentage of new claimant unemployment spells that
resulted in a separation denial ranged from a low of 4 percent in Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands to a high of 74 percent in Nebraska (see note 11). The
last two columns of Table 8-2 display the number of separation denials per
initial claim and the state rank.

Denial Rates for Nonseparation Issues
In 1994, of every 10 claimant contacts, 1.3 (or 13 percent) resulted in a nonseparation denial (see column 6 in Table 8-1). Although the nationwide rate
of nonseparation denials per determination has increased significantly over
time, the rate of nonseparation determinations per 10 claimant contacts has
decreased (see column 4 in Table 8-1). Over time, this has resulted in a fairly steady rate of nonseparation denials per claimant contact. In 1994, 37 percent of denials were related to able-and-available issues, 25 percent to disqualifying income, 22 percent to reporting requirements, and 2 percent to
refusal of suitable work; the remaining 14 percent related to "other" issues.
In 1994, nonseparation denials were most likely to occur in determinations involving violations of reporting requirements (66 percent of such
determinations were denied), the earning of disqualifying income (61 percent
denied), or being unable to work or unavailable for work (59 percent denied).
Denials for these issues resulted in a temporary denial of benefits; as soon as
the claimant's condition changed, he or she regained VI benefits. Only 28
percent of determinations related to refusing suitable work resulted in a
denial of benefits. (In most states, an individual disqualified for this issue
would subsequently be ineligible for benefits for the remainder of his or her
unemployment spell). Over time, the rate at which denials are made per
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determination has increased significantly for able-and-available issues and
for reporting requirements. The rate has remained fairly stable in regard to
other issues.
Table 8-3 shows that the 1994 rate of nonseparation denials per 10
claimant contacts ranged from a low of 1 percent in Tennessee to a high of
60 percent in Nebraska (see note 11).

TRENDS IN APPEALS
Because of data limitations, all trends in appeals are examined for this report
using data on lower- and higher-authority appeals decisions, rather than data on
the number of appeals filed. Consequently, the terms "appeals" and "decisions"
are used interchangeably throughout this section to refer to appeal decisions. 13

lower- and Higher-Authority Appeals
Total appeals increased substantially between 1971 and 1994, with 1.2 million total appeals decisions in 1994-more than 3 times the total in 1971.
Lower-authority appeals constitute the majority of all appeals. They also
were responsible for most of the increase in the number of total appeals. The
number of lower-authority appeals decisions in 1994 was almost 1 millionalso more than 3 times the number in 1971.
The number of lower-authority appeals increased during recessionary periods between 1971 and 1994, in large part because of the increased number of
initial claims for UI benefits filed during recessions. However, recessioninduced increases in lower-authority appeals do not entirely account for the
overall increase. Lower-authority appeals as a percentage of initial claims
increased steadily, from l.8 percent in 1971 to 5.6 percent in 1994 (see Figure
8-1).14 Similarly, lower-authority appeals expressed as a percentage of total
denials increased sharply, from 11 percent in 1971 to 26 percent in 1994. 15
Higher-authority appeals comprise a much smaller proportion of total
appeals than do lower-authority appeals, but higher-authority appeals also
displayed a steady upward trend between 1971 and 1994. The number of
higher-authority appeals in 1994 was 180,000-almost 4 times greater than
in 1971. However, as a proportion of lower-authority appeals decisions, higher-authority appeals remained relatively constant, fluctuating between about
15 percent and 20 percent between 1971 and 1994.

FIGURE 8-1. Total Lower-Authority Appeals as a Percentage of Total Initial UI Claims,
1971-1994
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8
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o
Year

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995b).
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By state, the numbers of lower- and higher-authority appeals vary greatly.
Table 8-4 displays the percentage of initial claims that were denied and
appealed in each state in 1994. Tennessee had the lowest percentage of denials
per initial claim at 8 percent, while Nebraska had the highest at 123 percent. 16
Total lower-authority appeals as a percentage of initial claims ranged from 2
percent in Idaho to 14 percent in Colorado. Appeals as a percentage of denials
ranged from 4 in Nebraska to 73 percent in the District of Columbia. 17

Lower-Authority Appeals Decisions, by Issue
Between 1971 and 1994, appeals of separation determinations accounted for,
on average, about 60 percent of all lower-authority appeals, whereas appeals
of nonseparation determinations accounted for about 40 percent of the total.
The share of separation appeals increased slightly throughout the 1980s and
early 1990s, amounting to 67 percent of total decisions in 1994. Separation
appeals as a percentage of separation denials increased from about 15 percent
in 1971 to about 38 percent in 1994, whereas nonseparation appeals as a percentage of nonseparation denials increased from 8 percent to 16 percent.
Furthermore, substantial changes occurred in the issues involved in lowerauthority appeals during the years examined. Appeals of misconduct disputes
almost doubled. By 1994, misconduct appeals made up the largest proportion
of total lower-authority appeals, at 38 percent. Appeals of voluntary quit disputes, on the other hand, decreased from 40 percent of total lower-authority
appeals in 1971 to 30 percent in 1994. As a percentage of totallower-authority appeals, appeals related to refusal of suitable work, able-and-available
issues, and labor dispute issues were significantly lower in 1994 than in ] 971
(amounting to 2 percent, 6 percent, and less than 1 percent, respectively, of
total lower-authority appeals in 1994). Other nonseparation appeals, which
include issues of receiving disqualifying income and failing to comply with
reporting requirements, were almost 2 times greater in 1994 than in 1971,
amounting to 24 percent of total lower-authority appeals in 1994. 18

Lower- and Higher-Authority Appeals, by Claimants and Employers
Overall, claimants file a greater number of lower- and higher-authority
appeals than do employers. 19 Claimant appeals made up about 74 percent and
68 percent of lower- and higher-authority appeals, respectively, in 1994.
However, employers' lower-authority appeal rates have increased more than
claimants' have in the past 10 years. The employer rate of lower-authority

TABLE 8-4. Lower-Authority Denials and Appeals as a Percentage
of Initial UI Claims, by State, 1994

State

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Lousiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

Denials as a

Appeals as a

Percentage of

Percentage of

Appeals a ••
Percentage of

Initial Claims
Rank
Rate

Denials

Initial Claims

Rale

37%
30
49
26
18
62
17
22
16
23
20
20
34
21
32
19
26
8
43
31
34
18
21
24
26
41
16
123
31
35
16

8
16
3
19
36
2
41
26
44
22
30
31

13%
10

24
21
25
23
38
34
73
43
28
22
5
40
27
54
40
37
24
16
29
32
16
25
31
18

11

29
12
33
17
50
5
14
10

39
28
20
18
6
42
1
13
9
43

11

4
27
17
38

Rank

47
49
29
36
26
30
10

14

Rale

Rank

5%
3
12
5
5
14
6
7

32
48
2
27
35

1

11

7
20
32
50
8
24
3
9
12
28
44
19
16
45
27
18
42
48
51
23
43

10

11

6
4
2
8
9
11

10

3
10

5
10

6
3
6
8
7
2
5
9

6
6

21
17
3
10
25
36
51
15
12
4
6
47
5
30
8
26
46
22
16
18
50
28
13
24
23
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TABLE 8-4. (continued)
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Appeals as a
Percentage of
Denials
Rale
Rank

Denials as a

State
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania

Percentage of
Initial Claims
Rale
Rank

18%
22
14
18
15
19
19
9

Rhode Island

17

South Carolina

14
37
8
30
48
21
23
22
12
20
22

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

56%
23
26
28
14
43
21
46
19
28
18
46
32
20
21
20
21
37
22
32

38
25
46
37
45
34
35
49
40
47
7
51
15
4
27
21
24
48
32
23

2
31
25
22
46
6
34
4
40
21
41
5
15
39
37
38
35
13
33
17

Appeals as a
Percentage of
Initial Claims
Rate
Rank

10%
5
4
5
2
8
4
4
3
4
7
4
10
10

4
5
5
4
4
7

7
31
43
29
49
14
41
39
45
42
20
44
9
11

37
34
33
38
40
19

NOTE: Rank = state rank, by rate. The higher a state's rate, the lower its rank.
According to knowledgeable sources in the Unemployment Insurance Service, there are problems
witb the denial rates reported by Nebraska. It is possible, however, for denials as a percentage of initial claims to exceed 100 percent in tbis table because tbe denominator of tbis ratio does not include
the number of weeks that ill benefits are claimed by active ill claimants (tbat is, weekly claimant
contacts). Therefore, exclusion of the weeks of claimant contacts from the denominator causes the
denial rate to be overestimated. Measuring total denials as a proportion of total initial claims, however, allows tbis ratio to be directly compared with the ratio of total appeals to initial claims.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (l995b).
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appeals doubled over this period, from almost 5 percent in 1983 to almost 10
percent in 1994, whereas the claimant rate leveled off (see Figure 8-2). In
contrast, the trend in the ratio of higher-authority appeals to unfavorable
lower-authority appeals was similar for claimants and employers between
1971 and 1994.
In addition, the difference in success rate by employers and claimants has
changed over time. Currently, employers win a slightly higher percentage of
the lower-authority appeals that they file than do claimants. Employer appellants, however, won a smaller percentage of decisions at the lower appeals
levels between 1971 and 1994, whereas claimant appellants won a larger percentage (see Figure 8-3). Similar trends are observed for higher-authority
appeals. The gap between appellant success rates for employers and
claimants at both levels of appeals declined substantially, with success rates
converging around 32 percent for appellants in lower-authority appeals and
18 percent in higher-authority appeals. Thus, the success rate of employer
appellants is falling at both the lower- and higher-authority appeals, while at
the lower authority, their appeal rate is increasing.

SUMMARY
Overall, the number of times a state denies benefits to UI claimants on the
basis of nonmonetary eligibility issues is more dependent on the number of
determinations than on the percentage of determinations that lead to denials.
Currently, 10 percent of all new claimant unemployment spells result in separation denials, and 1.3 percent of all claimant contacts result in nonseparation denials. There have not been large shifts in the nationwide denial rates,
but the rate of determinations and the percentage of determinations resulting
in denials differ for separation and nonseparation issues. In cases involving
separation issues, both rates have been increasing slightly, although in cases
involving nonseparation issues, the determination rate has been increasing
but the percentage of determinations resulting in a denial has been decreasing. In addition, some nonmonetary issues are more likely to result in denials
than are others. Most notably, voluntary leaving issues and violations of
reporting requirements are most likely to result in denials, and issues related
to misconduct and refusal of suitable work are least likely to result in denials.
There is large variation across states in their reported determination and
denials rates.
Between 1971 and 1994, the number of both lower- and higher-authority
appeals increased. Lower-authority appeals as a percentage of both initial

FIGURE 8-2. Claimant and Employer Rates of Lower-Authority UI Appeals, 1971-1994
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SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995b).
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FIGURE 8-3. Claimant and Employer Success Rates, Lower-Authority UI Appeals, 1_971-1994
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claims and denials also increased. Furthermore, within lower-authority
appeals, separation appeals as a percentage of separation denials and nonseparation appeals as a percentage of nonseparation denials both increased.
In particular, appeals of misconduct issues increased substantially, whereas
appeals of voluntary quit, refusal of suitable work, and able-and-available
issues decreased.
For the period examined, the number of appeals filed by claimants was
higher than the number filed by employers. Employers, however, were
appealing at an increasing rate over time. The success rate of employers in
winning the appeals that they filed decreased at both lower and higher
authorities, whereas the success rate of claimant appellants increased. In
1994, both employers and claimants who filed appeals were winning about
32 percent of the lower-authority appeals and about 18 percent of the higherauthority appeals.

NOTES
1. For more information on monetary eligibility, see Chapter 7 of Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation (1995).
2. Corson, Hershey, and Kerachsky (1986) is the source of the information on how nonmonetary determinations and denials are made.
3. For more information on nonmonetary eligibility definitions, see Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation (1995, 101-123).
4. In addition, some of these factors could affect the number of individuals who apply
for benefits.
5. Stated somewhat differently, there is significantly more variation across states in
determinations per initial claim than in the ratio of denials to determinations.
6. Specific state information on filing time and hearing officers for lower- and higherauthority appeals was obtained from U.S. Department of Labor (1995d).
7. Referees in Hawaii, Ohio, and Tennessee have up to 30 days to reconsider a decision;
in Michigan, referees have up to 10 days to reconsider.
8. Hawaii, Nebraska, and the Virgin Islands do not provide a second administrative
appeal. Appeals of lower-authority decisions in these states are taken directly to the state
courts for judicial review.
9. Exceptions are Mississippi, where the board is appointed by the Employment Security
Commission, and New Jersey, where the board is appointed by the Director of
Employment Security.
10. Data for the analysis of trends in determinations, denials, and appeals were extracted from the Unemployment Insurance Required RepOlts (UIRR) database, which contains
statistics provided by the states.
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11. According to the Unemployment Insurance Service, there are problems with some
data reported by Nebraska.
12. The denial rate pel' initial claim (column 3 in Table 8-1) is the mathematical product
of the determination rate pel' initial claim (column 1) and the denials per determination
(column 2).
13. The states report UI appeals information monthly by filing Report 5130 ofthe UIRR.
Other than the number of appeals filed each month, Report 5130 provides information in
terms of decisions made on higher- and lower-authority appeals. Therefore, to remain consistent, the analysis reported here uses "decisions" to approximate "appeals."
Between 1971 and 1994, the percentage of lower-authority appeals decided ranged
from 83 percent to 100 percent, and was below 93 percent in only four of those years. The
percentage of higher-authority appeals decided ranged from 84 percent to 100 percent,
and was below 93 percent in only six of those years. Therefore, the number of decisions
closely approximates the number of appeals and is adequate to analyze trends in UI
appeals.
14. The number of initial claims has increased 15 percent between 1971 and 1994.
15. In contrast to the increase in initial claims, the number of denials has remained relatively constant between 1971 and 1994.
16. According to the Unemployment Insurance Service, there are problems with the
denial rates reported by Nebraska. It is, however, possible for this ratio to exceed 100 percent because the denominator of the ratio does not include the number of weeks that ur
benefits are claimed by active UI claimants (that is, weekly claimant contacts). Therefore,
exclusion of the weeks of claimant contacts from the denominator in Table 8-4 causes the
denial rate to be overestimated. Measuring total denials as a proportion of initial claims,
however, allows this ratio to be directly compared with the ratio of total appeals to initial
claims.
17. Again, misreporting of data by Nebraska may make this figure artificially low.
18. Because the UIRR Report 5130 does not separate the "other" category by issue,
changes over time in appeals decisions with respect to specific issues within this category cannot be determined.
19. The figures in this section include only lower- and higher-authority appeals involving claimants and employers. Appeals in which the UI agency was a party are excluded.
They represent an average of 0.1 percent of total lower-authority appeals and 1 percent of
higher-authOlity appeals during the peliod 1971 to 1994.

9 / Analysis of Denials

and Appeals

THIS CHAPTER FOCUSES ON A NUMBER OF FACTORS that may affect the declining
receipt of Unemployment Insurance (UI) among the unemployed. The next
major section, "Explaining Denial Rates, Appeal Rates, and Appeal Outcomes," examines the following: (1) the rates at which state agencies deny
benefits to UI claimants, (2) the rates at which employers and claimants
appeal those decisions, and (3) the success rates of employers and claimants,
or the rates at which they win the appeals they bring. (The trends discussed
in the section were considered in detail in Chapter 8.) Using aggregate state
data from 1978 to 1990, the section entitled "Analysis of Appeal-Level Data"
then provides some explanation for the variation across states in the three
measures. Using 1994 appeal-level data from Texas and Wisconsin, additional research is conducted on the rates at which appeals are made and the parties that are likely to win their appeals. The final section, "Case Study of
Lower-Authority Appeals," discusses the ACUC case study of the appeals
system in eight states.

EXPLAINING DENIAL RATES, APPEAL RATES,
AND APPEAL OUTCOMES
In its discussion of trends in denial rates and appeal rates, the preceding
chapter indicates that there are significant differences in these rates, both
across states and over time. Awareness of these trends is important because
more appeals require more financial resources and time-and, as pointed out
in Chapter 8, the number of appeals has been increasing in recent years.
While claimants clearly have a right to appeal their Ul decisions, the increase
in the number of appeals could signal problems elsewhere in the overall UI
135
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program. Such problems may be related to changes in state administration
and eligibility criteria. Because the denial and appeal rates are directly linked
to UI eligibility and to the receipt of UI benefits, understanding the denial
and appeal rates may improve understanding of the process of eligibility
determination and how it affects VI claimants.
To understand the trends in denial rates, lower-authority appeal rates,
and appeal outcomes over time and across states, the Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation conducted regression analyses on these
issues. Details of the research methodology are reported in Appendix B.
This section discusses the empirical analyses using annual, state-level panel
data from 1978 to 1990, and the next section presents the empirical research
on appeal rates and success rates for both employers and claimants using
rnicrolevel data on appeals in two states-Wisconsin and Texas-for which
data were available to the Advisory Council.

Factors Influencing Denial Rates, Appeal Rates, and Appeal
Outcomes
For the regression analyses, the following variables were selected to describe
the denial rates, appeal rates, and appeal outcomes: trust fund solvency, state
tax collections, penalties associated with nonmonetary eligibility requirements, the efficiency of state administration, VI benefit generosity, and labor
force characteristics.! The regressions included dummy variables representing
each state, to determine which states had denial rates, appeal rates, or appeal
outcomes that were higher or lower than would have been expected from the
regression analysis. 2 The remainder of this section presents the results from
the regressions and includes maps that display geographic pattems in denial
rates. Only statistically significant results are discussed below.

Empirical Results
Separation and Nonseparation Denial Rates
To analyze denial rates, different equations were estimated for separation
issues (issues raised by employers regarding claimants' separation from work)
and nonseparation issues (raised by state agencies regarding claimants' ongoing eligibility for VI benefits). The variables used in this analysis explained
more of the differences across states and time for separation issues than they
explained for nonseparation issues.
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The regression results indicate that high separation denial rates are associated with the following: (1) nonmonetary eligibility penalties for separation issues which disqualify individuals from receiving benefits for less than
the full duration of unemployment (that is, more lenient penalties for voluntary quits and misconduct than are assessed by most states);3 (2) lower
weekly benefit amounts; (3) lower percentages of job losers; and (4) lower
rates of unemployment. High nonseparation denial rates are associated with
the following: (1) lower reserve ratios, (2) shorter duration of UI benefits,4
(3) lower rates of unemployment, and (4) lower rates of unionization.
A large amount of state variation in denial rates could not be explained
by the policy variables in the models discussed above. 5 An examination of
the patterns of denial rates across the United States reveals geographic clusters of high and low rates. Figure 9-1 maps the average separation denial
rate between 1978 and 1990, and Figure 9-2 maps the nonseparation denial
rate for the same period. These maps indicate that states' denial rates display
distinct geographical patterns. For example, Figure 9-2 displays a group of
contiguous states in the East that have particularly low nonseparation denial
rates, and it shows a large group of states in the West that have high nonseparation denial rates. These patterns could be the result of various factorsincluding cooperation among states or competition among states. In the case
of either cooperation or competition, neighboring states may be adopting
similar state laws or similar state administrative procedures, particularly in
the area of eligibility.
The statistical significance of many of the coefficients of the state dummy
variables from the regressions (presented in Appendix B) demonstrates that
the state variation that remains unexplained has an impact on denial rates. An
examination of the geographic patterns of the significant state coefficients
(see Figures 9-3 and 9-4) finds clusters similar to those of the denial rates
illustrated in Figures 9-1 and 9-2. For example, Figure 9-4 shows that the
group of states in the West with high nonseparation denial rates (Figure 9-2),
also has state coefficients that are positive and statistically significant. This
indicates that the denial rates in these states are higher than would be expected, given the effects of the other independent variables included in the analysis. (All effects of the state dummy variables are relative to Pennsylvania.)

Employer and Claimant Appeal Rates
Separate regression equations were estimated for employer and claimant
appeal rates. The variables used in these equations explained more of the

FIGURE 9-1. Average Rates at Which States Denied Benefits to UI Claimants on the Basis of
Separation Issues, 1978-1990
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FIGURE 9-2. Average Rates at Which States Denied Benefits to UI Claimants on the Basis of
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FIGURE 9-3. Statistically Significant State Coefficients from Regression Results for Separation
Denials, 1978-1990
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FIGURE 9-4. Statistically Significant State Coefficients from Regression Results for
Nonseparation Denials, 1978-1990
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differences across states and time for claimant appeal rates than they
explained for employer appeal rates. The regression results indicate that
high employer appeal rates are associated with the following: (1) higher
state taxable wage bases, (2) more stringent penalties for misconduct discharges, (3) higher denial rates, (4) longer durations of UI benefits, (5) lower
weekly benefit amounts (see note 4), (6) lower rates of unemployment,
(7) lower rates of unionization, and (8) higher percentages of job losers (see
note 4). High claimant appeal rates are associated with the following:
(1) higher effective tax rates, (2) more lenient penalties for refusal of suitable work, (3) more stringent penalties for misconduct, (4) higher denial
rates, (5) longer durations of VI benefits, (6) lower weekly benefit amounts
(see note 4), and (7) lower rates of unionization.
The statistical significance of most of the state coefficients from the
regressions (presented in Appendix B) indicates that unexplained state variation has a substantial impact on employer and claimant appeal rates. The
results indicate that a group of contiguous states in the Midwest and
Southwest has higher claimant appeal rates than would be expected (relative
to those of the reference state, Pennsylvania). The significant state coefficients from the employer appeal rate equation, however, showed no strong
geographic patterns.

Employer and Claimant Success Rates
Separate regression equations were estimated for employer and claimant success rates. Although individual variables in these regressions were significant, the overall models had low explanatory power (almost none of the variation across states and time was explained in either equation when the state
dummy variables were excluded). The results indicate that among employerinitiated appeals, high employer success rates are associated with only the
following variables: (1) lower effective tax rates and (2) lower rates of
employer appeals. These results suggest that when states have low tax collections, employers are more likely to win their appeals at the lower authority.
A number of variables were significant predictors of claimant appeal success. The results indicate that, among claimant-initiated appeals, high
claimant success rates are associated with the following: (1) lower effective
tax rates, (2) lower state taxable wage bases, (3) more lenient penalties for
voluntary quit and misconduct issues, (4) more stringent penalties for refusal
of suitable work, (5) Democratic state government, (6) lower quality of nonmonetary determinations, (7) higher denial rates, (8) lower rates of unioniza-
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tion, and (9) higher percentages of appeals filed by employers. Although the
explanatory power of the model was low, most of the significant variables
were anticipated.
Most of the states have insignificant coefficients in the employer success
rate equation (presented in Appendix B), whereas in the claimant success
rate equation, most have significant coefficients. Thus, the state dummy
variables were better able to explain claimant success rates than to explain
employer success rates. 6 The significant state coefficients indicate little geographic clustering of states with higher- or lower-than-expected employer or
claimant success rates.
Summary
All of the regression equations presented in this section, especially the success rate equations, performed relatively poorly, for two primary reasons:
(1) A number of variables were unavailable, although they could have added
significant explanatory power to the model. For example, information on the
administrative processes of the state UI programs and definitions of the nonmonetary eligibility requirements might have improved the regression equations' prediction of state variation (when the state dummy variables were
excluded). (2) States are probably not the best unit of measurement, especially in the equations estimating the appeal behavior of claimants and
employers. Appeal-level microdata-such as those presented in the next
section-provide a better framework for answering these questions.
ANALYSIS OF APPEAL-LEVEL DATA
The following questions can more appropriately be answered with appeallevel data than with state-level data: (1) Does the current structure that
finances UI benefits encourage employers to appeal legitimate cases or not?
(2) What factors predict which party will win an appeal? This section provides
background information on these two issues, and presents the results from an
analysis of 1994 appeal-level data from Texas and Wisconsin.
Effect of Experience Rating on Appeal Rates and Success Rates

In most states, VI benefits are financed exclusively through employer payroll taxes that are assessed by the state. 7 States are currently required by the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act to finance program benefits through an
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"experience-rated" tax structure. Under experience rating, the rate of taxation for a given tax schedule varies with an individual employer's unemployment experience. 8 In other words, employers who create the most cost
for the system are assessed the highest tax rates. 9 It is often argued that
experience-rated taxes allow state governments and the federal government
to influence employers' behavior in socially beneficial ways. Economists,
however, often assert that the entity on which a tax is legislatively imposed
(in this instance, employers) may be different from the entity that actually
pays the tax. 10
Recent research by Anderson and Meyer (1994), which focused specifically on the experience-rated UI tax that firms pay, indicates that firms are
able to shift flat taxes (for example, the minimum tax rate within that firm's
industry) to their employees, but that they are much less able to shift the
portion of their taxes that is experience-rated. Thus, a significant percentage
of experience-rated taxes are absorbed by the individual firm (see Chapter 7
on this subject).
As a result, an experience-rated UI tax (rather than a flat tax) is likely to
promote UI program goals by affecting a firm's decision making. One such
VI program goal is to provide a financial incentive for employers to police
the VI program by protesting ineligible claims. l1 This program goal, however, may result in negative consequences-for example, inappropriate
employer involvement in the eligibility determinations and appeals processes
if some employers respond to the financial incentives by contesting legitimate UI claims.
Since their VI taxes are directly related to the extent to which their former
employees receive UI benefits, employers have an incentive to contest UI
claims. In 1994, employers were responsible for 26 percent of lower-authority
appeals (a total of approximately 256,000 employer appeals). As previously
discussed, the rate of employer appeals has grown more rapidly than that of
claimant appeals (U.S. Department of Labor 1995b).

Description of Data from Texas and Wisconsin
The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation obtained 1994
microlevel data from two states-Texas and Wisconsin-that provided information on employer tax rates (in both states) and on the use of representation
by employers and claimants at appeals hearings (in Wisconsin only).12 The
data from Texas were a random sample consisting of 20 percent of all experience-rated employers in 1994. These data were merged with the correspond-
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ing lower-level appeals data for nonmonetary separation issues (3,561 hearings). The Wisconsin data included all lower-level appeals resulting from a
nonmonetary separation issue in 1994 (11,746 hearings).

Empirical Results: Appeal Rates
The Texas and Wisconsin data confirm earlier findings that employers at the
maximum tax rate are less likely to file appeals than are employers at other
tax rates (see U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Inspector General
1985). In Texas, employers brought 45 percent of all the appeals that
involved employers at the maximum tax rate and 55 percent of all appeals
involving employers at a tax rate other than the maximum. In Wisconsin,
employers brought 19 percent of all appeals involving employers at the
maximum tax rate and 31 percent of all appeals involving employers at a tax
rate other than the maximum (see Table 9-1). This finding does not necessarily indicate that employers are making excessive use of the appeals system. Such a conclusion might be valid, however, if there was evidence that
employer (or claimant) win rates vary systematically with an employer's
level of experience rating.

Empirical Results: Success Rates
Tabulations of the data from Texas and Wisconsin do not provide evidence
that employer success rates (that is, the number of appeals won by employers as a percentage of all appeals brought by employers) vary with experi-

TABLE 9-1. Employer Appeal and Success Rates, by Employer Tax
Rate, in Texas and Wisconsin, 1994 (percent)
Texas Data
Tax Rate
Less Than Maximum
Maximum Rate

Wisconsin Data

Appeal Rate

Success Rat.

Appeal Rate

Sucre.. Rale

55
45

14
14

31
19

26
28

NOTE: Data are based on 3,561 lower-authority appeal hearings from Texas and 11,746 lowerauthority appeal hearings from Wisconsin in 1994.
Employer success rate is defined as the number of appeals that employers win as a percentage of
all appeals filed by employers.
SOURCE: ACUC calculations, using data provided by Department of Industry, Labor, and Human
Resources, State of Wisconsin; and Texas Employment Commission.
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ence rating. Of the appeals filed by employers in Wisconsin, employers at
the maximum tax rate won 28 percent and employers at all other tax rates
won 26 percent. Of the appeals filed by employers in Texas, employers at
the maximum tax rate won 14 percent and employers at all other tax rates
also won 14 percent (see Table 9-1). Thus, this preliminary analysis of success rates by the level of experience rating does not provide evidence that
employers are making excessive use of the appeals system.
It is important to note that at least two main factors influence the outcome of an appeal. The first is which parties participated in the hearing, and
the second is which, if any, parties were represented (either by an attorney
or by an advocate who is not an attorney, such as a union official or a thirdparty employer representative). The regression results for Wisconsin presented later in this chapter provide additional information on how tax rates
influence employer success rates when important variables such as participation and representation are included. This more sophisticated analysis of
employer success also indicates that these rates do not vary significantly
with the experience-rated tax rate.
Finally, one might conclude that employers were making excessive use
of the appeals system if they won a substantially lower percentage of the
appeals that they filed compared to the percentage of appeals won by
claimants who file them. (This could indicate that employers were filing
appeals with less merit than the appeals filed by claimants.) There is no evidence that this is the case on a national level. In 1993, nationwide, employers won 34 percent of the appeals that they filed and claimants won 31 percent of the appeals that they filed (U.S. Department of Labor 1995b).
There is, however, considerable variation across states in the percentages
of appeals won by employers and claimants. Wisconsin data indicate that,
during 1994, employers won 28 percent of the appeals that they filed and
claimants won 29 percent of the appeals they filed. In Texas, however, data
indicate that employers won 14 percent of the appeals they filed and
claimants won 67 percent of the appeals they filed. Texas employers filed a
disproportionately higher share of appeals (55 percent compared to a national average of 26 percent), and claimants won a disproportionately higher
share of appeals (78 percent compared to a national average of 31 percent).
These statistics from Texas, while by no means conclusive, would be consistent with the hypothesis that employers in that state make excessive use of
the appeals system. 13
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Other Factors Influencing Appeals Outcomes
Little research has been devoted to understanding the VI appeals process
and the factors which affect the probability that either the employer or
claimant will win. This section discusses two relevant factors relating to
how well each side is able to present its case. The first factor is the importance of both parties participating in the hearing. The second is that representation may have a bearing on the effectiveness of case presentation. (See
the section below, "Case Study of Lower-Authority Appeals," for additional
information on these factors.)
The importance of participation depends on which separation issue is in
question. The burden of proof is placed on employers for misconduct issues
and on claimants for "voluntary quit" issues. Thus, if an employer did not
attend a hearing for a misconduct issue, the claimant would most likely win.
If an employer did not attend a hearing for a voluntary quit issue related to
good cause, however, the verdict would depend on whether the claimant
could prove he or she had good cause for leaving the job.

Participation
In both Texas and Wisconsin, claimants are more likely than employers are
to participate in lower-authority appeals. In Wisconsin, claimants participated in 66 percent of the total hearings (participation by telephone is included), and employers participated in only 16 percent. The claimant was somewhat more likely to participate in the hearing when he or she was the appellant (68 percent) than when the employer was the appellant (59 percent).
Employers participated in 16 percent of hearings in both circumstances.
In Texas, claimants participated in 70 percent of the total hearings (participation by telephone is included), and employers participated in 59 percent.
When the claimant was the appellant, claimants participated in 86 percent of
the hearings, whereas employers participated in 53 percent. When the
employer was the appellant, however, claimants participated in 58 percent of
the hearings, whereas employers participated in 65 percent. As expected, participation in a hearing increased the party's likelihood of winning when the
other party did not participate. Table 9-2 displays these results.

Representation
A second factor that increases the likelihood that one side or the other will
win an appeal is the use of representation (either an attorney or an advocate

TABLE 9-2. Lower-Authority Appeals Hearings: Appearance and
Success Rates in Texas and Wisconsin, 1994
Who Appears at Hearing
State

Only Claimant

Only Employer

Both Parties

Neither Party

20
36
7

9
3
14

50
50
51

21
12
28

87
4

N.A.

73
12

N.A.

46

712

320

1,792

737

53
55
46

3
3
3

13
13
13

32
29
38

43
23

1
59

33
33

2
30

6,168

324

1,508

3,746

Texas
Percent Appearing
All Hearings
Claimant Appellant
Employer Appellant
Success Rate (number)
Claimant
Employer
Number of observations

2

Wisconsin
Percent Appearing
All Hearings
Claimant Appellant
Employer Appellant
Success Rate (number)
Claimant
Employer
Number of observations

NOTE: N.A. indicates that the information is not available because sample sizes were too small to
estimate. Success rate is defined as the number of appeals claimants (employers) win as a percentage of all appeals brought by claimants (employers). Percents may not add to 100 due to rounding.
SOURCE: ACUC calculations, using 1994 data provided by Department of Industry, Labor, and
Human Resources, State of Wisconsin; and Texas Employment Commission.
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who is not an attorney). A recent process analysis of lower-authority appeals
hearings in Wisconsin addressed this issue (Kritzer 1995).14 Kritzer finds that
representation in general can have a significant effect on VI appeals hearings.
Representatives often perform one or more of the ,following functions: prepare a client for the ill hearing; help to frame the issue being appealed in a
manner that best serves the client; ensure that necessary witnesses and documentation are brought to the hearing; and ask relevant questions of the parties and their witnesses. In most states, representation of claimants and
employers can be by attorneys or by advocates who are not attorneys. There
are, however, some differences in the type of representatives that claimants
are likely to use and those that employers are likely to use.
Kritzer (1995) notes that claimant representatives are often union officials, or law students, or lawyers. Because the fees that attorneys earn when
representing claimants in UI cases are limited in most states (including
Wisconsin), lawyers represent claimants relatively infrequently, and often
only when the case is connected in some way to another proceeding (for
example, an allegation of harassment or discrimination). In contrast,
claimants are more frequently represented by union officials or law students.
Union officials usually represent claimants as part of their union duties, and
law students are usually acting as volunteers when they represent claimants.
Because of the necessarily low fees that attorneys can charge claimants
and the limited availability of most "voluntary" claimant representatives,
claimants may be more likely to have representation when they have a strong
case. Thus, it is possible that some portion of claimants with representation
are more likely to win their cases because of the basic strength of the case
than because of the actual contribution by advocates to the hearing process.
In general, employers are likely to be more familiar with the unemployment compensation appeals process than claimants are. Employers frequently are represented either by someone from inside the firm or by an agent
outside the firm; this representative mayor may not be an attorney. Larger
firms are more likely to have either internal legal staff or human resources
personnel who are familiar with the UI appeals system. Many firms also
rely on third-party employer representatives-agents who specialize in
monitoring and controlling firms' payroll costs, including costs associated
with workers' compensation and unemployment compensation. Part of the
responsibility of third-party representatives is to file appeals and represent
firms at the actual hearings. As a result of the use of third-party representatives and because of the unrestricted fees that lawyers can charge employers
(unlike claimants), employers are more likely than claimants to make use of
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some type of representation in VI hearings. Additionally, firms that are
large, have in-house experience with VI hearings, or contract with thirdparty representatives are more likely to bring a representative because of
their easy access to these resources.
As a result of his observations of VI hearings in Wisconsin, Kritzer
(1995) suggests that attorneys are not necessarily the most effective representatives in VI hearings for either claimants or employers. He finds that the
most effective advocates are those that are most familiar with VI hearings
procedures. Effective legal representatives, therefore, typically specialize in
employment law and appear at VI hearings frequently. Effective representatives who are not attorneys are generally knowledgeable about specific VI
rules, regulations, and procedures, and also specialize in providing representation at VI hearings.
In the appeal-level data used for this ACVC analysis, representation
information was available only for Wisconsin. In 1994 in Wisconsin, parties
(employer and/or claimant) were represented in only 6 percent of all appeals.
When one party or the other was represented, that party increased its chance
of winning the appeal. In addition, claimants were helped slightly more than
employers when they were represented by an attorney (see Table 9-3).15 The
following subsection discusses a more sophisticated analysis using the
Wisconsin data to determine how various factors influence the outcome of an
appeals hearing.

Empirical Results
Vsing the appeal-level data from Wisconsin, two categories of factors were analyzed to determine their influence on the success rates of claimants and employers.16 These categories include variables describing characteristics of the employer and variables describing characteristics of the appeal hearing. Appendix B
contains a detailed discussion of the variables and· the statistical technique used.
The regression results are discussed in the following subsections.
Results: Employer Success Rate. The results on the success rates of employers
indicate that they were more likely to win appeals when (1) the fIrm had more
than 100 employees, (2) the employer appeared at the hearing, and (3) the
employer was represented at the hearing. Employers were less likely to win
their appeals when (1) the claimant appeared at the hearing, (2) multiple issues
were contested (see note 4), and (3) the hearing was conducted by telephone.
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TABLE 9-3. Lower-Authority Appeals Hearings: Success Rate, by
Representation, Wisconsin, 1994
Success Rate

Observations (number)
Claimant (percent)
Employer (percent)

Only Claimant
Represented

Only Employer
Represented

Both Parties
Represented

Neither Party

(2.2%)

(3.2%)

(0.4%)

260

380

52

11,054

55
25

24
41

46
N.A.

28
28

Represented
(94.1%)

NOTE: N.A. indicates that the information is not available because sample sizes were too small to
estimate. Success rate is defined as the number of appeals that claimants (employers) win as a percentage of all appeals brought by claimants (employers). Percents may not add to 100 due to rounding.
SOURCE: ACUC calculations, using 1994 data provided by Department of Industry, Labor, and
Human Resources, State of Wisconsin.

Two variables that were not significant in this equation were the individual employer's tax rate and whether the claimant had legal representation.
These two results are important, indicating that individual employer tax
rates do not affect the employers' success in winning the appeals they bring,
and that when an employer files the appeal, a claimant's use of legal representation does not significantly affect the outcome.
Results: Claimant Success Rate. The results on the success rate of employees indicate that a claimant was more likely to win an appeal when (1) he or
she appeared at the hearing, (2) he or she was represented at the hearing,
and (3) the employer was taxed at a higher rate. A claimant was less likely
to win an appeal when (1) the employer had 20 or more employees, (2) the
employer appeared at the hearing, (3) the employer was represented at the
hearing, (4) the employer was in the manufacturing industry, (5) multiple
issues were contested, and (6) the hearing was conducted by telephone.
Both employers and claimants were less likely to win appeals that they
filed when there were multiple issues involved in the appeal and when the
hearing was conducted by telephone instead of in person. These factors,
however, had more of a negative effect on claimants than they did on
employers. Claimants were only about half as likely to win appeals when
mUltiple issues were involved, whereas employers were just a little more than
three-fourths as likely to win, all else being equal. This difference was smaller for telephone hearings. 17
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It is important to note that when claimants bring appeals, legal representation for both the claimant and the employer affects the outcome of the
appeal. In addition, unlike employer appeals, higher employer tax rates do
affect the success rates of claimants when claimants file the appeals.
CASE STUDY OF LOWER-AUTHORITY APPEALS
Research Design

In order to supplement existing data on lower-authority appeals and to collect otherwise unreported qualitative data about the hearing process, the
Advisory Council undertook a case study of appeals hearings that were
held in eight states-California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Texas, and Virginia-over the summer of 1995. 18 An effort was made to
select states that differed from one another with regard to a number of characteristics, including the volume of lower-authority appeals processed each
year, the location of the state, whether the state was primarily rural or
urban, and whether the state conducted the majority of its hearings by telephone or in person.
Researchers attended a total of 284 hearings l9 between May and August
1995 (approximately 35 hearings were attended in each of the 8 states).20
Primary issues of research interest included the following: (1) the nature of
the hearing process, including its complexity, the role of the administrative
law judge, and the relative ability of claimant and employer to participate
effectively; (2) the role of representation and its effect on appeal outcomes
and the hearing process; and (3) issues of due process of law under the U.S.
Constitution and the statutory "fair hearing" requirement. 21
Description of Observed Appeals

Of the hearings observed, 70 percent were for appeals filed by the claimant.
This percentage is similar to that of claimant appeals in the overall UI system. More than three-fourths of the hearings (77 percent) involved a separation issue. 22 Just over half of the hearings (52 percent) were conducted in
person, and the remaining 48 percent were conducted with at least one person participating by phone.
Employers appealed less frequently than claimants (30 percent of the
time); overall, however, 41 percent of the decisions were decided in the
employer's favor and 42 percent were decided in the claimant's favor. 23
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Employers and claimants each won roughly 42 percent of the time when
they appealed. For additional information on outcomes, see Table 9-4. A
number of factors affected the hearing process, including participation by
the parties and the presence of representation. These factors are explored in
additional detail below.
Participation

by the

Parties

Lack of participation was noteworthy in the observed hearings. 24 In most
states, appeals are automatically dismissed when neither side appears for the
hearing. Even having excluded such cases, however, at least one side failed
to appear in 37 percent of the separation hearings observed. The claimant
failed to appear for the hearing 14 percent of the time. The employer failed
to participate 23 percent of the time (see Table 9-5).25
As would be expected, participation in the hearing significantly affected
the outcome of appeals for both claimant and employer. Of the separation
hearings observed, claimants who participated achieved favorable outcomes
52 percent of the time, but those who did not participate won only 26 percent of the time. Similarly, employers who participated in hearings won 54
percent of the time, but those who did not participate won only 39 percent
of the time. 26 Similarly, both parties also prevailed more frequently when the
other side failed to appear.
Representation

Although the representation of employers and claimants at the hearings was
observed less frequently than their failure to participate, representation also
affected the observed lower-authority appeals. 27 It took various forms,
including legal representation28 and representation by nonattorneys, which
includes so-called "third party" representation, usually in the form of a payroll service or VI claims management firm. Legal representation was quite
infrequent, occurring in only 4 percent of cases.
Overall, claimants were represented in only 6 percent of the hearings in
which they participated, although 92 percent of their representation was
legal in nature. Employers, on the other hand, were represented in 28 percent of hearings they attended, usually by a payroll or claims management
firm (83 percent of the cases in which they were represented). Thus, when
representation was observed in this study, it was most frequently employer
representation in the form of payroll services or UI claims management
firms (see Table 9-6).

TABLE 9-4. Summary of Outcomes of Lower-Authority Appeals
Hearings in Eight States, Summer 1995
Description of Hearing

Number of
Cases Observed

Percentage of Cases Won by:
Claimant

Employer

OveralP

284

42

41

Appeal Initiated by:
Claimant
Employer

183
72

42
58

58
42

Issue Appealed
Separation
Nonseparationb

198
58

49
40

51
28

Appeal ConductedC
In Person
Phone

42
99

52
52

48
48

142
173
23
155
41

52
52
26
46
61

48
48
74
54
39

12
10

33
30

67
70

31
9

55
55

45
45

Participation
Both Parties Present
Claimant Present d
Claimant Not Presentd
Employer Presentd
Employer Not Presentd
Representation of Claimants C
Overall
Attorney
Representation of Employers
Overall
Attorney

------~--

SOURCE: Gallagher and Ralph (1995).
a In 17 percent of the cases, decisions were either unavailable or in favor of the state.
h Decisions in 32 percent of nonseparation cases were either unavailable or in favor of the state.
crncludes only those separation hearings in which both parties participated.
d Participation in separation hearings only.
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TABLE 9-5. Frequency and Effect of Parties' Participation in
Separation Appeals Hearings in Eight States, Summer 1995
Did Participate
(percent)

Did Not Participate
(percent)

Claimant
Overall
Favorable Outcome

86
52

26

Employer
Overall
Favorable Outcome

77
54

23
39

Party

--

14

--~-----------~-------------------------

NOTE: The number of cases in which claimants did not participate and employers did not participate are additive, because there is no overlap between these cases. Thus, in 37 percent of the hearings, only one party participated.
SOURCE: Gallagher and Ralph (1995).

Effect on Outcomes

The lack of any statistically significant impact of representation on outcomes for employers is noteworthy.29 Whether considering overall employer
representation or representation by a third-party firm, employers were not
statistically more likely to win cases in which they were represented. 30
Controlling for who participated in the hearing and for whether a separation
or nonseparation issue was at stake, employers were as likely to win a case
when they were represented by a payroll firm or claims management firm
(they won 50 percent of the time) as when they were when unrepresented
(they won 51 percent of the time in this situation). Overall, the results of the
ACUC study suggest that the predominant form of representation observed
had no significant effect on appeal outcomes.
Because the frequency of claimant representation was so low (14 out of
284 cases), no statistically significant effect of representation on outcomes
is observable. 31 Similarly, because the absolute level of legal representation
in the hearings observed was so low for both claimants and employers,32 no
generalizable findings with respect to the effect of legal representation on
outcomes based on this study are possible. 33
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TABLE 9-6. Frequency and Effect of Parties' Representation at
Appeals Hearings in Eight States, Summer 1995
Party

Represented
(percent)

Not Represented
(percent)

Claimant
Overall

6

94

50
57
64

20

Overall

28

72

Represented by VI Firm

23

Effect on Process When:
Documents Were Used
Witnesses Were Used
Objections Were Raised

9
7

Employer

Represented by Other
Effect on Process When:
Documents Were Used
Witnesses Were Used
Objections Were Raised

4

N.A.
94
3

N.A.
37
17

NOTE: Only statistically significant results are reported. N.A. indicates that the result was not statistically significant.
SOURCE: Gallagher and Ralph (1995).

Effect on Process

Although representation appeared to have no effect on outcomes in the cases
observed, it did appear to affect the hearing process. When claimants were
represented, they were far more likely to bring documents and witnesses to
the hearing than when they were unrepresented. For example, unrepresented
claimants brought witnesses to only 9 percent of hearings; represented
claimants brought witnesses to 57 percent of hearings. Claimants who were
represented were also more likely to register objections than were unrepresented claimants. 34
Employers were also more likely to bring witnesses and to register objections when represented than when unrepresented. For example, unrepresented employers registered objections in only 3 percent of cases, whereas repre-
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sented employers registered objections in 17 percent of cases. 35 Employers
were not statistically more llkely, however, to bring documents when they
were represented. This result was expected, because employers routinely
arrived at hearings with paperwork such as personnel and other records.
Hearings were longer when parties were represented than when they
were unrepresented. The average hearing length when neither claimant or
employer was represented was 29 minutes. The average hearing length
when at least one side had representation increased to 39 minutes, a statistically significant difference. These results suggest that, in the hearings
observed, represented parties asserted more rights than nonrepresented parties did, although the represented did not achieve more favorable results.

Telephone Hearings
The ACUC case study also examined the impact of conducting hearings by
telephone compared to the impact of holding hearings with all participants
attending in person. Each of the eight states in the case study conducts a
portion of its hearings by telephone. The percentages of observed hearings
in which at least one party participated by telephone varied among states,
ranging from a high of 75 percent to a low of 12 percent. Overall, 48 percent of observed hearings were conducted to some extent by telephone. 36
The criteria for conducting appeals hearings in person or by telephone
varies by jurisdiction. Interstate hearings or other situations in which the
employer and claimant are separated by a substantial geographical distance
(generally 30 miles or more) are usually held by telephone in all of the surveyed states.
Two of the eight states sampled conduct telephone hearings by default.
That is, the hearing would be by telephone unless at least one party requested an in-person hearing. 37 The other six states conduct hearings in person
unless a formal request for a telephone hearing is made in advance. Policies
vary by state regarding whether parties are informed in advance as to how
the other party will be participating.
The nature and complexity of the case also playa role in determining
how a hearing is conducted. Those that involve extensive documentation,
hearings in which attorneys or a number of witnesses are scheduled to participate, and those for which the claimant was allegedly separated from
employment for a violent offense are also generally conducted by telephone.
All surveyed states intend to maintain if not expand the use of telephones
for appeals hearings.
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Advantages and Disadvantages

There are advantages and disadvantages to conducting hearings by telephone. It is easier to maintain the safety of all parties when direct physical
confrontation is avoided. It is often logistically easier to participate if a
party has the option to do so by telephone. In addition, outcomes may be
less likely to be biased by how well a participant presents himself or herself
physically. At the same time, however, the use of telephone hearings may
cause difficulties or even inequities, as discussed here.
When a hearing is scheduled to take place by telephone, a substantial
amount of advance preparation must be undertaken to assure that all parties
have received copies of any documentation that will be referred to during
the hearing. This may pose difficulties for parties going through the process
for the first time.
Nonverbal cues, often an integral part of an in-person hearing, are not
available to the referee to assess credibility. It is virtually impossible for a
referee to verify whether or not a witness who is participating by telephone
has been sequestered. Parties that are not comfortable using the telephone
may be at a disadvantage. Finally, the hearing may be perceived as being
less formal and may not be taken as seriously if participants are not compelled to show up and confront the other participants face to face.
Effect on Process

Employers tended to participate in hearings by telephone more often than
claimants did. 38 It was found that the longest average hearings (50 minutes)
occurred when both parties participated in person. Hearings in which the
claimant participated in person and the employer participated by telephone
had the shortest average duration (28 minutes).
There is evidence that parties participating in in-person hearings are
more likely to bring documentation, and there is also some evidence that
parties participating by telephone may be less likely to raise questions about
the hearing process. Claimants were twice as likely (33 percent of the time)
to bring documentation to be used as evidence when both parties participated in person than they were when both parties participated by telephone.
Similarly, employers were more likely to bring documentation when participating in person than by telephone. In separation cases (in which it is more
likely that both sides participate), it was found that claimants who participated by telephone tended to raise fewer questions about the process than
did claimants who participated in person.
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The results of a subjective evaluation of how prepared each party was
for an observed hearing are also consistent with these findings. On a fivepoint scale, which took into consideration factors such as the use of supporting documentation and the use of relevant witnesses, both claimants and
employers received their highest scores when they both participated in person.
One additional consideration was evident in observing telephone hearings. Nearly 20 percent of hearings that involved the telephone were characterized as having vruious technical difficulties. This was defined as either a
poor-quality connection, or as situations where the referee had trouble establishing or maintaining telephone contact among all parties. Procedures vary
by state as to how long a referee will wait for an in-coming call from a participant before starting proceedings. They also vary as to how many times the
referee will attempt to reach a party if the initial attempt is unsuccessful.
Overall, therefore, as with the presence of representation, the use of
telephone participation did have some clear impact on the nature of the individual hearing process itself, although there is no evidence that it affected
the actual outcomes of the observed lower-authority appeals hearings.

NOTES
1. Appendix B contains a detailed discussion of the specific variables used in the analysis and an explanation of their expected effects on the dependent variables.
2. Pennsylvania was omitted from the regression equations as the reference state.
3. This is presumably because more individuals are being denied benefits at an early
stage in the application process.
4. This result was not expected. See Appendix B for a discussion of the expected effects
of the independent variables on denial and appeal rates.
5. This suggests that the variables available for this analysis could not adequately
explain the reasons for variations in denial rates across states. Other variables that may
explain some variation, but that could not be quantified for use in the regression analyses
include the following: actual definitions of nonmonetary eligibility conditions, the ability
of states to detect and investigate nonmonetary eligibility issues, and state administrative
practices.
6. Sixty-six percent of the variation in claimant success rates was explained when the
state dummy variables were included, whereas 35 percent of variation in employer success rates was explained when the state dummy variables were included.
7. Employees are also required to pay payroll taxes in four states. See Advisory Council
on Unemployment Compensation (1995, 51) for more information.
8. In addition, the tax schedule in effect in a given state often varies depending on state
trust fund solvency and economic conditions.
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9. See Chapter 6 of Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995) and
Chapter 7 of this report for additional information on experience rating and a detailed
discussion of the types of experience rating.
10. For example, some or all of the ultimate burden of UI taxes could be shifted from
employers to workers in the form of lower wages or benefits, or to consumers in the
form of higher prices.
11. Such involvement could include a firm's scrutinizing former employees' UI claims,
reviewing charges to the firm's UI account, and participating in the appeals process.
12. The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation thanks Council member
William D. Grossenbacher (Administrator, Texas Employment Commission) and Council
alternate Carol Skornicka (Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor, and
Human Relations) for providing these data.
13. When compared to other states, Texas has a higher-than-average rate of denial per
initial claim (see Table 8-4 in Chapter 8). This may explain, in part, why claimants have
such high success ratcs in winning the appeals they bring in Texas.
14. Much of the information provided in this section is taken from Kritzer (1995).
15. Representation included only attorneys (not other agents) in these data.
16. The Texas data were not used because the state's appeals are very different from the
national average; in Texas, employers comprised a large proportion of all appellants, and
claimants won a large percentage of all appeals. In addition, information on representation was not available.
17. Claimants were only 0.68 times as likely to win these appeals, whereas employers
were 0.71 times as likely to win, all else being equal.
18. The Advisory Council expresses its thanks to all of the individuals who work in the
appeals offices of the eight states that participated in the case study. In particular, this
project would not have been possible without the assistance of the following individuals:
Mike DiSanto, Ron Kammann, and Tim McArdle in California; Betty Graham, Lyle
Seebaum, and Dennis Zerlan in Colorado; Victor Napolitano in Illinois; Dan Anderson
and Steve Beasley in Iowa; Allan Toubman in Maine; Marvin Pazornick, Henry
Rutledge, and Louis Steinwedel in Maryland; Gordon Doig and Lee Hartman in Texas;
and David Breme and David Latham in Virginia.
19. Most of the hearings (90 percent) were observed live; the remaining 10 percent were
selected at random from hearings tape recorded during roughly the same time period.
20. Because of the relatively small number of hearings observed in each state, the
capacity to find statistically significant differences was generally limited. Unless otherwise noted, this section only reports results that are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
21. For additional detail on the findings and conclusions of this study, see Gallagher
and Ralph (1995).
22. See Chapter 8 of Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995) for
additional infonnation on nonmonetary eligibility, including separation issues.
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23. In the remaining 17 percent of the cases, the decision was either unavailable, or it
was more favorable to the state ill agency than to the claimant or employer. These decisions were most often issued in cases where the state found the claimant ineligible or disqualified after a nonseparation hearing to which the employer was not a party.
24. Analysis of participation in appeals hearings was limited to those hearings involving
a separation issue, in order to avoid underestimating employer participation. Employers
generally have less incentive to attend nonseparation hearings, both because the state
often appears as a party and because a relatively short period of disqualification or ineligibility is often at stake. Further, the state does not always consider the employer a party to
a nonseparation hearing and may therefore not notify the employer about the hearing.
25. Because the observations in the study were based solely on hearings actually held,
no statements can be made about the number of times both sides failed to appear. Under
such circumstances, most states would dismiss the appeal without a hearing.
26. This result was statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
27. Employers were considered to be "represented" when either an outside agent or inhouse legal counsel attended the hearing for purposes of presenting the employer's case
and conducting questioning and cross-examination. Human resource professionals who
may have acted in part as representatives were not treated as "representation."
28. "Legal" representation was defined in the ACUC study to include attorneys, paralegals, law students, and law clerks. "Nonlegal" representation was a catch-all term for
all other categories, including payroll firms for employers, or union representatives,
friends, or family for claimants.
29. Analysis of the impact of representation on appeals hearing outcomes was limited
to separation hearings in which both parties participated in order to exclude the independent effect of nonparticipation on outcomes.
30. In observed appeals, employers actually won more frequently when they were represented (17 out of 31 cases) than when they were unrepresented (48 out of 99 cases). As
noted, however, these results were not statistically significant.
31. Of separation hearings where both parties participated, claimants actually lost more
frequently (8 out of 12) when they were represented than when they were unrepresented
(58 out of 119). As noted, however, these results were not statistically significant.
32. Overall, legal representation was observed in only 19 of 284 cases.
33. In other words, when looking at the overall UI appeals system, repr.esentation may
have a measurable impact that could not be discerned through observation of the small
sample of cases at issue here.
34. Unrepresented claimants registered objections in only 7 percent of cases, whereas
represented claimants registered objections 64 percent of the time. Claimants who were
unrepresented also brought documents to the hearing only 20 percent of the time, but
represented claimants brought documents 50 percent of the time.
35. Employers also brought witnesses in 37 percent of cases when unrepresented, and 94
percent of cases when represented. The greater prevalence of witnesses among employers
may be, in part, due to definitional issues in the case study, as claimants who were repre-
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sented were not considered to be acting primarily as witnesses, in contrast to any individuals who gave testimony for a represented employer, who were considered witnesses.
36. In addition to hearings in which both parties participated by telephone, these percentages also include hearings in which one party participated in person at the local
office in the presence of the referee, while the other party participated by telephone
(hereafter referred to as mixed hearings).
37. If this request was made, a heming would then be scheduled at a local office most
convenient for the party who did not request the in-person hearing.
38. When both claimant and employer attended, hearings were classified on the basis of
the manner in which the primary spokesperson for either the claimant or the employer
participated. Both parties participated in a total of 105 hearings.

Appendix A/
Technical Issues in the Evolution
of Unemployment Insurance

THIS APPENDIX CONTAINS additional technical information regarding the quantitative and statistical methods that were used in the following three analyses
discussed in Chapter 4: (1) the analysis of eligibility and benefit levels
through the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP); (2) the
analysis of state cost-shifting between Unemployment Insurance and other
social programs; and (3) the analysis of interstate tax competition.

SIPP ANALYSIS
This section describes in detail how the eligibility and benefit simulations
discussed in Chapter 4 were performed, using the SIPP. The SIPP analyses
were performed by using a matched combination of the 1990 Full Panel
Research File, Waves 1 through 8 Core Data Files, and the Wave 2 Personal
History Topical Module. The Full Panel Research File provides a window of
two and one-half years (between 1989 and 1992) for identifying unemployment spells. The file provides monthly information for that time period on
individuals' demographic characteristics, employment and earnings history,
school attendance, and source and amount of income received (including
Unemployment Insurance benefits). The Core Data Files provide historical
information on labor force activity, earnings and employment history, reason
for separating from employment, and the source and amount of income from
other programs. The Wave 2 Personal History Topical Module was used to
identify the starting month and year of the most recent job.
Only individuals who experienced unemployment at some point during
their participation in the full research panel were included in the database
developed for these analyses. ' These individuals could have been unem163
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ployed for the entire panel. Individuals who reported that they were not
looking for work were not considered to be unemployed; rather, they were
considered to be out of the labor force.
Unemployment spells were included in the analyses only when there was
sufficient information available on base period earnings and employment
history to allow the simulation of UI eligibility. Some individuals with partially incomplete information in their base period, however, were included
in the sample, if the missing information could be interpolated.
Individuals were excluded from the analysis on the basis of the base
period definition in their state. When the base period was defined as the first
four of the last five completed calendar quarters, unemployment spells that
occurred in the first 15 months of the Full Panel Research File were excluded. When the base period was defined as the last four completed calendar
quarters, spells that occurred in the first 12 months of the Full Panel
Research File were excluded. In addition, individuals who identified themselves as being employed but who provided no corresponding information
on earnings or employment in the base period were excluded. As a result,
more than half of the unemployment spells in the file were not considered
for the purposes of the SIPP analysis in Chapter 4 because of missing or
unavailable data. The final number of unweighted unemployment spells
used in the analyses was 8,158 (32.6 million when weighted).
For ease of analysis and comparison, all unemployment spells were
adjusted slightly so that they could be treated as 1990 spells. The portion of
each spell that occurred outside of 1990 was converted by inflating (or
deflating) the earnings and income data to 1990 dollars by the Employment
Cost Index (ECI) for private industry, which is published in the Economic
Report of the President (Council of Economic Advisors 1995).
In order to examine the effects of changes in monetary eligibility since
1978, all spells were also converted to 1978 spells-a more complicated conversion. Ideally, the deflation of 1990 earnings to 1978 should account for the
significant changes in the distribution of earnings that occurred during that
time period. Detailed earnings information was available from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics in unpublished tables for 1979 (the earliest year for which
these data were available) and 1990. These tables were then used to create 10
separate gender-specific indices for deflating wages from 1990 to 1979. The
ECI was used to deflate earnings and income from 1979 to 1978.2
A series of calculations was performed to determine whether an individual would have been monetarily eligible for Unemployment Insurance in
either 1978 or 1990. Detailed information from each state's law, as pub-
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Ii shed in U.S. Department of Labor (1995a), was used as the basis for simulating program eligibility. Several variables were necessary for each unemployment spell before monetary eligibility could be determined. These
included the definition of the base period, base period earnings, high earnings, weeks worked, the number of quarters during which wages were
earned, the number of hours worked per week, and the average hourly wage
rate. 3 Based on the state of residence, the simulations calculate UI program
eligibility, weekly benefit amounts, and potential duration of benefits. The
eligibility determination retlects the individual state laws, including provisions for dependent allowances and deductions for other income received
during the period of unemployment (for example, Worker's Compensation
and Social Security).
These simulations were used in the discussions of monetary eligibility
and replacement rates in Chapter 4. The monetary eligibility calculations,
which were presented in Table 4-1, include individuals who report receiving
UI in a given month, but were simulated as ineligible. These individuals
represent approximately 3 percent of the UI spells examined. This discrepancy in eligibility may be a result of incorrect underreporting of earnings in
the SIPP. The weekly benefit amounts that were used to calculate replacement rates were the simulated amounts rather than the amounts that individuals reported in the SIPP. (These weekly benefit amounts are not reduced
when other income is received.) The replacement rates reported in Table 4-5
were calculated by dividing the simulated weekly benefit amount by the
individuals' average weekly earnings during the base period.
Two problems with the SIPP data should be noted. First, the state law
used for determining eligibility was based on the individuals' state of residence, although UI is based on the state in which the individual worked.
This information, however, was not available in the SIPP. As a result, calculations were incorrect for individuals who work in a state other than their
state of residence. Second, the SIPP groups some "small" states together. In
these cases, simulations were conducted using the UI laws of the state in the
group with the most liberal monetary eligibility laws. 4
COST-SHIfTING ANALYSIS

Regression analysis was conducted to test the hypothesis that "cost-shifting"
behavior by the states has contributed to the decline in UI recipiency among
the unemployed since the late 1970s. The analysis focused primarily on the
effects of the federal matching rate for the Aid to Families with Dependent
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Children (AFDC) program and federal per capita Food Stamps expenditures
on 01 recipiency. In theory, federal subsidies for income support programs
such as AFDC and Food Stamps may create incentives for states to shift
unemployed low-income workers from UI benefits, which are fully financed
by the states, to federally subsidized means-tested programs. Such a shift
could be achieved through increases in monetary eligibility requirements or
through changes in nonmonetary eligibility requirements.
Dependent Variable

The IV/TO, the ratio of the number of 01 claimants to the total number of
unemployed, was used as the dependent variable. The means and standard
deviations of all variables used in the analysis are reported in Table A-I.
AFDC and Food Stamp Variables

The econometric model that was used to examine the effects of cost-shifting
included measures of federal subsidies in means-tested programs as well as
a number of economic and other external variables that might be expected to
affect a state's IO/TO. Three measures were used to evaluate the impact of
AFDC and Food Stamps benefit payments on UI recipiency: the federal
AFDC matching rate, federal Food Stamp expenditures per capita, and federal AFDC expenditures per capita. Larger federal subsidies would be
expected to result in lower 01 recipiency rates.
The first two variables, the federal AFDC matching rate and Food Stamp
expenditures per capita, describe the rate and level of federal contributions
to the programs. The third, federal AFDC expenditures per capita, captures a
combination of the federal matching rate, the number of AFDC recipients,
and the level of benefit generosity in the state. As a result, the effect of federal AFDC expenditures per capita on 01 recipiency cannot be attributed
solely to federal subsidization. This variable is included in order to determine if states with more generous AFDC programs substitute these programs for UI. All three variables were lagged one year to allow for the likely delay between federal action and responses by the states.
UI Policy Variables

Five vmiables that m'e generally used in recipiency regressions were included in the model. They are as follows: (1) the employer tax rate, measured as
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TABLE A-1. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables from
Regression, 1979-1990
levels
-

First Differences

-----~---

--------

Variables

Mean

IUrrURatio

33.69

9.78

-0.16

5.08

Federal AFDC
Subsidy Rate (lagged)

59.90

8.54

0.12

2.16

Food Stamps
Expenditures
per Capita (lagged)

79.57

37.02

1.02

9.97

Federal AFDC
Expenditures
per Capita (lagged)

92.83

55.26

-2.98

8.21

2.45

0.98

-0.06

0.48

1,913.72

2,717.75

166.41

594.75

0.17

0.07

0.00

0.02

1,584.05

732.37

16.69

320.38

-0.01

1.27

0.10

1.67

Denial Rate per
Initial Claim

0.22

0.14

0.00

0.05

Percent of Employment
Covered by UI

0.99

0.08

0.00

0.02

Benefit AmountlWages

0.37

0.05

0.00

0.02

IUffU of
Contiguous States

0.33

0.07

0.00

0.04

IUrrU of Nearby States

0.34

0.07

0.00

0.03

IUrrU ofthe
Balance of States

0.35

0.04

0.00

0.03

22,641.67

3,754.66

222.99

787.83

Employer UI Tax Rate
State Taxable Wage Base
over Federal Level
Percent of Labor
Force Unionized
Required Base Period
Earnings for
Minimum Benefits
Change in Total
Unemployment Rate

Per Capita Income

Standard Deviation

SOURCE: ACUC calculations based on data discussed in Appendix A.

Mean

Standard Deviation
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the ratio of total employer taxes paid divided by taxable wages; (2) the state
taxable wage base, measured as the difference between the state taxable
wage base and the required federal wage base; (3) base period earnings
required for minimum benefits; (4) the benefit denial rate; and (5) ill benefit
generosity, measured as the ratio of the average weekly benefit to average
weekly wages. 5
Labor Force Variables

Three variables were used to control for variation in workplace and economic conditions: (1) the percentage of the workforce that is unionized, (2) the
percentage of the workforce that is in ill-covered employment, and (3) the
change in the unemployment rate between the current and the previous year.
Interstate Competition Variables

Results reported in the next major section, "Interstate Tax Competition
Analysis," illustrate the influence of interstate competition on employer tax
rates. In response to the findings on interstate competition, three variables
representing UI recipiency in other states were included in the model with
the expectation that they would control for the effects of interstate competition, as reflected in recipiency. As detailed in the next major section, states
were divided into two groups: "contiguous states" (those sharing a border
with the observed state) and states from the "balance of the country." For
each state, the mean IU/TU was calculated for each group of states and
included as independent variables in the model.
Data Sources

Data for the cost-shifting analysis were obtained from a variety of sources.
Information on AFDC and Food Stamp expenditures was obtained from the
Economics and Statistics Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
AFDC matching rates are contained in the various editions of The Green Book,
produced by the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of
Representatives. U.S. Department of Labor (1995d) provided data on employer
ill tax rates, the state taxable wage base, ill benefit levels, ill coverage and
recipiency, and average wages. State taxable wage base information was
obtained from the Council of State Governments. Unemployment and population data were provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Unionization rates
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were drawn from two papers based on Current Population Survey data:
Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985) and Curme et al. (1990).

Data and Model Specifications
The cost-shifting analysis used annual state data from 1978 to 1990. These
years were selected on the basis of considerations related to the availability
of data. Only data for the 48 contiguous states were used in order to allow the
inclusion of the interstate competition variables. The District of Columbia
was also excluded because of a lack of data on a number of measures.
The model was estimated using both levels data (using a fixed effects
estimator) and first differences. As can be seen in the regression results presented in Table A-2, some of the regression coefficients vary between the
two specifications. The analysis reported in Chapter 4 is based on the first
differences specification. This specification is used because its underlying
assumptions are less restrictive than those of the fixed effects model. If,
however, the fixed effects model were used, the estimated effect of Food
Stamp spending would only be about 58 percent of the effects reported for
the first differences model.

Regression Results
The regression results shown in Table A-2 indicate that decreases in ill
recipiency follow increases in the federal AFDC subsidy rate and per capita
Food Stamp expenditures. According to the first differences results, a state's
IUlTV ratio would be expected to fall by 0.48 percentage points after a $10
increase in per capita Food Stamp expenditures. Similarly, a 1.00 percentage
point increase in the federal AFDC matching rate would be followed by a
decrease in the IV/TV ratio of 0.14. Per capita federal AFDC benefit expenditures are not significant in explaining variation in VI benefit recipiency.
The first differences regression model also suggests that additional variables are significant predictors of VI recipiency. Decreases in recipiency are
associated with the following: increases in the base period earnings requirement, increases in the change in unemployment rate, increases in the benefit
denial rate, decreases in the ratio of average weekly VI benefits to average
weekly wages, and decreases in the IV/TV of contiguous states.
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TABLE A-2. Generali_z_ed L,=ast-~quares Regression Results
Levels

First Differences

Federal AFDC Subsidy Rate (lagged)

-0.060 (0.26)

-0.14 (0.03)

Food Stamps Expenditures per Capita (lagged)

-0.035 (0.01)

-0.066 (0.00)

Federal AFDC Expenditures per Capita (lagged)

0.015 (0.12)

0.0069 (0.72)

Employer UI Tax Rate

-0.26 (0.45)

-0.41 (0.21)

0.000019 (0.91)

-0.00042 (0.08)

12.69 (0.08)

-6.7 (0.32)

-0.0013 (0.00)

-0.0014 (0.00)

Change in Total Unemployment Rate

-0.21 (0.30)

-1.13 (0.00)

Denial Rate per Initial Claim

-9.46 (0.00)

-9.92 (0.00)

Percent of Employment Covered by UI

-0.47 (0.94)

-11.33 (0.09)

Benefit AmountlWages

39.34 (0.00)

68.01 (0.00)

IU/TU of Contiguous States

51.03 (0.00)

37.17 (0.00)

IUrrU of Nearby States

5.92 (0.39)

12.53 (0.10)

IU/TU of Balance of States

1.59 (0.91)

23.21 (0.15)

0.00028 (0.07)

0.00046 (0.06)

.45

.36

Explanatory Variables

State Taxable Wage Base over Federal Level
Percent of Labor Force Unionized
Required Base Period Eamings
for Minimum Benefits

Per Capita Income
R'
NOTE: Significance levels are reported in parentheses.

SOURCE: ACUC calculations based on data discussed in Appendix A.
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National Effects

Given that the first differences estimator is likely to control for unmeasured
heterogeneity better than a levels estimator is, the regression coefficients
produced by the first differences analysis were used to simulate the effects
on the IU/TU of changes in Food Stamps spending and the federal AFDC
matching rate on the IU/TU. The lagged changes in the annual national
mean for these two variables were multiplied by the corresponding regression coefficients to calculate the predicted change in the IUITU. The mean
values of these variables for 1972-1993 and their effects on the IUITU are
reported in Table A-3, along with means for the IUITU. 6 This table indicates
that the AFDC matching rate has varied little over time. Consequently, it
cannot explain variation in the IUITU.
Figure 4-4 (in Chapter 4) uses these calculations to compare the actual
IUITU to the IUITU that would have occurred without cost-shifting from UI
to Food Stamps. According to these calculations, the IU/TU in 1993 would
have been 0.04 percentage points higher that the actual IU/TU of 0.32 if
cost-shifting from ill to Food Stamps had not occurred. These results suggest that cost-shifting from UI to Food Stamps accounts for almost 64 percent of the 0.12 percentage point decline in the IUITU between 1971 and
1993. 7

INTERSTATE TAX COMPETITION ANALYSIS
The existence and potential impact of interstate competition in the UI system discussed in Chapter 4 was examined through regression analysis. In
particular, the impact that tax rates in other states have on the tax rate of any
given individual state was analyzed, taking into account several factors
including the following: the proximity of the other states, whether their prior
tax rates were higher or lower than the prior tax rate in the state being considered, the population of the other states, and the years being examined.
Dependent Variable

The dependent variable used in all regressions for the interstate tax competition analysis was the measure of UI taxes as a percentage of total wages in a
given state. Tax rate data are routinely reported by the U.S. Department of
Labor, and are available by state from 1938 to 1993.
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TABLE A-3. Annual Means of Federal AFDC Subsidy Rates and
Food Stamp Benefit Expenditures and Effects of Changes on UI
Recipiency (IU/TU)
,---"-_._--,,-Effect on IU!TU
----~-

AFDC Subsidy Rate

IU!TU

Year

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

Mean

0.38
0.37
0.44
0.50
0.40
0.38
0.38
0.40
0.44
0.37
0.38
0.32
0.29
0.31
0.32
0.31
0.31
0.33
0.37
0.39
0.35
0.32

Mean

58.30
58.30
57.29
57.29
56.06
56.32
56.24
56.33
56.50
56.68
56.64
57.00
56.76
56.82
57.31
57.61
58.D7
57.90
58.44
57.43
57.49
57.31

Annual
Change

-0.02
0.03
0.00
0.14
0.00
0.17
-0.04
0.01
-0.01
-0.02
-0.03
0,01
-0.05
0.03
-0.01
-0.07
-0.04
-0.06
0.02
-0.08
0.14
-0.01

Cumulative
Change

-0.02
0.01
0,01
0.15
0.15
0.32
0.28
0.30
0.28
0.26
0.23
0.24
0.19
0.22
0.21
0.15
0.10
0.04
0.06
-0.01
0.13
0.12

Food Stamp Benefit Expenditures
Mean

44.92
48.00
65.75
80.24
75.03
67.43
64.92
78.80
85.84
96.22
88.31
95.46
88.19
84.45
82.45
79.20
79.92
80.94
88.79
102.34
114.08
114.40

Annual

Cumulative

Change

Change

-0.86
-0.29
-0.20
-1.17
-0.96
0.34
0.50
0.17
-0.92
-0.46
-0.68
0.52
-0.47
0.48
0.25
0.13
0.21
-0.05
-0.07
-0.52
-0.89
-0.77

-0.86
-1.16
-1.36
-2.53
-3.49
-3.14
-2.64
-2.48
-3.39
-3.86
-4.54
-4.02
-4.49
-4.01
-3.76
-3.63
-3.42
-3.47
-3.53
-4.05
-4.94
-5.72

NOTE: The effect on IU/TU is calculated as the lagged change in the specified variable multiplied
by the regression coefficient for that variable.
SOURCE: ACUC calculations based on data discussed in Appendix A.
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Interstate Tax Variables

The econometric model that was examined in testing for the effects of interstate competition included interstate tax variables, as well as a number of
economic and other external variables that might be expected to affect the
VI tax rate of a given state.
In calculating interstate tax variables, two geographic categories of states
were created for each observed state. Those states that share a border with
the observed state were designated "contiguous" states. States have, on
average, slightly more than 4 contiguous states, with the number ranging
from 0 to 8. Those states that do not share a border with the observed state
were designated "balance of the country" states. States had, on average, 45
balance-of-the-country states, with the number ranging from 41 to 49.
A database was created in which the tax rates of each state's contiguous
and balance-of-the-country states were included for each state-year observation. Various interstate tax measures were then created using these geographic categories (for example, two unweighted average tax rates, one for
all states contiguous to the observed state and one for all balance-of-thecountry states).s
These variables were then lagged for different numbers of years, reflecting the hypothesis that if states' tax rates respond in some way to the tax
rates of other states, the impact would be observed in subsequent years.
Preliininary regressions indicated that one-year lags maximized the model's
explanatory power. Consequently, all subsequent analysis focused on oneyear lags.
In order to test whether an observed state responded differently to a
given category of other states when the tax rates were lower, not higher,
than that of the observed state, each of the three categories was further
divided into two categories. Thus, a total of four interstate tax variables was
examined in each of the regressions reported in Chapter 4. For both of the
geographic categories, there are two variables, indicated by "A" or "B." For
example, with regard to the contiguous state variables, if the lagged average
contiguous tax rate (that is, the lagged tax rate of all contiguous states) was
higher than or equal to the lagged tax rate of the observed state, then the
"A" value is the value of the lagged average contiguous tax rate, and the
"B" value is zero. If the lagged average contiguous tax rate is lower than the
lagged tax rate of the observed state, then the "A" value is zero and the "B"
value is the value of the lagged average contiguous tax rate. Similar calculations were made for the balance-of-the-country states. In this way, the
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potentially different responses of state tax rates when the tax rates of other
states are lower, rather than higher, were separated and could be captured in
the regression.
Economic and Other Variables

Seven other variables were included in the regressions on interstate competition. These variables would be expected to have a direct effect on the setting of a state's tax rate and, therefore, need to be controlled in the regression. The total unemployment rate and the change in the unemployment rate
were included because of their expected direct effect on the level of ur tax
rates, since tax rates would be expected to be higher if the unemployment
rate either (1) is at a relatively high level or (2) is decreasing (given countercyclical funding). The reserve ratio, a measure of ur trust fund solvency,
was included because it would be expected that tax rates would be higher
when the reserve ratio has been lower. Analysis indicated that a three-year
lag of the reserve ratio had the greatest predictive power; this measure of the
reserve ratio was used.
In order to control for the effect of politics at the state level, a measure
of the number of state political institutions (that is, the governorship and the
two bodies of the state legislature) controlled by the Democrats was also
included. A measure of state tax capacity was included to control for the
level of states' general tax bases. Unionization rates were included because
they are often found to have an effect on a number of UI-related measures.
Preliminary regressions included the ratio of the observed state's population
to the average population of all of its contiguous states. This was done in
order to test the hypothesis that larger states are more able to resist competitive pressures on tax rates. Y
Data Sources

These data were derived from a variety of sources. The total unemployment
rate variables and population ratios were drawn from Bureau of Labor
Statistics data. The reserve ratio was drawn from Unemployment Insurance
Service data. The state political variable was derived from Conference of
State Legislatures data. Unionization rates were obtained from two papers
based on Current Population Survey data, Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985)
and Curme et al. (1990).
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Regression Results

Regression analysis was performed on the data for the years 1977 to 1990 in
order to determine the responsiveness of state tax rates to tax rates in other
states. 10 Analysis was limited to those years because of data restrictions. In
particular, state-level unemployment rates are not available for all states
before 1976 (and, as a result, unemployment rate change is not available
before 1977), and unionization rates by state are not available after 1990.
Because both of these variables are highly significant in predicting tax rates,
the decision was made to limit the analysis to those 14 years. Observations
for Alaska and Hawaii were excluded from the analysis because they have
no contiguous states.
The results suggest that, all else being equal, state tax rates are affected
by the previous year's tax rate levels in other states, and that the impact is
statistically significant. The R2 of the regression that does not include the
interstate tax rate variables is 0.34. When the interstate variables are included, the R2 increases to 0.57.
Further, the results indicate that an average individual contiguous state
has a larger impact than an average individual balance-of-the-country state.
In addition, the evidence suggests that state tax rates respond more to the tax
rates in states where tax rates are lower than they are in the observed state.
For example, the regression results reported in Table A-4 indicate that, if
the lagged average of all contiguous states is lower than the lagged tax rate
of the observed state, then a 1.00 percent decline in the lagged average tax
rate of all contiguous states would result, on average, in a 0.33 percent
decline in the tax rate of the observed state. The comparable result for balance-of-the-country states is 0.44. In cases in which the average interstate
tax rate is higher than in the observed state, the overall response of the
observed state to changes in the interstate averages is significantly less
(between 54 and 80 percent of the response that occurs when the interstate
averages are lower than the rate in the observed state).11
The results discussed above can also be interpreted to indicate the average effect of a single state located in the contiguous or balance-of-the-country categories. The discussion in this paragraph refers to situations in which
the relevant average tax rate is lower than the tax rate in the observed state.
Since there are, on average, 4.2 contiguous states per state, a 1.00 percent
decline in the lagged average tax rate of anyone of those contiguous states
would result in a 0.08 percent decline in the tax rate of the observed state.
With an average of 44.76 balance-of-the-country states, a 1.00 percent
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TABLE A-4. Interstate Competition Regression Results

Explanatory Variables

Constant

Does No! Include
Interstate
Variables,
1977·1990

Includes
Interstate
Variables,
1977·1990

Includes
Interstate
Variables,
1977·1986

0.483 (0.00) -0.214 (0.07)

0.364 (0.06) -0.579 (0.01)

0,015 (0.17)

0.019 (0.17) -0.005 (0.82)

State Government

-0.003 (0.87)

Tax Capacity

-0.001 (0.10) 0.0001 (0.86) -0.0006 (0.42)

Unionization

2.330 (0.00)

Population Ratio
Lagged Reserve Ratio
Unemployment Rate (lJ,)

Includes
Interstate
Variables,
1987·1990

1.202 (0.00)

1.014 (0.00)

0.002 (0.21)
1.196 (0.00)

-0.021 (0.00) -0.024 (0.00) -0.004 (0.63)
-0.073 (0.00)

0.027 (0.02)

0.014 (0.29)

0.050 (0.02)

7.238 (0.00)

4.208 (0.00)

3.555 (0.00)

1.773 (0.13)

Change in
Unemployment Rate (fJ,) -10.947 (0.00) -6.375 (0.00) -7.453 (0.00) -4.298 (0.10)
"A" Contiguous Tax., (fJ3)

0.086 (0.04)

0.094 (0.07)

0.020 (0.75)

"A" Nearby Tax., (fJ.)

0.215 (0.00)

0.142 (0.04)

0.234 (0.00)

"A" Balance Tax., (fJ5)

0.131 (0.08) -0.102 (0.33)

0.372 (0.02)

"B" Contiguous Tax., (fJ6)

0.319 (0.00)

0.301 (0.00)

0.382 (0.00)

"B" Nearby Tax., (fJ,)

0.360 (0.00)

0.297 (0.00)

0.318 (0.00)

"B" Balance Tax., (fJ8)

0.329 (0.00)

0.078 (0.50)

0.700 (0.01)

R'

.37

.71

.68

.79

N

672

672

480

192

NOTE: Significance levels are reported in parentheses.
SOURCE: ACUC calculations based on data discussed in Appendix A.
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decline in the lagged average tax rate of any state located in the balance of
the country would result in a 0.01 percent decline in the observed state's tax
rate. Thus, among categories of states that have a lower tax rate than that in
an observed state, average individual contiguous states have an impact that
is eight times larger than the impact of individual balance-of-the-country
states.
Regressions were also run using alternative specifications of interstate
tax variables. In particular, the tax rates of the most populous one or two
contiguous states were included individually, with the contiguous variables
then comprised of the mean tax rate of only the remaining contiguous states.
The results of these regressions were consistent with the results discussed
above. Further, they suggest that the effects of contiguous averages are
largely a function of the tax rates of the two most populous contiguous
states. The coefficients of tax rate variables for these states tend to be larger
than the coefficients of the variables that then contain only the remaining
contiguous states.
In addition, attention was also given to the effect of using weighted
means for contiguous and balance-of-the-country variables, rather than
unweighted means. These specifications yielded results that were similar to
the unweighted regressions.

NOTES
1. Individuals from the SIPP with more than one spell of unemployment appear multiple times in the database.
2. It was expected that the significant change in the earnings distribution between 1978
and 1990 might affect the monetary eligibility calculations. For that reason, 10 deflators
for each gender group were calculated. An alternative 1978 model was also run to determine the impact of using a simple deflator between 1990 and 1978. The results indicated
only slight differences in the calculations of monetary eligible (63.3 percent versus 63.6
percent overall). It is possible that this difference is understated because of the small
number of individuals (22) in the SIPP whose hourly earnings data were affected.
3. The base period definition for 1990 was used in the 1978 simulations so that only
changes in the earnings requirements would generate differences in eligibility and benefit
amounts.
4. Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming were grouped together (Alaska was used);
Maine and Vermont were grouped together (Maine was used); and Iowa, North Dakota,
and South Dakota were grouped together (South Dakota was used).
5. See Chapter 5 of this report, which reports evidence that increases in the state tax rate
or taxable wage base are associated with increases the IUITU, and that the base period
earning required for minimum benefits and the benefit denial rate are associated with
decreases in the IUITU.
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6. The annual means are weighted by states' total unemployment in order to account for
changes in the distribution of unemployment over time. However, the state-level unemployment data needed to produce the weighted averages were not available for the years
1970-1975. Instead, the weights for 1976 were applied to these years.
7. Alternatively, calculations based on unweighted means produce a cumulative change
in the IUfTU of 0.036 percentage points, which accounts for 69 percent of the decline in
the IUfTU.
8. Regressions using averages weighted by state population were also examined. Both
weighted and unweighted averages were found to have similar effects in the regressions.
Therefore, a decision was made to use unweighted tax rates.
9. Although the results provided evidence in support of this hypothesis, the variable
was ultimately dropped from the analysis. This was done because the Hausman specification test indicated that a fixed effect estimator, rather than a random effects estimator,
should be used. The state population variable proved to be too highly correlated with the
state fixed effects, and, as a result, it was necessary to drop the population variable.
10. The results reported here are based on a fixed effects, generalized least squares
model.
11. This was determined by dividing the regression coefficients of average interstate tax
rates that are higher than the rate in the observed state by the coefficients for the averages when they are lower than the rate in the observed state.

Appendix BI
Technical Issues in Analyzing
Denials and Appeals

THIS APPENDIX CONTAINS technical information about the statistical methods
used in the "Analysis of Denials and Appeals," Chapter 9.

DENIAL RATE, APPEAL RATE, AND APPEAL OUTCOME ANALYSES
Factors Influencing Denial Rates, Appeal Rates, and Appeal
Outcomes
Factors that may influence denial and appeal rates were considered in the
statistical analysis presented in Chapter 9. These factors are grouped in four
categories: policy variables, benefit variables, labor force characteristics,
and state dummy variables. Each is discussed below.

Policy Variables
The policy variables considered in the analysis included those in the general
categories of solvency, nonmonetary eligibility rules, and state administration.
Solvency Variables. Three variables were used to measure the impact of
state solvency on denial and appeal rates. Two of these variables measure a
state's current ability to raise taxes-(1) the effective employer VI tax rate
as a percentage of taxable wages and (2) the state taxable wage base (as
measured by the difference between the state taxable wage base and the
required federal taxable wage base). A third factor, the reserve ratio (net
reserves as a share of total covered wages), was used to measure the health
of the state VI trust fund. 1
179

180/ ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

Lower state tax collections (as described by the combined effect of the
tax rate and tax base) would be expected to result in higher rates of denial
(and consequently appeal). Similarly, the lower the reserve ratio, the higher
the anticipated rate of denials and appeals. Denial rates and claimant appeal
rates would be expected to be higher when states are facing solvency problems, presumably because fiscal factors can create pressures to deny benefits and to establish (legislatively or administratively) more restrictive eligibility rules. Employer appeal rates, however, may be lower when states are
facing financial problems. This result is anticipated because when states
deny benefits at higher rates, there are fewer claims that employers can consider appealing.
Nonmonetary Eligibility Rules. Three variables were used to measure the
severity of the penalty imposed for nonmonetary eligibility disqualification.
State law regarding the length of time an eligibility disqualification is
imposed (either for the entire spell of unemployment or for a shorter period
of weeks) was used for the issues of voluntary leaving, discharge due to
misconduct, and refusal of suitable work. 2 As noted in Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation (1995), a number of states increased the
severity of their penalty in these areas between 1978 and 1994.3 On the one
hand, for each issue, a more severe penalty (that is, a durational disqualification) could result in increased denials (provided that states are able to
detect the eligibility problems which may result in a determination of ineligibility).4 On the other hand, a more severe penalty may discourage potential claimants from filing for benefits, thereby reducing the denial rate.
Similarly, the relationship between these nonmonetary eligibility measures
and appeal rates is difficult to predict a priori.
Measures of State Administration. Four variables were used to measure state
administration: (1) the quality of a state's nonmonetary determinations,
(2) the timeliness with which a state makes nonmonetary determinations,
(3) the extent to which Democrats control a state's legislature, and (4) the
denial rate of UI claims of a state. The quality and timeliness with which
nonmonetary determinations are decided should affect the rates at which
employers and claimants appeal decisions. If employers or claimants perceive that the state is doing a poor job in administering UI claims, then they
may be more likely to appeal eligibility decisions made by the state. The
extent to which Democrats are in control of the state legislature and the governor's office was also included in the model. This variable might serve as a
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proxy for measuring the state UI administration's attitude toward individuals applying for VI benefits. Presumably, a more Democratic state government could bring a more claimant-oriented perspective to the administration
of the program, and a more Republican state government could bring a more
employer-oriented perspective. Finally, when predicting appeal rates, the
denial rate was also included to control for differences in the percentage of
claimants for whom an appeal is an option; and when predicting appeal outcomes, information on denial rates and the rate at which employers file
appeals were used to control for these program differences across states.
Benefit Variables
Two measures of benefit generosity-(l) actual duration of benefits and
(2) the ratio of average weekly benefit amount to state average weekly
wage-were included in the analysis. 5 The more generous benefits are perceived to be, the more attractive the VI program appears to potential
claimants. Thus, more generous benefits would be expected to result in
higher denial rates, since more claimants are enticed to apply. Similarly,
claimant and employer appeal rates would be expected to be higher when
benefits are more generous because of an increased application rate for UI
benefits and an increased desire on the part of claimants to receive benefits.
Labor Force Characteristics
Three variables were used to control for differences in the labor force across
states and over time: (1) the total unemployment rate, (2) the percentage of
the unemployed who are job losers, and (3) the unionization rate. There are
higher unemployment rates and higher percentages of job losers during
times of recession, when individuals are more likely to be laid off, less likely to quit their jobs, and more likely to accept work. As a result, during periods of higher unemployment (and when a higher portion of the unemployed
are job losers), there are likely to be fewer separation denials and fewer
appeals. Higher rates of unionization are likely to be associated with fewer
separation denials and appeals, since unions are often concentrated in industries that rely on temporary layoffs (for example, construction, manufacturing) and unionized employees are more likely to be eligible for VI benefits
than are non-union employees. 6
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State Dummy Variables
In addition to the policy variables, benefit variables, and labor force characteristics already discussed, dummy variables for each state were included in
the model to determine the fixed effect of each state with respect to denial
rates, appeal rates, and appeal outcomes. Pennsylvania was omitted as the
reference state, because it has average denial and appeal rates. In general, a
state coefficient that is statistically significant and positive (or negative) indicates that the state has a higher (or lower) denial, appeal, or success rate relative to the reference state (Pennsylvania), holding all other factors constant.

Data and Model Specification
The model was estimated using annual, state-level data from 1978 to 1990.
These 13 years were the only years for which data were available for all variables. Data were excluded for the state of Nebraska, because its denial rates
are extremely high, and knowledgeable individuals in the Unemployment
Insurance Service indicated that data submitted by Nebraska may not be consistent with data from other states. Similarly, Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands were excluded from the analysis because of issues regarding data
reliability. Table B-1 displays the means for all the variables used.
Given the panel nature of the data (that is, multiple observations for each
state over a given number of years), the model was estimated using generalized least squares regression (GLS). Unlike ordinary least squares regression (OLS), the GLS model does not assume that the observations are independent of one another. Consequently, it is the preferred estimation technique for panel data, resulting in more reliable estimates both of standard
errors and of the model's overall explanatory power.

Discussion of Empirical Results
Results for Separation and Nonseparation Denial Rates
The denial rate results from the GLS regressions are presented in Table B-2.
Different equations were estimated for separation issues (raised by an
employer regarding a claimant's separation from work) and nonseparation
issues (raised by a state agency regarding a claimant's ongoing eligibility
for UI benefits). In these equations, the separation denial rate is expressed as
a percentage of initial claims and the nonseparation denial rate is expressed
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as a percentage of claimant contacts. The model had higher explanatory
power for differences across states and time for separation issues (29 percent of variation was explained when the state dummy variables were
excluded) than for nonseparation issues (only 7 percent of variation was
explained when state dummy variables were excluded). The statistically significant variables from these regressions are discussed in Chapter 9.

TABLE B-1. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables from
Regressions, All States, 1978-1990
Variables

Mean

Standard Deviation

Dependent Variables
Separation Denial Rate
Nonseparation Denial Rate
Employer Appeal Rate
Claimant Appeal Rate
Employer Success Rate
Claimant Success Rate

0.093
0.153
0.010
0.036
0.360
0.280

0.046
0.098
0.008
0.018
0.147
0.Q71

Explanatory Variables
Denial Rate
Effective Tax Rate
State Tax Base over Federal Level (1993 dollars)
Reserve Ratio (lagged 3 years)
Disqualification for Voluntary Quit (percent)
Disqualification for Refusing Work (percent)
Disqualification for Misconduct (percent)
State Government
Performance of Nonmonetary Determinations
Timeliness of Nonmonetary Determinations
Actual Benefit Duration (Weeks)
Benefit AmountlWages
Total Unemployment Rate
Percentage of Labor Force Unionized
Job Losers as Percentage of Unemployed
Percentage of Appeals Filed by Employers

0.211
0.012
2,269
1.09
0.90
0.69
0.71
2.02
0.82
0.75
13.6
0.37
0.068
0.17
0.48
0.199

0.099
0.010
3,474
1.04
0.30
0.46
0.45
0.97
0.19
0.17
2.7
0.05
0.023
0.07
0.08
0.097

-"----------

NOTE: Data are for 1978 to 1990 and include the District of Columbia and all states except
Nebraska.
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using database compiled from the following: Council of State Governments (1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, b, c, d); and U.S. General Accounting Office
(1993).
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TABLE B-2. Regression Results for Separation and Nonseparation
Denials, All States, 1978-1990
Explanatory Variables

Separation Denial
Rate/Initial Claim

Effective Tax Rate
0.051
-0.0000002
State Tax Base over Federal Level
Reserve Ratio (lagged 3 years)
0.002
Disqualification for Voluntary Quit
-0.022
Disqualification for Refusing Work
Disqualification for Misconduct
-0.020
-0.002
State Government
Actual Benefit Duration
0.0008
Benefit Amount/Wages
-0.106
Total Unemployment Rate
-0.349
Percentage of Labor Force Unionized
0.023
Job Losers as Percentage of Unemployed
-0.148
State Dummy Variables
Alabama
0.007
Alaska
0.000
Arizona
0.045
Arkansas
0.045
California
0.014
Colorado
0.119
Connecticut
0.005
Delaware
0.011
District of Columbia
0.072
Florida
0.086
Georgia
0.039
Hawaii
0.029
Idaho
0.025
Illinois
0.038
Indiana
0.038
Iowa
0.050
Kansas
0.025
Kentucky
0.017
Louisiana
0.089
Maine
0.005
Maryland
0.069
Massachusetts
0.001
Michigan
0.024

(0.88)
(0.83)
(0.22)
(0.00)

Nonseparation Denial
Rate/Claimant Contact

-0.600
-0.000001
-0.010

(0.49)
(0.57)
(0.01)

0.007

(0.50)

(0.00)
(0.22)
(0.36)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.48)
(0.00)

-0.001
-0.007
0.004
-0.468
-0.257
-0.043

(0.77)
(0.00)
(0.97)
(0.05)
(0.00)
(0.40)

(0.58)
(1.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.18)
(0.00)
(0.57)
(0.21)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.03)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.09)
(0.00)
(0.56)
(0.00)
(0.93)
(0.01)

0.171
0.149
0.144
0.032
0.082
0.221
0.045
-0.033
0.013
0.052
-0.056
0.103
0.231
0.046
0.022
0.031
0.071
-0.033
0.047
0.108
0.030
-0.028
0.051

(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.32)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.07)
(0.17)
(0.66)
(0.08)
(0.07)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.05)
(0.48)
(0.20)
(0.01)
(0.20)
(0.09)
(0.00)
(0.25)
(0.28)
(0.05)
(continued)
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TABLE B-2. (continued)
-----Explanatory Variables

Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
NOlth Carolina.
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Constant
R2 Statistic

Separation Denial
Rate/Initial Claim

Nonseparation Denial
Rate/Claimant Contact
----

0.031
0.027
0.050
0.039
0.110
0.011
0.010
0.074
-0.002
-0.010
0.016
0.025
0.073
0.023

(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.33)
(0.34)
(0.00)
(0.86)
(0.43)
(0.09)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.02)

0.118
-0.016
0.100
0.110
0.041
-0.008
0.131
-0.103
0.029
0.047
-0.071
0.135

(0.01)
(0.26)
(0.00)
(0.51)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.11 )
(0.79)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.24)
(0.04)
(0.01)
(0.00)

0.009
0.000
-0.003
-0.017
0.126
0.023
0.019
-0.010
0.013
0.027
0.019
-0.003
0.217

(0.30)
(0.98)
(0.75)
(0.11)
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.07)
(0.39)
(0.21)
(0.01 )
(0.03)
(0.78)
(0.00)

0.022
-0.065
0.154
-0.093
0.042
0.255
-0.076
0.002
0.103
0.008
0.019
0.090
0.306

(0.34)
(0.04)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.15)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.94)
(0.00)
(0.77)
(0.40)
(0.00)
(0.00)

0.82

0.063
0.D38

0.72

NOTES: Data are for 1978 to 1990 and include the District of Columbia and all states except
Nebraska.
A GLS fixed effects model was used to estimate the equations.
Pennsylvania was omitted from the state dummy variables as the reference state.
Significance levels are noted in parentheses.
The R' statistics for these equations are inflated because of the inclusion of the 49 state dummy
variables. When the state dummy variables were excluded from the models, the R' of the separation
denial rate equation was 0.29 and of the nonseparation denial rate equation was 0.07.
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using database compiled from the following: Council of State Governments (1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor (l995a, b, c, d); and the U.S. General Accounting
Office (1993).
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Results for Employer and Claimant Appeal Rates
The employer and claimant appeal rate results from the GLS regressions are
presented in Table B-3. In these equations, the employer (claimant) appeal
rate is defined as the number of appeals brought by employers (claimants)
as a percentage of all initial claims. The model had higher explanatory
power for differences across states and time for claimant appeal rates (34
percent of variation was explained when the state dummy variables were
excluded) than for employer appeal rates (17 percent of variation was
explained when the state dummy variables were excluded). The statistically
significant variables from these regressions are discussed in Chapter 9.

Results for Employer and Claimant Success Rates
The employer and claimant success rate results from the GLS regressions
are presented in Table B-4. In these equations, success rate is defined as the
number of appeals that employers (claimants) won as a percentage of all
lower-authority appeals brought by employers (claimants). These models
had very low predictive power (none of the variation was explained in either
equation when the state dummy variables were excluded). The statistically
significant variables from these regressions are discussed in Chapter 9.

ANALYSIS OF APPEAL-LEVEL DATA FROM WISCONSIN

Variables Used in the Analysis
Using the appeal-level data from Wisconsin,7 two categories of factors were
analyzed to determine their influence on the success rates of claimants and
employers: employer characteristics and characteristics of the appeal hearing. Table B-5 displays the means for all variables used.

Employer Characteristics
Three variables were used to describe characteristics of the employer. The
first measured the size of the firm and was divided into four groups: firms
with fewer than 20 employees, firms with between 20 and 99 employees,
firms with between 100 and 499 employees, and firms with 500 or more
employees. It is anticipated that larger employers are more likely to win a
hearing, since they have more resources to devote to managing unemploy-
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ment compensation costs. The second variable measured the experiencerated tax of the employer. 8 The expected effects of employer tax rates on
employer success rates are discussed above. A third measure of whether the
employer was in the manufacturing industry was included to describe the
type of employer further.

Characteristics of the Appeal Hearing
Six variables were used to describe characteristics of the hearing. The first
two were whether the claimant appeared at the hearing and whether the
employer appeared at the hearing. The second two were whether the
claimant was represented at the hearing and whether the employer was represented at the hearing. 9 Representation refers only to legal representation;
unfortunately, the data do not include any other form of representation. With
regard to employers, the attorney could either work internally for the firm or
be hired as outside counsel. As discussed earlier, participation and representation are generally expected to increase the likelihood that the party wins.
The fifth variable was whether the hearing involved consideration of multiple issues. Employers are more likely to win appeals involving multiple
issues than are claimants, because the issues that have been raised by the
employer in these appeals are more complex and require more preparation
and familiarity with VI laws and the appeals system. The final variable was
whether the appeal hearing was conducted by telephone or in person. The
effect of this variable is difficult to predict.
The issue being appealed was an important characteristic of the hearing that
was not available in these data and therefore not used in the equations. As discussed in Chapter 9, this is an important variable because the party who has the
burden of proof in a given appeal hearing varies with the issues being disputed.

Model Specification
Because the success rate variables that are being estimated are dichotomous
(that is, they equaled one if the claimant or employer won the appeal and
zero if the claimant or employer did not win the appeal), the model was estimated using a logistic regression. 1o The results of these regressions are presented in Table B-6. The numbers displayed in this table are the log odds
ratios associated with each variable. The log odds ratio indicates the change
in the likelihood of an event occurring (in this case whether the employer or
claimant won the appeal) caused by each explanatory variable, holding all
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TABLE B-3. Regression Results for Employer and Claimant
Appeals, All States, 1978-1990
Explanatory Variables

Employer Appeal Rate/
Initial Claim

Effective Tax Rate
-0.018
State Tax Base over Federal Level
0.0000003
Reserve Ratio (lagged 3 years)
-0.0002
Disqualification for Voluntary Quit
-0.0002
Disqualification for Refusing Work
Disqualification for Misconduct
0.005
State Government
-0.0004
Performance of Nonmonetary Determinations -0.0006
Timeliness of Nonmonetary Determinations
-0.001
Denial Rate per Initial Claim
0.017
Actual Benefit Duration
0.0003
Benefit AmountlWages
-0.017
Total Unemployment Rate
-0.049
-0.030
Percentage of Labor Force Unionized
Job Losers as Percentage of Unemployed
0.007
State Dummy Variables
Alabama
0.006
Alaska
-0.006
Arizona
0.001
Arkansas
-0.001
California
-0.001
Colorado
0.020
Connecticut
0.024
Delaware
-0.004
District of Columbia
0.013
Florida
0.004
Georgia
0.012
Hawaii
0.000
Idaho
-0.010
Illinois
0.010
Indiana
-0.001
Iowa
0.019
Kansas
0.010
Kentucky
0.001
Louisiana
0.016
Maine
-0.002

Claimant Appeal Rate/
Initial Claim

(0.73)
0.178
(0.01) 0.000000002
(0.22)
0.0003
(0.80)
0.002
-0.003
(0.00)
0.010
(0.13)
-0.0004
(0.47)
-0.002
(0.21)
0.0004
(0.00)
0.052
(0.06)
0.0006
(0.01)
-0.019
(0.00)
-0.040
(0.00)
-0.023
(0.04)
-0.004

(0.06)
(0.99)
(0.50)
(0.24)
(0.04)
(0.00)
(0.44)
(0.15)
(0.83)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.09)
(0.12)
(0.02)
(0.46)

(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.79)
(0.79)
(0.45)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.00)
(0.90)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.54)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.42)
(0.00)
(0.22)

(0.70)
(0.53)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.05)
(0.51)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.40)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.00)
(0.02)

0.001
-0.003
0.020
0.014
-0.010
0.044
0.006
0.006
0.030
0.019
-0.007
0.002
-0.025
0.007
0.003
0.Dl8
0.023
0.006
0.034
-0.006

(continued)
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TABLE B-3. (continued)
Explanatory Variables

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Constant
R2 Statistic

Employer Appeal Rate/
Initial Claim

Claimant Appeal Rate/
Initial Claim

0.007
0.001
0.002
0.003
-0.001
0.004
-0.003
0.006
-0.007
0.002
0.009
-0.004
-0.003
-0.003
-0.002
0.004
-0.003

(0.00)
(0.45)
(0.15)
(0.03)
(0.72)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.27)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.13)
(0.10)
(0.12)
(0.01)
(0.11)

0.024
-0.003
-0.011
0.004
0.008
0.011
-0.014
0.Q28
0.010
0.012
0.021
-0.006
-0.007
0.006
-0.017
0.024
-0.005

(0.00)
(0.25)
(0.00)
(0.15)
(0.06)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.11)

-0.004
0.001
0.001
-0.002
0.010
-0.002
0.001
-0.001
-0.002
0.008
0.003
0.004
0.010

(0.00)
(0.59)
(0.78)
(0.33)
(0.00)
(0.40)
(0.53)
(0.49)
(0.20)
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.01)

-0.006
-0.001
0.009
-0.007
0.025
0.007
0.001
-0.006
-0.003
0.013
-0.002
-0.005
0.020

(0.02)
(0.76)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.68)
(0.08)
(0.32)
(0.00)
(0.46)
(0.07)
(0.00)

0.86

0.90

NOTES: Data are for 1978 to 1990 and include the District of Columbia and all states except
Nebraska.
A GLS fixed effects model was used to estimate the equations.
Pennsylvania was omitted from the state dummy variables as the reference state.
Significance levels are noted in parentheses.
The R' statistics for these equations are inflated because of the inclusion of the 49 state dummy
variables. When the state dummy variables were excluded from the models, the R' of the employer
appeal rate equation was 0.17 and of the claimant appeal rate equation was 0.34.
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using database compiled from the following: Council of State Governments (1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, b, c, d); and U.S. General Accounting Office
(1993).
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TABLE B-4. Regression Results for Lower-Authority Appeal
Success, All States, 1978-1990
Lower-Authority Appeal Success Rate
Explanatory Variables

Employer

Effective Tax Rate
-4.209
State Tax Base over Federal Level
-0.000002
Reserve Ratio (lagged 3 years)
-0.011
Disqualification for Voluntary Quit
0.017
Disqualification for Refusing Work
Disqualification for Misconduct
0.004
State Government
0.008
Performance of Nonmonetary Detenninations -0.026
Timeliness of Nonmonetary Detenninations -0.024
-0.105
Denial Rate per Initial Claim
Actual Benefit Duration
0.004
Benefit AmountlWages
-0.020
Total Unemployment Rate
-0.522
Percentage of Labor Force Unionized
0.132
Job Losers as Percentage of Unemployed
0.053
Percentage of Appeals Filed by Employers -0.304
State Dummy Variables
Alabama
0.203
Alaska
0.149
Arizona
0.072
Arkansas
0.016
California
0.017
Colorado
0.182
-0.060
Connecticut
Delaware
0.326
District of Columbia
0.089
Florida
0.041
Georgia
0.303
Hawaii
-0.014
Idaho
0.137
Illinois
0.004
Indiana
0.064
Iowa
0.154
Kansas
0.005
Kentucky
0.028
0.093 .
Louisiana
-0.038
Maine

(0.04)
(0.64)
(0.22)
(0.63)

Claimant

(0.88)
(0.40)
(0.38)
(0.55)
(0.33)
(0.49)
(0.93)
(0.34)
(0.54)
(0.66)
(0.01)

-2.286
-0.000006
-0.004
-0.027
0.025
-0.015
0.009
-0.017
-0.003
0.069
0.003
0.068
-0.015
-0.238
0.047
0.101

(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.18)
(0.04)
(0.01)
(0.14)
(0.01)
(0.10)
(0.81)
(0.07)
(0.14)
(0.42)
(0.94)
(0.00)
(0.27)
(0.02)

(0.01)
(0.15)
(0.31)
(0.84)
(0.79)
(0.02)
(0.37)
(0.00)
(0.19)
(0.56)
(0.00)
(0.85)
(0.06)
(0.95)
(0.34)
(0.01)
(0.93)
(0.64)
(0.16)
(0.49)

-0.033
0.105
-0.116
-0.070
0.041
0.016
-0.111
0.044
-0.024
-0.102
-0.163
0.027
0.042
-0.126
-0.042
0.050
0.083
-0.076
-0.055
-0.004

(0.25)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.l0)
(0.56)
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.32)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.28)
(0.09)
(0.00)
(0.07)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.84)
(continued)
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TABLE B-4. (continued)
Lower-Authority Appeal Success Rate
Explanatory Variables

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Constant
R' Statistic
---~

Emr>loyer

Claimant

0.112
-0.091
-0.050
-0.006
-0.035
0.101
0.082
0.107
0.038
-0.044
0.123
-0.172
0.215
0.130
0.044
0.036
0.059

(0.09)
(O.l 0)
(0.41)
(0.92)
(0.67)
(0.15)
(0.14)
(0.08)
(0.56)
(0.49)
(0.07)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.42)
(0.56)
(0.36)

0.118
0.009
0.100
-0.031
-0.122
-0.078
-0.061
-0.013
-0.035
0.007
-0.007
-0.050
-0.056
0.041
-0.001
-0.101
0.078

(0.00)
(0.68)
(0.00)
(0.05)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.54)
(0.16)
(0.76)
(0.77)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.95)
(0.00)
(0.00)

-0.004
0.213
0.050
0.069
0.052
0.055
-0.005
0.128
0.028
0.100
-0.062
0.137
0.395

(0.94)
(0.01)
(0.46)
(0.30)
(0.47)
(0.43)
(0.93)
(0.06)
(0.65)
(0.12)
(0.25)
(0.03)
(0.01)

0.080
-0.114
-0.060
-0.115
-0.047
0.059
-0.071
-O.l09
0.045
0.051
-0.048
-0.055
0.287

(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.06)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)

0.35

0.66

..

NOTES: Success rate is defined as percentage of appeals won by party who appealed.
Data are for 1978 to 1990 and include the District of Columbia and all states except Nebraska.
A GLS fixed effects model was used to estimate the equations.
Pennsylvania was omitted from the state dummy variables as the reference state.
Significance levels are noted in parentheses.
The R' statistics for these equations are inflated because of the inclusion of the 49 state dummy
variables. When the state dummy variables were excluded from the models the R' of both equations
was 0.00.
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using database compiled from the following: Council of State Governments (1970-1994); U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, b, c, d); and U.S. General Accounting Office
(1993).
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other factors constant. A log odds ratio greater than 1 denotes an increase in
the likelihood of the event, whereas a log odds ratio less than 1 denotes a
decrease in the likelihood of the event. For example, according to the results
of the regressions in Table B-6, an employer who appeared at a hearing was
2.027 times more likely to win the appeal than an employer who did not
appear. In contrast, an employer was only 0.623 times (about two-thirds) as
likely to win an appeal when the claimant appeared at the hearing than when
the claimant did not appear.

TABLE B-5. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables from
Wisconsin, 1994

~egressions,
Variables

Mean

Standard Deviation

Dependent Variables
Employer Received Favorable Decision*
Claimant Received Favorable Decision*

0.58
0.42

0.49
0.49

8
51
247
2,203
2.31
0.29
0.16
0.65
0.03
0.04
0.33
0.18

6
23
113
2,242
1.95
0.45
0.36
0.48
0.16
0.19
0.47
0.38

-----"""---------------------------

Explanatory Variables
Employer Size
Fewer Than 20 Employees
Between 20 and 99 Employees
Between 100 and 499 Employees
500 or More Employees
Tax Rate
Manufacturing Industry*
Employer Appears at Hearing*
Claimant Appears at Hearing*
Employer Is Represented at Hearing*
Claimant Is Represented at Hearing*
Multiple Issues Contested*
Telephone Hearing*

NOTES: Data are based on 11,746 lower-authority appeal hearings from Wisconsin in 1994. The
means of variables with an asterisk (*) are percentages of the total sample. For example, the mean
value of 0.58 for the first dependent variable indicates that employers received a favorable decision
in 58 percent of all appeals brought.
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using data provided by Department of Industry, Labor, and Human
Resources, State of Wisconsin.

APPENDIX B /193

Results

The model for employers correctly predicted whether the employer would win
or lose an appeal that the employer brought in 72 percent of the cases and was
statistically significant, as indicated by the model chi square of 117. It was
significantly better at predicting when an employer would lose an appeal than
when an employer would win an appeal, however. It correctly predicted when
an employer would lose an appeal in 99 percent of the cases, but it correctly

TABLE B-6. Regression Results for Employer and Claimant Success
Rates, Wisconsin, 1994
Received Favorable Decision
Explanatory Variables
-----------------

Employers

Claimants

Employer Size
Fewer Than 20 Employees
Between 20 and 99 Employees
Between 100 and 499 Employees
500 or More Employees

1.090 (0.44)
1.355 (0.01)
1.345 (0.01)

0.813 (0.01)
0.845 (0.03)
0.742 (0.00)

Tax Rate

0.986 (0.53)

1.046 (0.00)

Manufacturing Industry

1.125 (0.19)

0.873 (0.03)

Employer Appears at Hearing

2.027 (0.00)

0.666 (0.00)

Claimant Appears at Hearing

0.623 (0.00)

30.143 (0.00)

Employer Is Represented at Hearing

1.698 (0.00)

0.642 (0.01)

Claimant Is Represented at Hearing

0.872 (0.63)

2.288 (0.00)

Multiple Issues Contested

0.769 (0.00)

0.533 (0.00)

Telephone Hearing

0.711 (0.00)

0.678 (0.00)

N

3,583

8,132

Percent Correctly Classified

72.17

71.84

117 (0.00)

1,906 (0.00)

Model Chi Square

NOTES: Data are based on lower-authority appeals hearings ti'Om Wisconsin in 1994.
A logistic regression model was used to estimate the equations.
"Fewer Than 20 Employees" was omitted as the reference group.
Significance levels are noted in parentheses.
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using data provided by Department of Industry, Labor, and Human
Resources, State of Wisconsin.
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predicted when an employer would win an appeal in only 4 percent of the
cases. Employers in Wisconsin lose 72 percent of their appeals, and the model
was able to correctly predict 72 percent of the outcomes.
The model for claimants correctly predicted whether the claimant would
win or lose his or her appeal in 72 percent of the cases and was statistically
significant, as indicated by the model chi square of 1906. Like the employer
model, this model was significantly better at predicting when a claimant
would lose an appeal than when a claimant would win an appeal. It correctly
predicted when a claimant would lose an appeal in 94 percent of the cases,
but it correctly predicted when a claimant would win an appeal in only 17
percent of the cases. Claimants in Wisconsin lose 71 percent of their
appeals, and the model was able to correctly predict 72 percent of the outcomes. The results of both regressions are discussed in Chapter 9.

NOTES
1. This measure was lagged 3 years in the regression equation. The 3-year lag structure
had the most statistically significant impact on the denial and appeal rates. Statistically,
the lag structure reflects the notion that it takes a few years for state policy decisions
prompted by the status of the trust fund balance to affect a state's law or a state's administration of the program.
2. Since refusal of suitable work is not a factor in determining initial eligibility, it was
not included in the equations for the separation denial rate, employer appeal rate, or
employer success rate.
3. Between 1978 and 1994, 9 states imposed durational disqualifications for voluntary
leaving, 12 states imposed durational disqualifications for misconduct discharges, and 15
states imposed durational disqualifications for refusing suitable work. (Advisory Council
on Unemployment Compensation 1995, 111).
4. For example, a state that is not adept at identifying nonmonetary eligibility violations
would be paying benefits to recipients who are actually "ineligible"; this would result in
low determination rates and consequently low denial rates. By contrast, a state that is
good at detecting eligibility violations would conduct more determinations that would
result in more denials.
5. There are some disadvantages with the use of these two particular measures. For
example, the report of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995)
noted that the wage replacement rate (that is, the average weekly UI benefit divided by
average weekly wage) is an inaccurate measure because the denominator is not available
for UI recipients. (See, for example, Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation
(1995, 126).) Similarly, variations in the actual duration of benefits are more dependent
upon the characteristics of the unemployed and the labor market in a given state and year
than on the potential duration for which a claimant is eligible to receive benefits.
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6. Tabulations from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) indicate
that while 61 percent of unemployed union members receive DI benefits, only 29 percent
of unemployed non-union workers receive benefits (Bassi and Chasanov, forthcoming).
7. As discussed in Chapter 9, these data include 11,746 lower-authority appeal hearings
resulting from nonmonetary separation issues.
8. A dummy variable measuring whether the firm was paying the maximum tax rate
was also considered. It was not statistically significant in either the employer or the
claimant regression equations. However, only 1.6 percent (183) of the hearings in this
sample involved firms at the maximum tax rate, which may make conclusions about the
lack of significance of this variable inappropriate. Therefore, it was dropped from the
analysis.
9. A dummy variable measuring whether both the claimant and the employer had representation at the hearing was also considered. It was not statistically significant in either
the employer or claimant regression equations. However, only 0.4 percent (52) of the
! hearings in this sample were those in which both parties were represented, which may
make conclusions about the lack of significance of this variable inappropriate. Therefore,
it was dropped from the analysis.
10. The model was also run using OLS and probit regressions. However, the models
did not correctly account for the error distribution of the data using any of the regression
techniques, and only the logistic regression results are presented here.

Appendix C /
Financing: Background
Figures and Table

THIS COLLECTION OF FIGURES and a table contains historic and state-by-state
information related to the financing of the Unemployment Insurance system.
Included are data on the high cost multiple, the relationship between trust
fund solvency and benefit recipiency, the reserve ratio, state tax rates and
tax collections, and federal loans to state UI trust funds.
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FIGURE C-1. High Cost Multiple for the Overall UI System, 1955-1994
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NOTES: Data are for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Data are included for Puerto Rico
beginning in 1961 and for the Virgin Islands beginning in 1978.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor (l995d); U.S. General Accounting Office (1988).

FIGURE C-2. States with Adequate Reserves as Measured

by High Cost Multiple, 1955-1994

60 - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,

__,--v--:_=-=,, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

50

'"

~

40

.c
E

30

.,..

'0

,.

~~------------

-----~\/------

Z

w

----------- ------

10

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

Year

NOTES: Data are for aliSO states and the District of Columbia. Data are included for Puerto Rico beginning in
1961 and for the Virgin Islands beginning in 1978.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor (199Sd); U.S. General Accounting Office (1988).

g

High cost multiple >1

g

High cost multiple >1.5

»

""Z
m

o

X

n

FIGURE C-3. Relationship Between Benefit Recipiency and Trust Fund Solvency, 1955-1994
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FIGURE C-4. Reserve Ratio and FUTA Wage Base, 1940-1994
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TABLE C-1. Reserve Ratios, by State, 1994
State

Reserve Ratio

State

Reserve Ratio

Puerto Rico

7.54

Tennessee

1.62

Virgin Islands

6.67

Kentucky

1.55

Vennont

4.51

North Dakota

1.55

Wyoming

4.15

Nebraska

1.51

Oregon

3.86

Rhode Island

1.51

Alaska

3.81

Pennsylvania

1.48

Washington

3.45

Florida

1.47

Iowa

3.23

West Virginia

1.47

Kansas

3.20

Arizona

1.33

Delaware

3.14

Colorado

1.21

Idaho

3.14

South Dakota

1.16

NcwMexico

3.13

Ohio

1.13

Wisconsin

3.03

Virginia

1.13

Mississippi

2.98

Arkansas

1.02

Louisiana

2.92

Illinois

0.99

Utah

2.86

Maryland

0.96

North Carolina

2.49

Michigan

0.90

Hawaii

2.26

Mainc

0.87

Oklahoma

2.21

Minnesota

0.80

New Jersey

2.12

California

0.72

Indiana

2.11

District of Columbia

0.35

New Hampshire

2.06

Texas

0.30

Georgia

1.95

Massachusetts

0.26

Montana

1.95

Missouri

0.26

South Carolina

1.79

New York

0.10

Alabama

1.77

Connecticut

0.01

Nevada

1.70

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995c).

FIGURE C-5. Average Employer State Tax Rate (as a Percentage

of Taxable and Total Wages),

1940-1994

3.5

3.0

2.5

~

2.0

~<II

.&

1.5

1.0

(;j Rate as

g

0.5

% of taxable

Rate as % of total

0.0
1940

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965
Year

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

»
v
v

m
Z

g
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995b).

x

n
-.....
N

a

w

FIGURE C-6. State Unemployment Insurance Tax Collections per Worker, 1940-1994 (constant
1994 dollars)
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FIGURE C-7. Amount of Federal Loans and Number of States with Outstanding Loans,
1972-1994 (constant 1994 dollars)
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Appendix D /
Benefits: Background
Figures and Tables

Tms COLLECTION OF FIGURES AND TABLES contains historic and state-by-state
infonnation related to Unemployment Insurance benefits and benefit claimants.
Included are data on demographic characteristics of claimants, percentage of
unemployed who are job losers, benefit recipiency rates, the ratio of UI
claimants to job losers, duration of unemployment spells and benefit payments,
the percentage of claimants who exhaust benefits, total UI benefits paid by program type, weekly benefit amounts, and selected eligibility requirements.
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TABLE D-1. Demographic Characteristics of Civilian Labor Force,
All Unemployed, and UI Claimants, 1994 (percent)
Civilian

Characteristic

labor Force

Total
Unemployed

UI Claimants

Age
16 to 34
35 to 54
55 and over

43
45
12

60
32
8

42
48

Gender
Men
Women

54
46

55
45

59
41

Race
White
Black
Other

85
11
4

74
21
5

N.A.
N.A.
N.A.

10

------""

NOTE: "N.A." indicates data are not available.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor (l995b); U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics (1995a).

FIGURE 0-1. Percentage of Unemployed Who Are Job losers, 1968-1994
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FIGURE D-2. Recipiency Rate for Regular State UI Programs and Total Unemployment Rate,
1950-1994
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FIGURE D-3. Ratio of UI Claimants to Job Losers, 1970-1994
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FIGURE D-4. Duration of Unemployment and Potential Duration of UI Benefits (in weeks),
1950-1994
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FIGURE D-5. Percentage of UI Claimants Exhausting Benefits, 1940-1994
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FIGURE 0-6. Unemployment Insurance Benefits Paid, 1948-1994 (constant 1994 dollars)
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TABLE D-2. \\feekly Benefit Amount, by State, 1994
State
Hawaii
New Jersey
Massachusetts
Connecticut
District of Columbia
Rhode Island
Minnesota
Michigan
Pennsylvania
Washington
New York
Illinois
Colorado
Kansas
Ohio
Virgin Islands
Wisconsin
Utah
Nevada
Texas
Delaware
Iowa
Maryland
Oregon
North Carolina
Wyoming
Alaska

Weekly Benefit
Amount (dollars)

266
246
237
222
220
220
217
213
212
206
203
199
195
192
191
191
188
187
185
185
183
183
180
179
175
173
170

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995d).

State
Florida
Virginia
Oklahoma
Idaho
West Virginia
Vermont
Arkansas
Maine
North Dakota
Kentucky
Indiana
Montana
California
South Carolina
Georgia
Missouri
Arizona
New Hampshire
Tennessee
Nebraska
New Mexico
South Dakota
Alabama
Mississippi
Louisiana
Puerto Rico

Weekly Benefit
Amount (dollars)

169
169
168
167
167
164
161
161
160
159
158
156
154
154
153
150
148
146
142
140
140
138
131
129
118
89
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TABLE D-3. Minimum Qualifying Requirements for Minimum
Unemployment Insurance Benefits and Minimum Duration, by
State, 1995
--~--

..

..

-~--

Minimum Benefits
-~~~--

State

Required Earnings
in Base Period

Minimum
Work Required'

Weekly Benefit
Amount b

Number of
Weeksc

--~---~~--

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

$1,032
1,000
1,500
1,269
1,125
1,000
600
0
1,950
400
1,350
130
1,430
1,600
2,750
1,155
1,950
1,500
1,200
2,286
900
2,000
1,340
1,250
1,200
1,500
1,356
1,200
600
2,800
2,520

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

$22
44 to 68
40
47 d
40
25
15 to 25
20
50
10
37
5
44
51
87
33 to 40
65 d
22
10
35 to 52
25 to 33
14 to 21
42
38
30
45
57d
20
16
32
75

15+
16
12+
9
14+
13+
26
24
20
10
9+
26
10
26
8+
11+
10
15
8
21+ to 22
26
10+ to 30
15
10+
13+
11+
8
20
12+
26
15
(continued)
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TABLE D-3. (continued)
Minimum Benefits
Required Earnings

Minimum

State

in Base Period

Work Required'

New Mexico

$1,334

New York
North Carolina

1,6001l,200e
2,603

North Dakota

2,795

Ohio

2,640

Oklahoma

1,500

Oregon

1,000

Pennsylvania

1,320

Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina

280
1,780
900

South Dakota

1,288

Tennessee

1,560

Texas

1,517

Utah

1,800

Vermont

1,628

Virginia

3,250

Virgin Islands

1,287

Washington

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

0

West Virginia

2,200

Wisconsin

1,500

Wyoming

1,700

X
X
X

Weekly Benefit
Amount b

Number of
Weeksc

$41 d

19+

40

26

25

13 to 26

43

12

66

20

16

20+

70d

4+
16

35 to 40
7

26

41 to 51

15+

20

15

28

15+

30

12+

42

9+

17

10

25

26

65

12

32
75 d

13+
16+ to 30

24

26

50

12

16

12 to 26

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, 3-27 to 3-29, 3-35 to 3-37, 3-45 to 3-47).

a An "X" indicates that a state directly or indirectly requires work in at least 2 quarters of the base
year. States with a dash (-) have the minimum work requirement specified as an earnings amount.
bWhen two amounts are given, the lower amount is for a single individual and the higher amount
includes dependents' allowances for 1 dependent child and/or nonworking spouse.
C

A range of weeks is presented when the calculation for minimum weeks varies with qualifying earnings.

dMinimum benefit amount is computed annually as a percentage of average weekly wage.
eThe higher amount resulting from two formulas is used to determine an individual's required base
period earnings.
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TABLE D-4. Qualifying Requirements for Maximum Potential
Unemployment Insurance Benefits and Maximum Duration, by

State, 1995
Maximum Benefits
State

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

Required Earnings

Weekly Benefit

Number of

in Base Period

Amount

Weeks

$14,039
22,250
14,429
20,592
11,958
28,288
13,400
13,800
18,044
26,000
23,318
8,944
20,956
12,675
20,150
17,472
20,280
20,042
17,428
15,444
9,000
28,000
15,651
23,634
14,040
13,650
22,800
14,352
18,486
25,500
20,650

$180
212 to 284
185
264b
230
272b
335 to 385 b
300c
347 b
250
205
344b
248 b
242 to 321 b
217
224 to 274 b
260 b
238 b
181 b
198-297 b
250
336 to 504b
293 b
303 b
180
175
228 b
184
237 b
204
354b

26
26 a
26
26
26 a
26
26 a
26
26 a
26
26
26 a
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
30
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
(continued)
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TABLE D-4. (continued)
Maximum Benefits
State

Required Earnings

Weekly Benefit

in Base Period

Amount

Number of
Weeks

$205 b

26
26

23,166

300
297b

North Dakota

20,218

243 b

26

Ohio
Oklahoma

12,740

26

Oregon

24,080
13,520

245 to 328 b
247 b
30l b

New Mexico
New York

$8,883
11,980

North Carolina

16,055

Pennsy 1vania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island

5,320
23,480

340 to 348 b
133b
324 to 404b

26

26
26 a
26
26 a
26

South Carolina

16,614

South Dakota

14,040

2I3b
180b

Tennessee
Texas

20,800

200

26

24,263

Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Virgin Islands
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

24,363

252
253 b

26

9,540

212b

26

20,800

26

17,394

208
223 b

31,500

350b

27,400

290 b

30
26

26

26

266

26

19,417

233 b

26

- _ ._ _ ..
a Benefits are extended when the unemployment rate in the state reaches a specified level.

C

26

17,290

SOURCE: U.S. Deprutment of Labor (1995a, 3-35 to 3-37, 3-39 to 3-40, 3-45 to 3-47).

b Maximum

26

benefit amount is indexed with the state average weekly wage.

Maximum benefit amount varies with trust fund balance.

Appendix E /
1994 Findings and
Recommendations

Note: The material contained in this appendix is reprinted from Chapter 2
of the first annual report of the Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation, published in February 1994.

PURPOSE OFTHE EXTENDED BENEFITS PROGRAM

Findings
The Council finds that the nature of unemployment has changed since the
inception of the Unemployment Insurance system. The length of time that
individuals are unemployed, which increases sharply during recessions, has
also increased slowly but steadily during non-recessionary times. Workers
who have been laid off from their jobs are now less likely to return to their
previous jobs than has historically been the case. This indicates an increase
in the level of long-term unemployment in the economy.
The Unemployment Insurance system was designed primarily as a means
of alleviating the hardship caused by short-term unemployment. The system
was never intended to combat long-term unemployment. The purpose of the
Unemployment Insurance system, and in particular the Extended Benefits
program, must be expanded if the system is to deal effectively with the changing nature of unemployment. In doing so, however, careful consideration must
be given to the funding of the system, in order to ensure that expenditures for
combatting long-term unemployment do not drain the Unemployment Insurance trust fund reserves. It must also be recognized that while Unemployment Insurance reform is a necessary component of developing effective
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strategies for dealing with long-term unemployment, other reforms-especially among programs for dislocated workers-wi11 be needed.

Recommendation
The scope of the Extended Benefits program should be expanded to
enhance the capacity of the Unemployment Insurance system to provide assistance for long-term unemployed workers as well as shortterm unemployed workers. Those individuals who are long-term
unemployed should be eligible for extended Unemployment Insurance
benefits, provided they are participating in job search activities or in
education and training activities, where available and suitable, that
enhance their re-employment prospects. To maintain the integrity of
the Unemployment Insurance income support system, a separate
funding source should be used to finance job search and education
and training activities for long-term unemployed workers. *

THE TRIGGER FOR EXTENDED BENEFITS
Findings
The Council finds that receipt of Unemployment Insurance benefits by the
unemployed has slowly but steadily declined since at least 1947-the first
year for which data on the system are available. In addition to the long-term
downward trend in receipt of benefits, there was a pronounced decline in the
early 1980s, just as the economy entered a recession.
The reasons behind the decline in the Unemployment Insurance system
are many. The long-term decline appears to have been caused by the changing demographics of the labor force, the changing industrial and geographic
composition of employment, and a decline in the solvency of states'
Unemployment Insurance trust funds. The sharp decline in receipt of benefits in the early 1980s appears to be attributable primarily to changes in federal policies which encouraged the states to increase the solvency of their
trust funds by restricting eligibility for Unemployment Insurance benefits
and/or increasing employers' tax rates, as well as independent state efforts
to improve their trust fund solvency.
*One member of the Council emphasizes that an increase in employers' payroll taxes should not
be used as the funding source. Another member emphasizes that such a recommendation must be
considered in the context of reform of dislocated workers programs.
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The utilization of the Unemployment Insurance system is measured by
the Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR). The IUR is the number of Unemployment Insurance recipients, relative to the number of individuals in UIcovered employment. Since the inception of the Extended Benefits program
in 1970, states have been required to use the state IUR as a "trigger" that
determines whether or not individuals who have exhausted their regular UI
benefits are eligible for Extended Benefits.
Research has shown that the decline in the utilization of the Unemployment Insurance system has caused the IUR to become a less reliable indicator of economic conditions, reducing the likelihood that Extended Benefits
will trigger on in states with high unemployment. In addition, just as the IUR
was experiencing a marked decline during the recession of the 1980s, the
"trigger" level required to become eligible for Extended Benefits was raised.
The combination of the reduction in the IUR and the increase in the trigger
level resulted in the failure of the Extended Benefits program to trigger on as
unemployment continued to rise during this most recent recession. As a result,
Congress found it necessary to pass a series of emergency extensions of
Unemployment Insurance benefits. The Council finds that emergency extensions of Unemployment Insurance benefits are extremely inefficient since
they are neither well-timed nor well-targeted. Therefore, it is necessary to
reform the Extended Benefits program prior to the onset of the next recession,
in order to minimize the need for future emergency legislation.
The Council has considered a variety of measures that could be used to
trigger the Extended Benefits program. While no perfect measures exist, the
best available evidence about the condition of the overall labor market within a state is the Total Unemployment Rate (TUR), which indicates the supply of individuals who are unable to find work. It should be noted, however,
that beginning in 1994, the TUR rates will be affected by the redesign of the
Current Population Survey. An alternative measure of the labor market conditions that are faced by Unemployment Insurance recipients is the Adjusted
Insured Unemployment Rate (AIUR), which is the IUR adjusted to include
those individuals who have exhausted their regular Unemployment
Insurance benefits.
The Council finds that while substate (or regional) data are available on
some measures of local labor market conditions, these data are extremely
unreliable measures of the true conditions that the unemployed face.
Furthermore, there would be substantial administrative difficulties in using
either substate or regional data for triggering Extended Benefits.
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The Council finds that, in addition to problems with the triggers that
have been used to determine whether or not Extended Benefits are available
within a state, the thresholds built into the biggers have been problematic.
These thresholds require that a state's unemployment rate (whether measured by the IUR or the TUR) exceed the level that prevailed over the previous two-year period (by a factor of 120 percent for the IUR or 110 percent
for the TUR).
The threshold requirements do not significantly affect the number of
states in which Extended Benefits trigger on during a recession. However,
the thresholds have the effect of delaying the point at which Extended
Benefits trigger on in some states with the highest unemployment, as well as
hastening the point at which such states trigger off the Extended Benefits
program. As a result, the thresholds have caused dissatisfaction among some
with the operation of the program since those states suffering the most economic hardship are triggered on for the shortest period of time. This problem could be addressed by eliminating the thresholds and setting the triggers
at a slightly higher level.

Recommendation
The Council is unanimous in the view that there is a pressing need to
reform the Extended Benefits program.
The majority of the Council recommends that the Extended Benefits
program should trigger on when a state's seasonally adjusted total unemployment rate (STUR) exceeds 6.5 percent as measured before the
Current Population Survey redesign. * Two members of the Council recommend that each state should have the choice of using either the STUR
trigger of 6.5 percent with a threshold requirement of 110 percent above
either of the two previous years, or an IUR or AIUR trigger set at 4 percent with a threshold requirement of 120 percent over the previous two
year period.
The Council hopes Congress can implement these reforms promptly. Although the Council has reservations about the inefficient targeting of emergency benefits, Congress should extend the existing
Emergency Unemployment Compensation for a six month period to
provide a bridge program until these Extended Benefits reforms can
be implemented. **
*Two members of the Council recommend that the trigger should he set at 6.5 percent regardless
of any changes in the measured unemployment rate that result from the redesign of the Current
Population Survey.
**Two members do not agree to the recommendation that Emergency Unemployment Compensation should be extended.
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Recommendation

Neither substate nor regional data should be used for the purpose of
determining whether or not Extended Benefits are available within a
given area.

FINANCING EXTENDED BENEFITS REFORM
Findings

The Council finds that the integrity of the Unemployment Insurance system
as well as its capacity to adapt to the changing p.ature of unemployment are
compromised by incorporating its trust funds into the unified federal budget.
While the flow of funds into the Extended Unemployment Compensation
account may be adequate to finance the recommended Extended Benefits
reform, such reform is complicated by the use of dedicated Unemployment
Insurance trust funds for the purpose of deficit reduction. Several members
of the Council believe that prompt action should be taken to correct this situation. Other members feel that the issue of how trust fund accounts should
be treated in the budget is a very complex one, and requires careful consideration within a broader context. The Council intends to revisit this issue in
its future deliberations.
Recommendation

If additional revenue is required to implement the Council's recommendations, such revenue should be generated by a modest increase
in the FUTA taxable wage base, to $8,500.*

WORK SEARCH TEST UNDER EXTENDED BENEFITS
Findings

The Council finds that another problematic aspect of the Extended Benefits
program is the federal requirement that, with some exceptions, those individuals who are receiving Extended Benefits must accept a minimum wage
job if one is offered, or become ineligible for benefits. While the Council
understands that recipients of both regular and extended Unemployment
Insurance benefits have an obligation to search actively for work and accept
appropriate job offers, the Council finds the current federal requirements to
*Two members object to this recommendation.
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be excessively onerous. All states use a "suitability" test to determine the
jobs which claimants are required to accept to remain eligible for benefits.
This test gives states the flexibility to ensure adequate work search by
claimants, while protecting unemployed workers' living standards and job
skills by permitting them to decline substandard jobs. The States are in a
better position to determine appropriate mechanisms for enforcing a work
search test, given the particular conditions of their labor markets.

Recommendation
The federal requirement that individuals who are receiving Extended
Benefits must accept a minimum wage job if one is offered, or
become ineligible for benefits should be eliminated. Each state should
be allowed to determine an appropriate work search test, based on
the conditions of its labor market.

STATE TRUST FUND SOLVENCY
Findings
The Council finds an overall decline in receipt of Unemployment Insurance
benefits among the unemployed. This decline is at least partially caused by
the inadequate reserves of many states' trust funds. During the past decade,
many states with low or negative trust fund reserves have found themselves
in the position of either having to increase taxes on employers in the midst
of an economic downturn, or having to take measures to restrict eligibility
and benefits for the unemployed. Some believe that this reliance on pay-asyou-go funding has worked to the overall detriment of the Unemployment
Insurance system.
The Council believes that it would be in the interest of the nation to
begin to restore the forward-funding nature of the Unemployment Insurance
system, resulting in a building up of reserves during good economic times
and a drawing down of reserves during recessions. The Council finds, however, that any move toward creating federal guidelines for states' Unemployment Insurance trust fund accounts must be carefully weighed.
Otherwise, there will be a risk of creating undue incentives for the states to
restrict the eligibility and level of Unemployment Insurance benefits in
order to achieve the solvency guidelines. The Council intends to make specific recommendations on this issue in future reports.
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FUTA TAXATION OF ALIEN AGRICULTURAL WORKERS
Findings
The Council was asked by Congress to consider the treatment of alien agricultural workers within the Unemployment Insurance system. Currently, the
wages paid to alien agricultural workers with H2-A visas are exempt from
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). This exemption is set to expire
on January 1, 1995.
The Council finds that there are arguments both for and against continuing this exemption. Under the current exemption, alien agricultural workers
are less costly to hire than domestic workers, on whom FUTA taxes must be
. paid. This cost differential may create an incentive for substitution of foreign workers for U.S. workers, which argues in favor of repeal of the
exemption. Furthermore, the process of certifying workers and issuing H2A visas imposes costs on the federal and state governments that have the
responsibility for overseeing this process. The vast majority (97 percent) of
the cost of the certification process is funded through the FUTA tax. Since
FUTA serves as the mechanism for funding the costs of the certification
process, there is an additional rationale for repealing the exemption of H2-A
workers from FUTA taxation.
On the other hand, H2-A workers are ineligible to receive Unemployment Insurance benefits since their visas require that they return to their
country of origin within ten days after their employment terminates.
Consequently, these individuals cannot meet the "available for work" test of
the Unemployment Insurance system. Thus, FUTA taxes would be imposed
upon the wages of individuals who cannot receive Unemployment Insurance
benefits, which argues against imposing the FUTA tax on their wages.
On balance, the Council finds that the arguments in favor of FUTA taxation of alien agricultural workers outweigh the arguments against continuing
that exemption.

Recommendation
As of January 1, 1995, the wages of alien agricultural workers (H2-A
workers) should be subject to FUTA taxes.

Appendix F /
1995 Findings and
Recommendations

Note: The material contained in this appendix is reprinted from Chapter 2
of the second annual report of the Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation (Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Benefits,
Financing, and Coverage), published in February 1995.

THE PURPOSE OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation finds that, although
an increasing percentage of the unemployed experience long spells of unemployment, the majority of the unemployed experience relatively short unemployment spells. Similarly, while a growing minority of individuals who
receive Unemployment Insurance exhaust their benefits without having
found new employment, the majority of individuals receive Unemployment
Insurance benefits for a relatively short period of time before returning to
employment. This reality dictates that the Unemployment Insurance system
must be designed to deal effectively with a variety of needs. In particular,
the system must both provide temporary wage replacement to individuals
and facilitate the productive reemployment of those individuals who experience longer spells of unemployment.
The Unemployment Insurance system also serves an important macroeconomic stabilization role by injecting additional money into the economy
during periods of downturn. This objective, however, can only be achieved
effectively if the system is forward-funded, thereby accumulating funds during periods of economic health.
These findings lead the Council to a formulation of the following statement of purpose for the Unemployment Insurance system.
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1. Statement of Purpose
The most important objective of the u.s. system of Unemployment
Insurance is the provision of temporary, partial wage replacement as a
matter of right to involuntarily unemployed individuals who have
demonstrated a prior attachment to the labor force. This support
should help to meet the necessary expenses of these workers as they
search for employment that takes advantage of their skills and experience. Their search for productive reemployment should be facilitated
by close cooperation among the Unemployment Insurance system and
employment, training, and education services. In addition, the system
should accumulate adequate funds during periods of economic health
in order to promote economic stability by maintaining consumer purchasing power during economic downturns.

FUNDING OFTHE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM
The Unemployment Insurance system's capacity to promote economic stability rests on two key aspects of its funding mechanism. First, the funding
of the system is "experience rated"-that is, employers who have been
responsible for greater demands on the system pay higher taxes and consequently bear a greater share of the system's costs. Second, during periods of
prosperity, the system accumulates reserves that are then spent during periods of economic decline.
Some members of the Council believe that experience rating is a crucial
component of the program, providing effective incentives for employers to
avoid laying off workers. Other members believe that experience rating
causes employers to make excessive use of the system's appeal mechanism
in an attempt to keep their experience-rated taxes as low as possible.
Although the Council was unable to resolve this difference of opinion, it
intends to address the issue of experience rating in its next annual report.
The Council unanimously concludes, however, that promoting economic
stability is an objective that transcends the interests of the states and cannot
be achieved by states working in isolation. While some states have attempted to maintain an adequate degree of forward funding, others have not. The
low reserves in some states' trust funds weaken the Unemployment
Insurance system's capacity to achieve its economic stabilization function.
Effectively promoting the forward funding of the Unemployment
Insurance system requires a coherent federal strategy that includes congressionally stated goals.
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2. Recommendation
Congress should establish an explicit goal to promote the forward
funding of the Unemployment Insurance system. In particular, during
periods of economic health, each state should be encouraged to accumulate reserves sufficient to pay at least one year of Unemployment
Insurance benefits at levels comparable to its previous "high cost." For
purposes of establishing this forward-funding goal, previous "high
cost" should be defined as the average of the three highest annual levels of Unemployment Insurance benefits that a state has paid in any of
the previous 20 calendar years.
To complement these forward-funding goals, financial incentives to
encourage forward funding should be created. This can be done by changing
the structure of the interest rates that the federal government pays to the
states on their Unemployment Insurance trust fund balances. A slight reduction in the interest rate paid on low levels of states' trust funds could be used
to finance a fairly substantial interest rate premium paid on high levels of
reserves. While it is difficult to predict with accuracy how many states
would respond to such incentives, careful management of the interest rate
structure could ensure that these incentives could be financed without additional cost to the federal government.

3. Recommendation
To encourage further forward funding, an interest premium should be
paid on that portion of a state's Unemployment Insurance trust fund that
is in excess of one "high cost" year of reserves. The cost of this interest
rate premium should be financed by a reduction in the interest rate paid
on that portion of each state's trust fund that is less than one "high cost"
year of reserves. The U.S. Department of Labor should be given authority
to adjust periodically the interest rate structure to ensure that these
incentives create no additional cost to the federal government.
The Council finds that the CUlTent federal policy of providing short-term,
interest-free loans to state trust funds creates a disincentive for states to forward fund their systems. Preferential loan treatment should be available
only to states that have met, or made satisfactory progress toward, the forward-funding goal. An example of how satisfactory progress might be
defined is presented in Chapter 5 of this report.
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4. Recommendation
Preferential interest rates on federal loans to the states should be
restricted to those states that have achieved (or made satisfactory
progress toward) the forward-funding goal. In particular, the current
system of making interest-free, cash-flow federal loans generally available to all states should be ended. Rather, these interest-free loans
should be made available only to those states that have achieved (or
made satisfactory progress toward) the forward-funding goal prior to
the onset of an economic downturn. In other states, these loans
should be subject to the same interest charges that are incurred on
long-term loans to state Unemployment Insurance trust funds.

5. Recommendation
A method is needed for determining whether a state that has not yet
met the forward-funding goal has made "satisfactory progress"
toward the goal. This method should be based on an empirical analysis of the rate at which state trust funds must be restored during periods of economic health in order to achieve the forward-funding goal
prior to a recession.

6. Recommendation
When states have achieved (or made satisfactory progress toward) the
forward-funding goal, yet find it necessary to borrow from the federal
government, the interest rate charged on long-term loans should be a
preferential rate that is 1 percentage point lower than would otherwise be charged.
The Council has discussed the level at which the taxable wage base and
tax rate established by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) should
be set. This is a complex issue. FUTA revenues are earmarked for financing
the administration of the nation's Unemployment Insurance system, as well
as that of the U.S. Employment Service. However, because the bust funds
are currently held within the unified federal budget, it is not possible for
these programs to achieve direct access to the funds that are earmarked for
them. In addition, a two-tenths surcharge that was imposed in 1977 to pay
off trust fund debts has been extended well beyond the time when the debt
was repaid. Quite apart from these issues, the Council has not yet made a
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determination of whether or not additional revenues from FUTA would contribute to more efficient and effective operation of the Unemployment
Insurance system and the Employment Service.
Another element of complexity results from the fact that the minimum
taxable wage base that the states use for financing their Unemployment
Insurance benefits is tied to the FUTA taxable wage base. On average, those
states with higher taxable wage bases have a higher level of reserves than do
states that have set their taxable wage base at the minimum level of $7,000.
Consequently, raising the FUTA taxable wage base might contribute to the
overall forward funding of the system.
Furthermore, a low taxable wage base within a state tends to impose the
burden of Unemployment Insurance payroll taxes disproportionately on
employers of low-wage workers. To the extent that employers pass on a portion of the tax to their workers in the form of lower wages, therefore, a disproportionate share of the burden of the tax is ultimately borne by low-wage
workers. Those low-wage workers who work part-time or part-year, however, are often ineligible for Unemployment Insurance. As a result, the low
taxable wage base within the Unemployment Insurance system is both
regressive and unfair.
The Council has not yet reached a consensus on how to address these
interrelated issues most effectively. As it considers the issues of administrative
funding and efficiency over the course of the next year, however, the issue of
the FUTA taxable wage base and tax rate will once again be addressed.
The Council does note, however, that the Unemployment Insurance system
was intended as a self-contained system of social insurance. Inherent in this
design is the principle that funds are accumulated and held in trust solely for
their intended purpose: namely, the payment of benefits to eligible unemployed
workers, economic stimulus, and the costs of administering the system.
Inclusion of FUTA accounts and state Unemployment Insurance trust fund
accounts within the unified federal budget undermines the integrity of the
Unemployment Insurance system. Since federal budget offsets must be identified before additional FUTA funds (which are earmarked for program administration) can be appropriated, some states have found it necessary to divert
their trust funds to pay for administrative expenses--expenses that should be
paid out of the FUTA trust fund. This diversion, while perhaps necessary,
tends to erode the integrity of the system's financing. Employer willingness to
contribute to the system, state capacity to develop and maintain adequate trust
funds, and worker confidence in the system are all undermined.
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Furthermore, when Unemployment Insurance trust fund balances that have
been explicitly accumulated for countercyclical purposes are used to balance
the annual federal budget, the system loses its capacity to increase spending
automatically during recessions. Consequently, unlike other trust funds held
by the federal government, the Unemployment Insurance trust funds are rendered fundamentally incapable of achieving one of their major objectiveseconomic stabilization-through their inclusion in the unified federal budget.
7. Recommendation
All Unemployment Insurance trust funds should be removed from the
unified federal budget.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE AND TAXATION
Virtually all wage and salaried workers are covered by Unemployment
Insurance, and their employers pay taxes into the system accordingly. There
are, however, two important exceptions. The first exception is that nonprofit
employers do not pay FUTA taxes, despite the fact that their employees are
eligible for Unemployment Insurance, use the system, and generate administrative costs for the system. In calendar year 1992, this exemption cost the
federal trust funds approximately $300 million. The second exception is that
agricultural workers on small farms are not covered by Unemployment
Insurance. The Council finds no justification for either of these exceptions.
8. Recommendation
The FUTA exemption for nonprofit employers should be eliminated.

9. Recommendation
The exemption of agricultural workers on small farms from Unemployment Insurance coverage should be eliminated.*

The Council also finds that Unemployment Insurance taxes owed by
farm labor contractors ("crew leaders") often are not paid. Federal law specifies that, under most circumstances, these farm labor contractors are the

*Two members of the Council object to this recommendation.
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designated employers of their workers and that they are responsible for the
payment of Unemployment Insurance taxes. It is difficult, however, to
enforce this provision because of the many obstacles that prevent locating
crew leaders who have outstanding tax obligations.

10. Recommendation
Federal law should be amended so that farm owners or operators are
assigned responsibility for unpaid Unemployment Insurance taxes
owed by the crew leaders with whom they contract for workers on
their farms. *
The Council finds that some employers improperly avoid paying Unemployment Insurance taxes by misclassifying their employees as independent
contractors. Clear definitions that delineate the conditions under which an
individual would legitimately be qualified as an independent contractor
would help to alleviate this problem.
Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 protects businesses that have
"reasonable basis" for misclassifying employees as independent contractors.
Businesses that fall under the Section 530 "safe harbor" are not required to
correct the classification of employees and cannot be assessed back taxes or
penalties based on the misclassification of workers. Section 530 also prohibits
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from clarifying the guidelines for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. The
ambiguity of these guidelines is the cornerstone of the misclassification problem and the tax revenue losses associated with it. In addition, revenue collection is limited by Section 3509 of the Internal Revenue Code, which caps the
employment tax liability of those businesses not covered by Section 530.
The greatest revenue loss results from businesses that do not file information returns on independent contractors. These are circumstances under
which businesses are most likely to misclassify workers, as well as the circumstances under which independent contractors are least likely to report
their entire income. Increasing the penalty for failing to file information
returns would increase the incentive to file, increase the percentage of independent contractor income reported, and provide the information needed to
identify employers that misclassify workers-thereby creating an incentive
to classify workers correctly.
*One member of the Council objects to this recommendation.
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While the Council recognizes that correcting these problems would have
ramifications that reach far beyond the Unemployment Insurance system,
the Council finds that the problems are sufficiently serious to merit action at
both the state and federal levels.
11. Recommendation

States should review and consider adopting the best practices of other
states to address classification issues which include the following: clarifying the definitions of employee and independent contractor; specifying employer liability for payroll taxes; licensing, bonding, or regulating the employee leasing industry; and strategic targeting of audits.
12. Recommendation

Federal law should be amended to eliminate the "prior audit" safe
harbor provision of Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978.
13. Recommendation

Federal law should be amended to eliminate the provision of Section
530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 that bars the IRS from issuing guidelines to define the employment relationship.
14. Recommendation

Federal law should be amended to repeal Section 3509 of the Internal
Revenue Code and to require businesses to pay all taxes owed for
workers that are misclassified after the enactment of the repeal.
15. Recommendation

The $50 penalty for businesses that fail to file information returns
with the IRS or with the independent contractor they have hired
should be increased.
The Council notes that available statistics do not accurately measure the
level of Unemployment Insurance receipt among the unemployed (that is,
"recipiency"). The measure of the "insured unemployed" (IU) and the ratio
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of insured unemployed to the covered labor force (that is, the insured unemployment rate-the IUR) are frequently used for a number of purposes.
When used as measures of recipiency, however, they are misleading. Both
statistics consistently overstate the number of individuals who actually
receive Unemployment Insurance benefits in a given week. In addition to
counting recipients, the two measures both include individuals who file a
claim for, but do not receive, benefits in a given week (these include individuals on a waiting week, individuals whose claims are ultimately denied
for nonmonetary reasons, and individuals who are disqualified for a given
week). At the national level, this inclusion has the effect of overstating the
number of the unemployed who actually receive Unemployment Insurance
benefits by approximately 10 percent (although there is considerable variation among the states in the extent to which currently reported statistics
overstate the actual receipt of benefits).
16. Recommendation
The U.S. Department of Labor should report a measure of Unemployment Insurance recipiency. The measure should be a ratio, with
the numerator defined as the number of individuals who are actually
paid Unemployment Insurance benefits, and the denominator defined
as the total number of unemployed individuals.

EliGIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS
Five percent of all workers in 1993 reported that they were unable to find
full-time employment, and 16 percent of the work force held part-time jobs.
The Council finds that in some states, these individuals are unable to qualify
for Unemployment Insurance benefits, even when they have substantial
labor force attachment. This problem is especially pronounced for low-wage
individuals, many of whom must work in temporary or part-time jobs.
Welfare reform could result in an increase in the number of low-wage workers who find themselves in this situation.
Some unemployed workers are unable to qualify for Unemployment
Insurance benefits because of their state's definition of the "base period."
The base period is the period of time that is used for calculating whether or
not unemployed individuals' earnings are sufficient to qualify them for
Unemployment Insurance. Many states define the base period as the first
four of the past five completed calendar quarters. In these states, therefore,
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between three and six months of an individual's most recent work experience is excluded from consideration in calculating eligibility for benefits.
This may have the effect of disqualifying some workers who have worked
continuously, but who need the most recently completed quarter of earnings
to be included in the base period in order to qualify for Unemployment
Insurance benefits. To solve this problem, some states now use a "moveable
base period," which allows the minimum earnings requirement to be met on
the basis of the four most recently completed quarters of work if it is not
met using the standard definition.
The Council finds that advances in technology have made it feasible for
all states to use the most recently completed quarter when determining benefit eligibility, and that using this quarter is consistent with the legislative
requirement that states ensure full payment of Unemployment Insurance
when due. While the Council has been unable to develop sound estimates of
the cost of implementing such a change, there are reasons to believe that the
cost may not be prohibitive. First, many of the individuals who are determined to be eligible using a moveable base period would become eligible
eventually (as soon as an additional quarter of earnings information
becomes available). Second, some of the increase in the cost of
Unemployment Insurance benefits would be offset by a reduction in benefits
paid under means-tested programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps.
In some cases, unemployed individuals cannot qualify for Unemployment Insurance benefits because their eligibility is contingent upon
their earnings in the calendar quarter in which they became unemployed.
Information about their most recent earnings is typically not available until
after the quarter has been completed. These individuals often do not realize
that they can reapply (and often qualify) for benefits when information
about their most recent quarter of earnings becomes available. This problem
could be corrected if these individuals were told when they should reapply
for benefits, as well as what additional earnings they would need to qualify
for benefits.

17. Recommendation
All states should use a moveable base period in cases in which its use
would qualify an Unemployment Insurance claimant to meet the
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state's monetary eligibility requirements. When a claimant fails to
meet the monetary eligibility requirement for Unemployment
Insurance, the state should inform the individual in writing of what
additional earnings would be needed to qualify for benefits, as well as
the date when the individual should reapply for benefits.
In some states, low-wage workers face an additional impediment in
qualifying for Unemployment Insurance benefits. In order to meet their
state's base period and/or high-quarter earnings requirements, low-wage
individuals must work more hours than workers who earn higher wages.
For example, an individual who works half-time for a full year (i.e., 1,040
hours) at the federal minimum wage level would not meet minimum earnings requirements in 9 states. At an hourly wage of $8.00, however, a halftime, full-year worker would be eligible in all states. Similarly, an individual who works two days per week for a full year (approximately 800 hours)
at the minimum wage would not meet the minimum earnings requirements
in 29 states. At a wage of $8.00 per hour, however, that individual would
be eligible in all but 2 states.
The Council finds that any individual who works at least 800 hours per
year should be eligible for Unemployment Insurance benefits and that
states' minimum earnings requirements should be set accordingly. If all
states set their earnings requirements at this level, the number of individuals
eligible for Unemployment Insurance benefits would increase by approximately 5.3 percent, and the amount of benefits paid would increase by
approximately 3.6 percent. Some of the increase in the cost to the system,
however, would be offset by a reduction in receipt of means-tested benefits
such as AFDC and Food Stamps.
18. Recommendation

Each state should set its law so that its base period earnings requirements do not exceed 800 times the state's minimum hourly wage, and
so that its high quarter earnings requirements do not exceed onequarter of that amount.
Fourteen states preclude workers in seasonal industries from collecting
Unemployment Insurance except during the season in which work is normally done within the industry. In addition, twelve of these states disallow
seasonal workers' earnings from being counted toward their minimum earn-
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ings requirement, even if the individual subsequently works in a nonseasonal job. The Council finds these exclusions to be problematic.

19. Recommendation
States should eliminate seasonal exclusions; claimants who have
worked in seasonal jobs should be subject to the same eligibility
requirements as all other unemployed workers.
In addition to the monetary requirements for qualifying for Unemployment Insurance, each state has a variety of nonmonetary requirements
that unemployed individuals must satisfy in order to qualify for benefits.
These requirements include stipulations about availability for suitable work,
ability to work, work search requirements, voluntary separation for good
cause, discharges due· to misconduct, refusal of suitable work, and unemployment as a result of a labor dispute. In some cases, part-time workers
(who meet monetary eligibility requirements) are explicitly precluded from
receiving Unemployment Insurance.

20. Recommendation
Workers who meet a state's monetary eligibility requirements should
not be precluded from receiving Unemployment Insurance benefits
merely because they are seeking part-time, rather than full-time,
employment.
State legislation often does not address the specifics of many of the situations that Unemployment Insurance claimants face. As a result, interpretations of nonmonetary eligibility requirements can also be found in administrative and judicial case law and administrative rules. Testimony presented
in the Council's public hearings indicates that the complexity of these nonmonetary requirements creates confusion about eligibility requirements. It
can be difficult for both claimants and employers to understand these
requirements with a reasonable degree of certainty. These problems can be
particularly pronounced for multistate employers.
Not only can this lack of certainty impede the receipt of Unemployment
Insurance, it may also increase unnecessarily the number of appeals filed by
both claimants and employers. These problems appear to be particularly
severe with regard to determinations involving employee misconduct,
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refusal of suitable work, and voluntary leaving for good cause. Clarifying
these issues would serve the interests of both groups.
21. Recommendation
A state-specific information packet that clearly explains Unemployment
Insurance eligibility conditions (both monetary and nonmonetary)
should be distributed by the states to unemployed individuals.

The Council is particularly concerned about a number of specific nonmonetary eligibility conditions. For example, it is not always clear whether
an individual who is unavailable for shift work (perhaps due to a lack of
public transportation or child care) will be found to be eligible for Unemployment Insurance. Consideration needs to be given to situations in which
individuals quit their jobs because of one of the following circumstances: a
change in their employment situation (e.g., change in hours of work), sexual
or other discriminatory harassment, domestic violence, or compelling personal reasons, including family responsibilities. In addition, the Council is
concerned about the variability in the definition of misconduct across states,
and about the treatment of individuals who refuse employment because it is
temporary or commission work. The Council intends to address these and
related issues in its third annual report.

ADEQUACY OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS
At the inception of the Unemployment Insurance system, much debate was
devoted to the adequacy of benefits. Many of the founders of the system
argued that benefits should replace 50 percent of lost earnings; they believed
that this percentage was high enough to allow workers to purchase basic
necessities, but not so high as to discourage prompt return to work.
A number of presidents, including and following Dwight Eisenhower,
have endorsed a goal of 50 percent replacement of lost earnings within the
Unemployment Insurance system. President Richard Nixon advocated that
the Unemployment Insurance system should seek to replace 50 percent of
lost earnings for four-fifths of all Unemployment Insurance recipients.
The level of a state's maximum weekly benefit amount has a direct
impact upon the percentage of Unemployment Insurance recipients who
receive benefits that equal or exceed a given replacement rate. Those individuals whose earnings qualify them for their state's maximum weekly ben-

242/ ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

efit amount typically have less than half of their wages replaced. Therefore,
when a state's maximum benefit amount is relatively low as a percentage of
the state's average weekly wage, the state will not meet the 50 percent
replacement rate goal for a large percentage of recipients.
The Council endorses the long-standing goal of 50 percent replacement
of lost earnings, and notes that a state is likely to be able to achieve this goal
for a large number of workers by setting the state maximum weekly benefit
amount equal to two-thirds of state average weekly wages.
22. Recommendation
For eligible workers, each state should replace at least 50 percent of
lost earnings over a six-month period, with a maximum weekly benefit
amount equal to two-thirds of the state's average weekly wages. *

The Council also notes that, starting in 1986, all Unemployment
Insurance benefits became subject to taxation. Taxation of Unemployment
Insurance benefits results in a reduction of the effective replacement rate.
23. Recommendation
Unemployment Insurance benefits should be tax-exempt. **

The Council finds that the current system for reporting the average
replacement rate of lost earnings within the Unemployment Insurance system needs to be improved. While the U.S. Department of Labor routinely
reports the replacement rate, the concept used in the calculation is flawed.
The reported replacement rate is calculated by dividing Unemployment
Insurance benefits paid by the wages of all covered workers. To the extent
that those who receive Unemployment Insurance have lower wages than the
average covered worker, the reported replacement rate will understate the
actual replacement rate. Conversely, if those who receive Unemployment
Insurance have higher wages than the typical covered worker, the reported
replacement rate will overstate the actual replacement rate. Advisory
Council calculations using data available from selected states suggest that
the reported replacement rate significantly understates the actual replacement rate.
*One member of the Council objects to this recommendation.
**Four members of the Council object to this recommendation.
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24. Recommendation
The U.S. Department of Labor should calculate and report the actual
replacement rate for individuals who receive Unemployment
Insurance. This replacement rate should be calculated by dividing the
weekly benefits paid to individuals by the average weekly earnings
paid to those individuals prior to unemployment.

REEMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES
The Council finds that financial incentives (such as reemployment
bonuses or self-employment subsidies) for facilitating rapid reemployment
have a positive impact on a small portion of the unemployed. In some cases,
this positive impact could be offset partially by negative impacts on others
who find jobs more slowly because they are displaced in the job queue by
those who receive the incentives. This displacement effect is likely to be
more pronounced during periods of relatively high unemployment.
The Council concludes, therefore, that the states should be permitted to
experiment with reemployment incentives, but it opposes incentives to
encourage (or require) states to implement such strategies.
Some members of the Council object to the use of self-employment
incentives within the Unemployment Insurance system---especially when an
individual's entire benefit is paid in lump-sum form.
25. Recommendation
States should be given broad discretion in determining whether reemployment incentives, such as reemployment bonuses or self-employment allowances, should be included as a part of their Unemployment
Insurance systems.

ADMINISTRATIVE FINANCING
States' administrative costs are financed by the federal government with a
portion of the revenues generated by FUTA. This situation requires some
systematic method for allocating these revenues among the states. The
Council finds that whatever method is chosen, it is important to create
financial incentives for states to administer their Unemployment Insurance
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systems efficiently. For example, those states that are able both to administer their Unemployment Insurance systems with less money than is allotted to
them and to achieve U.S. Department of Labor performance requirements
could be allowed to keep all or part of the surplus for other uses within their UI
systems. The Council intends to address this issue, in conjunction with the U.S.
Department of Labor's performance requirements, in its next annual report.
The U.S. Department of Labor has proposed an Administrative Financing Initiative (API) that would allocate FUTA funds based on a national unit
cost with base-level and contingency-level funding. The Council takes no
position on the API, because the U.S. Department of Labor and the states
have not yet agreed on the details of this initiative.
The Council notes that it is inefficient for the federal government to
require employers to fill out and submit separate forms and payments for their
FUTA and state Unemployment Insurance taxes. Not only does this impose an
unnecessary paperwork burden on employers, it also creates redundant tax
collection units in the federal and state governments. The expense of collecting Unemployment Insurance taxes could be reduced by allowing the states to
collect FUTA taxes on behalf of the federal government.

26. Recommendation
FUTA taxes should be collected with other Unemployment Insurance
taxes by each of the states and submitted to the federal government for
placement in the federal trust fund. States' Unemployment Insurance
taxes should remain in the state trust funds, as is currently the case.
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The Council's Official Designation
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (hereinafter called
"Council").

The Council's Objectives and the Scope of its Activity
It shall be the function of the Council to evaluate the unemployment com-

pensation program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding of State administrative costs, administrative efficiency, and any other aspects of the
program and to make recommendations for improvement.

Period of Time Necessary for the Council to Carry Out its Purposes
Four years.

The Agency and/or Official to Whom the Council Reports
The President and the Congress.

The Agency Responsible for Providing the Necessary Support to
the Council
The Unemployment Insurance Service of the Employment and Training
Administration of the Depattment of Labor.
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Membership
The Council shall consist of 11 members as follows:
(A) Five members appointed by the President, to include representatives of business, labor, State government, and the public.
(B) Three members appointed by the President pro tempore of the
Senate, in consultation with the Chairman and the ranking member
of the Committee on Finance of the Senate.
(C) Three members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Repre-

sentatives, in consultation with the Chairman and the ranking member of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives.
(D) The President shall appoint the Chairman of the Council from
among its members.
(E) In appointing members under subparagraphs (B) and (C), the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives shall each appoint(i)
one representative of the interests of business,
(ii) one representative of the interests of labor, and
(iii) one representative of the interests of State governments.

A Description of the Duties for Which the Council Is Responsible
It shall be the function of the Council to evaluate the unemployment compensation program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding of State
administrative costs, administrative efficiency, and any other aspects of the
program and to make recommendations for improvement. Not later than
February 1, 1995, the Council shall submit to the President and the Congress
a report setting forth the findings and recommendations of the Council as a
result of its evaluation of the unemployment compensation program, including the Council's findings and recommendations with respect to determining
eligibility for extended unemployment benefits on the basis of unemployment statistics for regions, States or subdivisions of States.
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The Estimated Annual Operating Costs in Dollars and Staff Years
for Such Council
It is anticipated that expenditures will be approximately $1,200,000, including six PrEs.
The Estimated Number and Frequency of Committee Meetings
It is anticipated that the Council will meet five times during each year.
Termination Date

January 31, 1996.
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Calendar

November 15, 1991

Establishment of Council by statute

January 24, 1992

Chartering of Council

May 11, 1993

First Council Meeting
Washington, DC

September 20, 1993

Public Hearing
Dallas, Texas

September 21, 1993

Council Meeting
Dallas, Texas

December 9, 1993

Council Meeting
Washington, DC

January 10, 1994

Focus Groups of UI Claimants
San Francisco, California

January 11-12, 1994

Council Meeting and Public Hearing
San Francisco, California

April 21-22, 1994

Council Meeting and Public Hearing
Springfield, Oregon
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June 16-17,1994

Council Meeting and Public Hearing
Portland, Maine

August 18-19, 1994

First Council Research Conference
Portland, Maine

September 8, 1994

Focus Groups of UI Claimants
New York, New York

September 8-9,1994

Council Meeting and Public Hearing
New York, New York

November 30December 1, 1994

Council Meeting and Public Hearing
Denver, Colorado

January 4,1995

Council Meeting
Washington, DC

March 30-31,1995

Legal Symposium
Ann Arbor, Michigan

April 5-6, 1995

Council Meeting and Public Hearing
Detroit, Michigan

May 31-June 1, 1995

Council Meeting and Public Hearing
Washington, DC

August 17-18,1995

Second Council Research Conference
Burlington, Vermont

September 13-14,1995

Council Meeting and Public Hearing
Charleston, South Carolina

December 13,1995

Final Council Meeting
Washington, DC

Appendix 1/
Public Hearings

THE ADVISORY COUNCIL has held nine sets of public hearings over the course
of its three-year tenn in order to provide individuals and organizations with an
opportunity to present their views and recommendations regarding the improvement of the Unemployment Insurance system. Members of the public
were asked to address a variety of topics related to Unemployment Insurance.
More than 160 witnesses have presented testimony before the Council
and more have submitted written statements. Both the hearings and the written statements have proven to be a rich source of infonnation, providing
many new perspectives on Unemployment Insurance issues. The Advisory
Council expresses its appreciation to the members of the public who took
the time to share their time and ideas with the members of the Council.
These witnesses are listed below.

WITNESSES WHO PRESENTED TESTIMONY
Amanda Afton, Employers Unemployment Compensation Council, Michigan
Jonathan Baird, New Hampshire Legal Assistance
Michael Baker, South Carolina
Jim Barrett, Michigan State Chamber of Commerce
Milt Bartholomew, Douglas County Fanners Co-op, Oregon
Mary Frances Bartlett, Maine Welfare Directors Association
Robert Becker, Raff and Becker, New York
Lee Beyer, Oregon State Representative
Stephen Bingham, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance
Foundation
Jon Bloom, Workers' Defense League, New York
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Warren Blue, R. E. Harrington, Inc., Ohio
Malcolm Bonner, California
John Bourg, Louisiana AFL-CIO
Christopher Bowlin, National Association of Manufacturers, Washington, DC
Sandra Boynton, Maine
Deborah Bronow, State of California Employment Development
Depmtment
Keith Brooks, New York Unemployed Committee
Frederic Buse, New York Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance
Albert Ca1ille, Ameritech, Michigan
Sally Cansino, Oregon
Barry Cargille, Small Business Association of Michigan
Anthony Carnevale, National Commission on Employment Policy,
Washington, DC
Don Carrington, John Locke Foundation, North Carolina
Larry Clark, Gibbens Company, Utah
Brenda Cochrane, San Francisco State University
Clarence Cooper, Suffolk University, Massachusetts
Leighanne N apua Cote, Maine
Jesse Damesworth, UAW, Michigan
John Davidson, Chrysler Corporation, Michigan
Gene Derfler, Oregon State Representative
Loleta Didrickson, Illinois Department of Employment Security
Sharon Dietrich, Community Legal Services, Pennsylvania
Mary Dirk, SEW Local 31M, Michigan
John Dorrer, New England Training and Development Corporation,
Massachusetts
Robert Du Val, Unemployment Cost Control, New Jersey
Robert Edwards, Michigan Employment Security Commission
Eunice Elton, Private Industry Council of San Francisco
Maurice Emsellem, National Employment Law Project, New York
Joan Entmacher, Women's Legal Defense Fund, Washington, DC
Ron Eskin, Merrimack Valley Legal Services, Massachusetts
James Evatz, JCPenney Company, Texas
Terry Evert, Gibbens Company, California
Arthur Fandel, New York State Advisory Council on Unemployment
Insurance and Seneca Systems & Services
Gary Fitch, Agricultural Affiliates, New York
Lloyd Fleming, U.S. Department of Labor, Georgia
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Irv Fletcher, Oregon AFL-CIO
Roger Gette, Legal Services of North Texas
Jeff Gilbert, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago
Mary Katherine Gillespie, California Rural Legal Assistance
Bruce Goldstein, Fannworker Justice Fund, Washington, DC
Edward Gorham, Maine AFL-CIO
David Gough, Gibbens Company, Colorado
Betty Graham, National Association of Unemployment Insurance Appellate
Boards, Colorado
Wayne Graham, Oregon
John Gray, South Brooklyn Legal Services, New York
William Griffin, Employment Security Commission, South Carolina
Monica Halas, Greater Boston Legal Services
Maurice Hall, Sloan, Montgomery, Gregory & Hall, South Carolina
Gary Hanamoto, Oregon
James Handy, Maine State Senate
William Hannigan, Zagar, Inc., Ohio
Sandra Hansberger, Lewis and Clark Legal Clinic, Oregon
Katherine Hansen, National Association of Unemployment Insurance
Appellate Boards, Michigan
Robert Harvey, California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
Christine Hastedt, Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Maine
Robert Haynes, Massachusetts AFL-CIO
J ames Holt, Labor Policy Association, Washington, DC
Charles Howarth, Council of State Chambers of Commerce, California
John Hudacs, New York State Department of Labor
John Humphrey, U.S. Department of Labor, California
Robert Hunter, National Association of Professional Employers
Organizations, Virginia
Warren Hysell, Boise Cascade Corporation, Idaho
Peter Isberg, Automatic Data Processing, Inc., California
James Jackson, Texas Employment Commission
Thomas Jackson, California
Judy Johnson, State of Washington Employment Security Department
Preston Johnson, Employment Security Commission, North Carolina
Patrick Johnston, California State Senate
Keir Jorgensen, Amalgated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO,
New York
Bob Kenyon, U.S. Department of Labor, Texas
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Richard King, Washington State Joint Legislative Task Force on
Unemployment Insurance
Rena Kottcamp, Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training
Steven Kreisberg, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, Washington, DC
Yvonne Kroll, Job Service, North Dakota
Erik Lang, Colorado Rural Legal Services
Laurie Larrea, Private Industry Council of Dallas
Daniel G. LeBlanc, Virginia State AFL-CIO
Ed Leslie, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington State
Hui Lian Chen, Chinese Progessive Association Workers Center,
Massachusetts
David Lien, San Francisco Department of Social Services
Leslie Linson, Legal Assistance Corporation of Central Massachusetts
Paul Lodico, Mon Valley Unemployed Committee, Pennsylvania
Steve Lund, Minnesota Employers Association
Tom Mahar, Monitor Sugar Company, Michigan
Larry Malo, State of Washington Employment Security Department
Walter Mankoff, New York State Advisory Council on Unemployment
Insurance and International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union
Charles Marciante, New Jersey AFL-CIO
Rodolfo Mares, Jr., Legal Services of North Texas
Philip Martin, University of California at Davis
Pamela Mattson, Oregon Employment Department
Catherine McCuish, Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce
William McGraw, Michigan AFL-CIO
Lorrie McKinley, Community Legal Services, Pennsylvania
Harold Meyer, Georgia-Pacific Corporation, Georgia
Eric Millage, Employers Unity, Colorado
Kathy Moore, Kennebec Valley Technical College, Maine
Martin Morand, Pennsylvania Center for the Study of Labor Relations
Suzanne Murphy, Unemployment Tax Control Associates, Massachusetts
Dave Murrie, Oklahoma Employment Security Commission
Irv Newhouse, Washington State Joint Legislative Task Force on
Unemployment Insurance
Nils Nordberg, Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training
Larry Norton, Texas Rural Legal Aid
Margaret O'Riley, Michigan Business Ombudsman
Ellen Palmer, Lane Community College, Oregon
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Diana Pearce, Women and Poverty Project, Washington, DC
Don Peitersen, Colorado Department of Labor and Employment
Manuel Perez, Oregon Legal Services
Marvin Perry, Rhode Island Department of Employment and Training
Christina Peters, Gates-McDonald and Company, Ohio
William Petz, USX Corporation, Pennsylvania
Ted Potrikus, Retail Council of New York
Donnie Potts, Texas
Fred Radtke, FAR Management, Michigan
Norman Raffael, The Weyerhauser Company, Washington State
Tom Rankin, California AFL-CIO
Cynthia Rice, California Rural Legal Assistance
Ted Roberts, Texas Association of Business
John Rooney, Jr., Jon-Jay Associates, Massachusetts
Carol Ross-Evans, California Tax Payers Association
Dominic Rotondi, New York
Harold Roy, Gallmeyer & Livingston, Michigan
Paul Rundle, Small Business Association of Michigan
Rashan Sanchez, San Francisco Department of Social Services
Scott Schapiro, The Frick Company, New York
Anthony Serrano, GC Services, California
Isaac Shapiro, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, DC
Emmett Sheppard, Texas AFL-CIO
Bob Shiprack, Oregon State Representative
Charlotte Sibley, Farmworker Legal Services of New York
Gary Sorenson, Minnesota Department of Employment Security
Peter Sorenson, Oregon State Senate
Richard Stifter, General Motors Corporation, Michigan
Vernon Stoner, State of Washington Employment Security Department
Richard Studley, Michigan Chamber of Commerce
Keith Talbot, Camden Regional Legal Services, New Jersey
Steve Tegger, Oregon Workforce Quality Council
Gail Thayer, Maine Department of Labor
Liston Thomasson, Mississippi Employment Security Commission
David Tilton, Oregon Legal Services
Allan Toubman, Maine Department of Labor
Dale Tuvey, United Claims Management, Washington
Donald Vial, California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy
Judy Villa, BankAmerica Corporation, California
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Don Villerejo, California Institute for Rural Studies
Richard Virgili, California
Eloise Vitelli, Maine Displaced Homemakers Program
Wayne Vroman, The Urban Institute, Washington, DC
John Watt, Oregon State Representative
Patricia Webber, Maine
Joseph Weisenburger, New Hampshire Department of Employment Security
Libby Whitley, American Farm Bureau Federation, Washington, DC
Jonathan Wilderman, Wilderman and Linnett, Colorado
Christine Worthington, Texas
Mary Ann Wyrsch, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC
Stephen Yelenosky, Legal Aid Society of Central Texas
Rick Zimmerman, New York Farm Bureau
David Zurvalec, Michigan Manufacturers Association
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